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Abstract 
This thesis presents the theme of social interaction and risk taking. There is a growing interest in 
incorporating the influence of social interaction in the economic modelling of human choices. 
Although the current economic literature is awash with the topic of social interaction a 
disproportionate bias is towards theoretical as opposed to empirical work. Of the existing 
empirical literature, a small proportion deals with sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries as case 
studies. This is quite surprising given that the cultural characteristic of close-knit social kinship 
and ties in this region makes it more likely that human choices will be influenced by social 
interaction. Further to this the existing empirical literature is abounds with criticism regarding the 
lack of sound methods to curb identification problems which include the effects of 
unobservables, selection bias, simultaneity and the related reflection problem. 
Against this backdrop the thesis makes an empirical investigation into the role of social 
interaction on risk taking behaviour. The thesis consists of three self-contained papers, each with 
the aim of unearthing the influence of social interaction on risk taking. Two types of risky 
behaviours apparent in SSA are investigated. The first is risky sexual behaviour associated with 
the HIV infection. This risk is covered in two papers that constitute chapters 2 and 3. The 
second type of risky behaviour relates to crimes of social behaviour, specifically contact crimes and 
contact related crimes, and this is covered in one paper which forms chapter 4. 
The thesis uses three main data sources. The first is the Cape Town Panel Survey (CAPS) dataset 
which concentrates on young adults living in the Cape Town Metropolitan area of South Africa. 
The second dataset is the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) which includes adults from 
developing countries. Six DHS datasets, covering Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from the Eastern 
African region and the datasets on Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland in the Southern African 
region are used. The final data source is Cape Town crime data which consists of crime statistics 
from the South African police service covering the Cape Town Metropolitan area. 
The first paper titled “The Effects of Social norms and Social Pressure on Multiple Partnerships” 
investigates the influence of social norms and social pressure in influencing multiple partnerships. 
This paper is motivated by the persistence of multiple partnerships in SSA, a pivotal ingredient 
of heterosexual transmission of HIV in SSA. Furthermore recent qualitative research suggests 
that the aforementioned factors are responsible for the persistence in multiple partnerships. To 
the best of our knowledge this is the first study to measure this relationship. The main challenge 
with our estimation model is the existence of the identification problem which includes selection 
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different estimation strategies are applied to CAPS, using both cross sectional and panel 
methods. In these different estimation strategies similar results were obtained: social norms and 
social pressures that occur as a result of social interaction are indeed pivotal in influencing multiple 
partnerships. 
The second paper titled ‘Know your Epidemic’: The Effects of Expected Health and Contextual Health 
Uncertainty on Risky Sex, examines the effects of expected income, expected health and the contextual 
effects of health uncertainty on risky sexual behaviour using a selection of DHS data. The 
motivation for the second paper is UNAIDS’s “know your epidemic, know your response” campaign 
calling for countries to identify and understand the underlying contextual factors driving their 
local HIV/AIDS epidemic. The study is closely aligned to empirical studies of Oster (2009, 2012) 
and Bezabih et al., (2010). The novel feature of this study lies in the application of an alternative 
estimation strategy to existing studies to overcome the identification problem arising from 
selection bias, unobservables and simultaneity. The results from the selected DHS surveys 
generally reveal a significant negative relationship between expected health and risky sex and a 
significant positive relationship between health uncertainty and risky sex, supporting Mannberg’s 
(2010) theoretical framework. 
An equally important risky behaviour is violent criminal behaviour, especially in South Africa. 
Extending the theme of contextual effects, the CAPS dataset and the crime data are used to 
investigate how community social disorganisation, family disruption, residential instability, community 
disadvantage, lack of basic services and unemployment, can induce individuals in Cape Town 
Metropolitan area of South Africa to resort to crimes of social behaviour. This is the background of 
the third and final paper titled ‘The Role of Community Social Disorganisation in Contact Crime and 
Contact Related Crime’. The motivation of this paper is the fact that crimes especially contact crimes 
continues unabated in South Africa. In addition South Africa has complex and unique socially 
disorganised communities, an aftermath of the apartheid past and the current high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence. In this study the community is the unit of analysis. In order to establish the 
relationship the study needed to first circumvent four estimation challenges namely, excessive 
collinearity among the regressors, measurement error as a result of reporting bias, omitted 
variable bias, and the influence of community unobservables. In general the results reveal that the 
social factors are positive and significant in predicting both contact and contact related crime, but 
more so among the majority Black communities. 
Keywords: Social interaction, Contextual factors, Risk Taking, HIV/AIDS, Sexual behaviour, 
Social norms, Social Pressure, Multiple partnerships, Health Uncertainty, Community social 
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Chapter 1 
Background, Introduction and Motivation to 
Research Problem 
 
“Economists have long been ambivalent about what social interactions constitute proper domain of the 
discipline. The narrower view has been that economics is primarily the study of markets, a circumscribed class of 
institutions in which persons interact through anonymous process of pricing. The broader view has been that 
economics is defined by its concern with allocation of resources and its emphasis on idea that people respond to 
incentives. In this view, economists may properly study how incentives shape all social interactions that affect the 
allocations of resources (Manski, 2000: p. 115). “Within economics, the study of social interactions has 
expanded the domain of inquiry to incorporate many ideas that are traditionally associated with sociology. 
Social interactions analysis also extends the methodological individualism of economics in new directions through 
its focus on the feedback between individual behaviours and aggregate outcomes (Durlauf et al., 2010: p. 452). 
 
1.1 Introduction to Research Problem 
The human behavioural consequence of social interactions1 has long been central to sociological, 
psychological and anthropological literature (Manski 1993; Bernheim 1994; Brocks and Durlauf 
2004; Fletcher 2006; Lindbeck and Persson 2009). The argument put forth is that human 
behaviour is complex and multifaceted, hence to understand human behavioural outcomes it 
becomes paramount to go over and beyond atomistic research approaches2 (UNAIDS3 1999; 
Macintyre et al. 2002; Grodner and Kniesner 2006; Durlauf et al. 2010). 
Despite mounting evidence that support this hypothesis most economic research on human 
behaviour has in the past been methodologically individualistic4. This is usually based on the 
assumption that we as individuals act rationally as isolated agents (Morgan and Niraula 1995; 
Logan et al. 2002; Coates et al. 2008; Benefo 2010; Durlauf et al. 2010), a basic foundation of 
microeconomics. As noted by Duesenberry (1960) and famously cited: ‘economics is all about 
how people make decisions, sociology is about how they have no decisions to make’ 
(Duesenberry, 1960 cited in Morgan and Niraula, 1995 p. 542). Only relatively recent and some 
                                                 
1 Empirical research on social interactions can be grouped into three hypotheses, endogenous interactions/simultaneity 
where an individual’s behaviour varies with the behaviour of the group, contextual/exogenous interactions where an 
individual’s behaviour varies with the exogenous characterises of the group members, and lastly correlated effects 
where individuals in a given group behave the same as a result of the similar environment (Manski 1993). The 
endogenous and exogenous interaction captures social influence, whereas the correlated effects explain a non-
social interaction (Manski 2000; Moffit 2001). 
2 Research dating back to as early as the twentieth century has consistently demonstrated this argument. For 
example, Goldberger in 1916 found the risk of pellagra to be associated with the availability of fruits and 
vegetables in the village, independent of individual incomes, illustrating a link between individual and village level 
factors. Another example is in infectious diseases, where it is hypothesised that the risk of contracting an 
infectious disease is dependent on not only an individuals’ immune system but on the community of residence 
(Diez-Roux 1998; Macintyre et al. 2002).   
3 United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS). 
4 …theories guiding most interventions are essentially cognitive and individualistic, and assume people have 
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would say reluctantly, has the influence of social interaction on human behaviour gained an 
exponential interest in economic research. However, much attention has been devoted to 
theoretical research, while empirical research still falls behind5.  
The theme of this thesis therefore involves filling the current literature gap by making an 
empirical investigation into the role of social interaction on risk taking. In doing so, three areas 
which are underexplored in economic literature are investigated, while taking into consideration 
the identification problem that plagues models of social interactions. The first area explores the 
role of social norms in multiple partnerships, to assess whether they could explain the persistence 
of multiple partnerships in sub-Saharan Africa. As suggested by among others Gausset (2001); 
Takyi (2003); Akwara et al. (2003); Airhihenbuwa and Webster (2004); Lamptey et al. (2006); 
Wellings et al. (2006); UNAIDS (2007); UNAIDS (2008); Wilson and Halperin (2008); WHO6 
(2008); and Mah and Halperin (2010a).  
The second area relates to the role of contextual factors in driving sexual behaviours associated 
with the risk of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, as argued by current literature, see for 
example Adimora and Schoenbach (2005); Peterman et al. (2005); Wellings et al. (2006); Gillespie 
et al. (2007); Wilson and Halperin (2008); Gabrysch et al. (2008); Nattrass (2009); Mah and 
Halperin (2010a); and Mannberg (2010). The third area looks at the role of community social 
disorganisation in influencing crimes of social behaviour. The focus here is whether community 
social disorganisation matter for crimes of social behaviour in South Africa as stated by current 
literature, see Emmett (2003); Ward (2007); SAIRR7 (2010); and Daniels and Adams (2010). 
1.2 Research Objective, Hypothesis and Contribution 
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers, with each of the papers consisting of a 
research problem and an objective that falls within the overall theme of the thesis. 
The first objective looks at the influence of social norms and social pressure on multiple partnerships. 
The hypothesis is that these will have a positive effect on the number of sexual partners, as a 
result of the endogenous social interaction. The main contribution of this chapter lays in the 
novel quantitative investigation into the relationship between social norms, social pressure and 
multiple partnerships. To the best of our knowledge this is the first such study to make such an 
empirical investigation.  
                                                 
5 The dominant reason behind this trend is the difficulty in econometric modelling as a result of the 
identification problem inherent in models of social interactions (Brocks and Durlauf 2004; Fletcher 2006; 
Grodner and Kniesner 2006; Lindbeck and Persson 2009; Durlauf et al. 2010). 
6 World Health Organisation (WHO). 
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The second objective looks at the role of expected income, expected health and the contextual effect of 
health uncertainty on risky sex. The hypothesis here is that expected health will have a negative effect 
on risky sex while health uncertainty will have a positive effect. The novel feature of this study and 
the departure from current empirical studies lays in the application of an alternative estimation 
strategy to overcome the identification problem arising from selection bias, unobservables and 
simultaneity in the empirical model. In addition we also use new datasets (selected Demographic 
and Health Survey) in the empirical investigation. 
The third objective looks at the influence of social disorganisation, specifically, family disruption, 
residential instability, community disadvantage, lack of basic services and unemployment on contact crime and 
contact related crime. In this objective the hypothesis is that communities that are socially 
disorganised are more likely to be dominated by these crimes. This study differs from current 
studies in that measurement errors, omitted variable bias and unobservables are control in the 
empirical model. In addition new datasets (Cape Area Panel Study and South African Police 
Service crime data) and a new study area (Metropolitan Cape Town area of South Africa) are 
used. 
1.3 Area of Study and Sources of Data 
As earlier indicated the thesis is based on an empirical investigation. Three data sources are 
utilised to aid this investigation: The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), the Cape Area 
Panel Study (CAPS) and crime data. DHS8 are cross sectional surveys conducted in developing 
countries with an interval of approximately five years which capture nationally representative 
data. The surveys focus on population, nutrition and health of women and men aged between 15-
49 years. In addition information on household characteristics of respondents is also gathered. 
The recent surveys contain information on HIV/AIDS including knowledge around the 
epidemic and sexual relationships and for some countries the survey project even undertakes 
HIV testing and includes these results in the data. The thesis uses six DHS datasets, three from 
the Eastern Africa region which includes Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, while the remaining three 
cover selected Southern Africa countries namely Swaziland, Lesotho and Zimbabwe9. 
CAPS10 is a longitudinal study of young adults in the Metropolitan Cape Town area of South 
Africa. CAPS has a total of five waves, the first wave was conducted in 2002, while the most 
recent wave occurred in 2006. The survey captures information on young adults who were aged 
                                                 
8 http://www.measuredhs.com 
9 We utilise the 2004 Tanzanian DHS, the 2003 Kenyan survey, from Uganda we employ the 2006 DHS, the 
2006 survey of Swaziland is utilised, from Lesotho we use the 2004 DHS, and in Zimbabwe we utilise the 2005 
DHS. The selection of the countries in each of the region is based on the availability of the variables we use. 
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between 14-22 years in 2002 and follow up information gathered on these young adults since 
then. The CAPS datasets captures information on schooling, work, health and sexual matters of 
the young adults. The survey also includes information on young adults’ household composition, 
with the most recent waves capturing information on the young adults’ parents and community.  
The crime dataset contains crime statistics from the South African Police Service (SAPS) 
collected at community level in the Metropolitan Cape Town area of South Africa between 
2001/2002 and 2005/2006. The dataset records 33 types of crime, which can be grouped into the 
five main SAPS categories which are contact crimes, contact related crimes, property related crimes, crimes 
detected by police and other serious crimes. By utilising the different data sources both cross sectional 
and panel data methods of analysis are possible. In addition this approach permits us to observe 
the findings of the research while taking into consideration variation in geographic and 
demographic composition within and between data sources. 
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis and Expected Papers 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The current chapter began with an introduction and details 
of the main research areas of the thesis. The next three chapters consist of the three self-
contained papers dealing with the aforementioned objectives and falling into the overall theme of 
the thesis. The last chapter provides a conclusion. Specifically, chapter 2 begins with the first 
objective and first paper, which is based on a quantitative investigation of the role of social norms 
and social pressure in influencing multiple sexual partnerships using both cross sectional and panel data 
methods on Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) datasets. The chapter outlines the background, 
motivation, theoretical and empirical framework of the paper. Additionally, because each chapter 
constitutes a stand-alone paper, the chapter also includes a list of references applicable to the 
paper. Chapter 3 introduces the second paper answering the second research question. The 
chapter highlights the motivation for the study and the research methods used to investigate the 
relationship between expected income, expected health and the contextual effects of health uncertainty on 
risky sex using cross sectional methods and this is because the data (Demographic Household 
Survey - DHS dataset) does not permit us to make a panel data analysis.. The third paper is 
presented in chapter 4 where the role of community social disorganisation in influencing contact 
crimes and contact related crimes is explored, thus answering the third and final research question. 
Finally, similar to chapter 2, this paper uses panel data methods on CAPS datasets. The last 
chapter, chapter 5, synthesises the thesis findings from the three self-contained papers and 
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Even though antiretroviral treatment is becoming more efficient and available to susceptible 
populations, new HIV infections and HIV/AIDS related death still occur. This is particularly the 
case in sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore problematic that sexual risk taking, in terms of multiple 
sex partners persist in spite of increasing levels of HIV awareness and knowledge. Sexual 
transmission of HIV is still the main mode of transmission in sub-Saharan Africa, and multiple sex 
partners have been shown to be especially important for the spread of the disease. Although a 
substantial body of research highlights the importance of social norms and social pressure in terms of 
influencing the number of sexual partners, to our knowledge no one has conducted a quantitative 
analysis of the relationship. In this vein, this study examines the role of social norms and social pressure 
on multiple partnerships. We derive a simple theoretical model of sexual behaviour in the presence of 
HIV/AIDS to derive testable hypotheses, and test these on the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) data. 
In order to deal with identification problems such as unobservables, selection bias and the reflection 
problem in our empirical analysis, we employ an instrumental variable approach with both cross-
sectional and panel data methods on the linear-in-means and non-linear in means model. Overall 
our results show that social norms, proxied by the average number of sex partners in the social 
reference group, have a positive and significant influence on the individuals’ choice of number of 
sex partners, and that this effect is stronger, the stronger is the social pressure. 





























“I will take a lot of pressure from the boys. They will tease and make funny jokes and tell me that having one 
girlfriend is the same as having no one at all.” “Other people will think that you do not have a game (if not having 
multiple girlfriends). You do not know how to treat the girls” (Ragnarsson et al., 2010, p. 3). “There are those who 
discourage you when you have one girlfriend, because they say if one leaves you; you will be ‘uzakusokola esisihumane’ 
(struggling bachelor), you will struggle since you do not have a girlfriend; such names” (Selikow et al. 2009, p.109). 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent qualitative research suggests that social norms and the related social pressure are responsible for 
the persistence in multiple partnerships11 in sub-Saharan Africa, for example Ragnarsson et al. 
(2009); Selikow et al. (2009) and Ragnarsson et al. (2010). The current consensus is that multiple 
partnerships is the main sexual behaviour driving heterosexual transmission of HIV in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Horton et al. 2008; Wilson and Halperin 2008; WHO 2008, UNAIDS 2009; Mah and 
Halperin 2010a). This implies that social norms and social pressure that support and maintain multiple 
partnerships greatly hinder the achievement of the ‘Zero new infection’ vision promoted by UNAIDS12. 
As such it becomes worthwhile to undertake an empirical investigation into the effects of social 
norms and pressure on the practice of multiple partnerships.  
In the current study the empirical investigation is based on a simplified theoretical framework of 
Mannberg and Sjögren (2010). In our estimation model multiple partnerships13 is our outcome variable. 
Our main regressors are the social norm and social pressure. To capture the former the mean number of 
sex partners within the social group14 is used as a proxy following the current literature, while the 
absolute deviation from the mean is used as a proxy for social pressure. The main challenge with our 
estimation model is the existence of the identification problem usually present in models of social 
interactions (Manski 1993; Blume et al. 2010). These include the effects of selection bias, 
unobservables, simultaneity and the related reflection problem caused by the social interaction 
regressors (Manski 1993; Blume et al. 2010; Giorgi et al. 2010). To avoid the identification problem 
alternative estimation strategies are employed following the work of Manski (1993, 2000, 2003); 
                                                 
11 Although multiple sexual partners appears to be a dominant trend among men in SSA in general (Wellings et al. 
2006; Selikow et al. 2009; Ragnarsson et al. 2010), this trend is however gaining popularity among  women (Selikow et 
al. 2009; Mah 2010b).  
12 It is increasingly recognised that for the UNAIDS vision ‘Zero New HIV Infection’ to be realised there needs to be a 
revolution in sexual behaviour (UNAIDS 2011). In the case of SSA this implies a decrease in multiple partnerships, 
since it is the dominant sexual behaviour associated with the risk of HIV/AIDS. 
13 This is defined as the number of sex partners in the last 12 months. Because this information does not allow us to 
distinguish concurrent partnership from serial partnership, we refer to this as multiple partnerships. 
14 Our social groups comprise of individuals with the same age, race, gender and income. We do not included 
physical geography so as to avoid geography related unobservables. In addition, the increases in residential mobility 
and technological advancement in communication have to some extent weakened the importance of physical 
geography in social interaction. For this literature refer to the works of Subrahmanyann et al. (2008); Wellman et al. 


















Moffit (2001); Grodner and Kniesner (2005); Brock and Durlauf (2004); Durlauf and Ioannides 
(2006); Munshi and Myaux (2006); Etile (2007); Blume et al. (2010) and Giorgi et al. (2010). These 
estimation strategies include using cross-sectional and panel data methods, different model 
specifications (linear-in-means and non-linear-in-means models) and a menu of instrumental variables. 
The first instrument is the trend setter of the norms IV, the second is the adjacent social group age bracket 
IV and the last instrument is the conventional instruments based on one year lag and two year lag 
instruments.  
These different estimation strategies are applied to the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) datasets 
consisting of young adults and within different populations (a sexually active population and a sexually 
inactive population). Falsification tests following Lavy and Schlosser (2007) were performed to test our 
social group composition. In addition, after providing a background to the validity of our 
instruments the Anderson canon correlation statistics of underidentification and Sargan-Hansen and 
Amemiya-Lee Newey statistics test of overidentification are employed. These different estimation 
strategies showed similar results: social norms and social pressures that occur as a result of social 
interaction are indeed pivotal in influencing multiple partnerships. 
2.2 Contribution and Organisation of the Study 
In support of the qualitative literature, a substantial body of literature has highlighted the 
importance of social norms in influencing sexual behaviour in sub-Saharan Africa15. For example 
see Gausset (2001); Takyi (2003); Akwara et al. (2003); Airhihenbuwa and Webster (2004); Latkin et 
al. (2005); Lamptey et al. (2006); Wellings et al. (2006); Wilson and Halperin (2008); WHO (2008); 
UNAIDS (2008) and Mah and Halperin (2010a). Yet, despite this strong consensus, our literature 
review did not identify any quantitative study that has investigated this relationship. This study 
therefore addresses the current literature gap, by seeking to determine whether the aforementioned 
factors can help explain multiple partnerships in SSA. Therefore the main contribution of this study is 
in its novel quantitative investigation of the relationship between social norms, social pressure and 
multiple partnerships. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study of its kind. Secondly, we 
make a methodological contribution to the empirical analysis of social interaction, especially given 
that social interaction16 models in general lack consensus on how to best examine interdependence 
                                                 
15 Researchers agree that African AIDS is sustained through a complex interaction of social and cultural processes 
(Takyi 2003: p. 1223). …in SSA, sexual activity appears to be driven by socio-cultural beliefs and practices…the 
ability of individuals to sustain safer sexual behaviours may largely depend upon societal sexual norms and practices 
(Akwara et al. 2003: p. 386). Culture plays a vital role …particularly in Africa, where values of extended family and 
community significantly influence individual behaviour (Airhihenbuwa and Webster 2004: p. 4). 
16 Empirical research on social interactions can be grouped into three hypotheses, endogenous interactions/simultaneity 
where an individual’s behaviour varies with the behaviour of the group, contextual/exogenous interactions where an 
individual’s behaviour varies with the exogenous characterises of the group members, and lastly correlated effects where 
individuals in a given group behave the same as a result of the similar environment (Manski 1993). The endogenous 
and exogenous interaction captures social influence, whereas the correlated effects explain a non-social interaction 















between individuals given the existing identification problem (Manski 2000; Moffit 2001; Grodner 
and Kniesner 2006). Hence current empirical studies are often criticised for the lack of sound 
econometric methods17.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The subsequent section highlights the 
relationship between multiple partnership and HIV/AIDS infections. Section 2.4 provides a brief 
literature review on social norms and social pressure. After that, section 2.5 outlines the theoretical 
model that guides our econometric modelling. Section 2.6 begins by defining our outcome variable 
and the main regressors. Thereafter the empirical model and our estimation strategy to overcome 
the identification challenge are described. This is followed by detailing the estimation results in 
section 2.7. Finally, section 2.8 offers the concluding remarks. 
2.3 A Synopsis of HIV/AIDS and Multiple Partnership 
While it is a given that the HIV/AIDS epidemic remains a worldwide emergency, the epidemic has 
been evolving differently in different regions of the world (UNAIDS 2009). In sub-Saharan Africa 
heterosexual sex has become the main mode of HIV transmission (Dunkle et al. 2008; Wilson and 
Halperin 2008; Horton and Pam 2008; UNAIDS 2009, 2010a; Lurie and Rosenthal 2010a). One of 
the main arguments for this evolution besides medical advancement is the persistent lack of change 
in sexual behaviour18 (Akwara et al., 2003; Wellings et al., 2006; Kongnyuy and Wiysonge 2007; 
Morris 2010). Recent HIV/AIDS statistics show that 80% of new infections occurred through 
sexual intercourse (UNAIDS 2010a).  
As such there is general consensus on the fundamental role played by sexual behaviour in driving 
this heterosexual transmission (UNAIDS 2007, 2009; Horton and Pam 2008; Wilson and Halperin 
2008; WHO 2008; Reniers and Watkins 2009; Mah and Halperin 2010a). There is however an on-
going debate regarding the role played by multiple concurrent partnerships in HIV transmission, 
which has most notably been captured in the articles of Mah and Halperin (2010a, 2010c); Lurie and 
Rosenthal (2010a, 2010b); Morris (2010) and Epstein (2010). This debate centres on the perceived 
lack of sufficient evidence to support the role of concurrency in HIV transmission. Nevertheless, 
the current research is motivated by the role played by social norms and the associated social pressure in 
influencing multiple partnerships. Furthermore, the pivotal role of sexual behaviour in driving HIV has 
been highlighted by the UNAIDS (2007): 
A quarter of a century of global experience has produced some promising 
innovations….Despite advances in prevention, treatment, care and support…., 
fundamental role of behaviour in spread of HIV is increasingly clear. Remarkable regional 
differences in intensity and scope of pandemic serve as powerful reminders that social and 
                                                 
17 See Manski (1993, 2000); Moffit (2001); and Grodner and Kniesner (2006) for some of the critiques.  
18 Sexual behaviour is probably responsible for much of differences in heterosexual epidemics among countries as 















cultural factors ultimately shape the impact of HIV….Although we continue to place great 
hope in opportunities to employ male circumcision, microbicides, vaccines and other 
approaches, we recognise that failure to sustain a focus on behaviour change threatens to 
undermine benefits of such advances. Unfortunately, fostering behaviour change is not an 
easy task. It demands a persistent commitment to meeting the diverse and changing needs 
of individuals, and to addressing the characteristics of their social, cultural and physical 
environments. It is a collaborative process and an urgent imperative (UNAIDS 2007: p. i). 
 
Figure 2.1 uses CAPS (wave 1 (2002), wave 3 (2005) and wave 4 (2006)) and Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) data to plot the trend in multiple partnerships in the selected countries, where the 
top panel is based on the male population while the bottom graph represents data on women. The 
CAPS dataset consists of data on young adults residing in the Metropolitan area of Cape Town. In 
order to make comparison between these datasets plausible comparisons with DHS data is limited 
to young adults residing in urban areas. This is represented by the un-shaded region in both graphs, 
where on average men have more than one sex partner at a time, while women have on average one 
sex partner19.  
Figure 2.1: Number of Sex partners in the last 12 months by Gender and Country20
 
                                                 
19 When we dig deeper we find that multiple partnerships is more prevalent among the population with the 
following relationship status: have a partners but not living together with their partner, and some evidence among the 
divorced, have a partners but living together and never married, and less prevalent among the married population in the DHS 
datasets. 
20 KEN represents Kenya, LES is Lesotho, SWA is Swaziland, UG is Uganda, ZIM is Zimbabwe, SA 2002 is based 







































































2.4 The Social Norm and Social Pressure Nexus 
As earlier mentioned, the recent qualitative research of Ragnarsson et al. (2009); Selikow et al. (2009) 
and Ragnarsson et al. (2010) suggests that social norms and the related social pressure are responsible for 
the persistence in multiple partnerships. A pivotal contribution in these studies is the ‘real man’ identity 
arising from the influence of social groups. Specifically, a ‘real man’ is viewed as one who has several 
sexual partners, including one official partner, secondary partners and casual weekend partners. This 
behaviour is known and supported by the social group, and if a man deviates from this norm he is 
emasculated and seen as a ‘lesser man’ and even faces being ostracised from the social group. This 
highlights the powerful and indeed disturbing influence of social norms and social pressure in supporting 
and maintaining multiple partnerships.   
The literature on norms can be traced back to the social psychological disciplines of social 
interaction and human behaviour as early as 1900s (Cialdini and Trost 1998). At its core the social 
psychological literature offers the following description of a norm: 
A construct that has widespread usage because it helps describe and explain human 
behaviour… Norms have been conceptualised in a variety of ways. Summer (1906) wrote 
of ‘folkways’ -habitual customs exhibited by a group because they were originally expedient 
in meeting basic needs. Sherrif (1936) described norms as jointly negotiated rules for social 
behaviour, the ‘customs, traditions, standards, rules, values, fashions, and all other criteria 
of conduct which are standardised as a consequence of the contact of individuals (Cialdini 
and Trost 1998: p. 152). 
Social psychologists believe that social norms constitute the main source of social influence, and it is 
social interaction that causes people to conform to set norms (Cialdini and Trost 1998). 
Interestingly conformity is likely to occur even if the set social norms clash with personal norms, 
contradicting the expected rational behaviour of individuals. The main reason for this irrational 
behaviour is the fear of sanction resulting from non-conformity (Fisher 1988; Bernheim 1994; 
Akerlof 1997; Cialdini and Trost 1998; Munshi and Myaux 2006; Fletschner and Carter 2008; Blume 
et al. 2010). That is, individuals respond to social pressure to conform to social norms that will allow 
them to avoid sanction. It is this social pressure that will lead an individual to revise his/her behaviour 
in line with the prevailing social norm and adopt seemingly irrational behaviour. For example Cialdini 
and Trost (1998) and Bernheim (1994) state that: 
Thus we conform to others when perceived or real pressure from them causes us to act 
differently from how we would act if alone (Cialdini and Trost 1998: p. 152). 
Most social scientists agree that individual behaviour is motivated in large part by social 
factors such as the desire for prestige, esteem, popularity, or acceptance. A large body of 
sociology, psychological, and anthropological research supports the view that these factors 
are widespread and that they tend to produce conformism, social groups often penalise 















The qualitative literature on multiple partnerships and social pressure that inspired this study also points 
to the need for conformity as a result of fear of sanctions (Selikow et al. 2009; Ragnarsson et al. 2009; 
Ragnarsson et al. 2010). For instance Ragnarsson et al. (2010) in highlighting the role of social 
pressure makes the following conclusion:  
Within peer groups, the pressure to live up to set norms further reinforced the meaning 
and status of the player. If a man adopted an alternative form of masculine ideal, he would 
risk being emasculated and thought not to have what it takes to be a real man according to 
prevalent norms in this specific context and group of men… Strong social pressure within 
male core groups to pursue and maintain these concurrent sexual relationships and 
temporary sexual encounters existed and helped legitimise specific behaviours that the 
player represented (Ragnarsson et al. 2010: p. 4). 
To date a rapidly growing body of economic literature has used social norms to analyse various aspects 
of human behaviour, although the literature is skewed in favour of theory over empirical 
application. Some examples of economic disciplines that have analysed the effects of social norms 
include labour economics (Moffit 2001; Vendrik 2001; Grodner and Kniesner 2005; Akerlof and 
Kranton 2005; Grodner and Kniesner 2006; Mannberg and Sjögren 2010), psychology (Bamberg 
and Moser 2007), education (Giorgi et al. 2010), environment (Elster 1989), juvenile behaviour 
(Evans et al. 1992; Gaviria and Raphael 2001; Lundborg 2006; Fletcher 2009), entrepreneurship 
(Meek et al. 2009), and health (Etile 2007; Manski 2000; Munshi and Myaux 2006; Trogdon et al. 
2008).   
Related to the current study Fisher (1988) gives a literature review on how social norms affect risky 
sexual behaviour. The author makes reference to interviews that were conducted among 
heterosexual college students about sexual intercourse and condom use. These interviews revealed 
that students feared rejection (sanctions) that would result from non-conformity to group 
expectations. This fear meant it was easier for the students to have unprotected intercourse rather 
than discuss prevention methods. Another example given by the author is in culturally driven 
minority groups, where it is difficult for partners to negotiate safe sexual intercourse since the 
norms governing these minority groups determine this as inappropriate, and deviating from such 
norms could lead to sanctions.  
As previously indicated, while our study is novel in its quantitative modelling of the effects of social 
norms and social pressure on multiple partnerships, the research question is not a new phenomenon. A 
large body of qualitative research has found social norms and social pressure to be in conflict with and 
undermine HIV/AIDS prevention methods (see for instance Latkin (2005), Ragnarsson et al. (2009), 
Selikow et al. (2009) and Ragnarsson et al. (2010). In addition, a recent quantitative study by Mah 
(2010b) suggested that social norms could be driving the variations in multiple concurrent 
partnerships in Cape Town (South Africa) and called for probing of this area. Further to this there is 















norms guiding sexual behaviour (Gausset 2001; Takyi 2003; Akwara et al. 2003; Airhihenbuwa and 
Webster 2004; Lamptey et al. 2006; Wellings et al. 2006; UNAIDS 2007, 2008; Wilson and Halperin 
2008; WHO 2008; Mah and Halperin 2010a), providing the motivation for exploring this 
phenomenon in this study. 
2.5 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework presented in this section guides our empirical analysis by outlining a 
theory that highlights the underlying social interaction channels that influence multiple partnerships. 
The framework is loosely based on a theoretical model developed by Mannberg and Sjögren 
(2010)21. Mannberg and Sjögren (2010), extends previous theoretical work by Vendrik (2003) and 
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) in terms of including both social norms, and social pressure into a 
dynamic model for behavioural choice and investments in identity, and show that, if the social 
pressure is strong, social norms that are in conflict with personal preferences may both give rise to 
conformity and to a change in preferences. The theoretical model developed in the current study is a 
much simpler representation of behaviour. However, in spite of the admittedly simple framework, it 
allows us to derive testable hypotheses on how social norms and the strength of these norms (social 
pressure) affect behaviour in terms of the choice to have many sexual partners. The choice to 
engage in sexual activity is naturally not the same as decisions related to consuming other risky 
goods such as cigarettes or alcohol. First and foremost, it does take two to tango, and sexual 
activities are therefore perhaps best represented in a bargaining model. However, we will assume 
that the individual can choose sex freely. This assumption will allow us to derive analytically 
tractable results and is perhaps motivated by the fact that men in sub-Saharan Africa still hold the 
power to choose when it comes to sex. Secondly, sexual decisions are in general made in the heat of 
the moment, and thus often plagued by myopia. However, using a hyperbolic utility function would 
not change our results significantly.22 We therefore treat the individual as having time consistent 
time preferences. 
Let us start by assuming that all individuals belong to a predetermined, and thus exogenously given, 
social group (g). To simplify the analysis, the individual is assumed to only derive utility from sexual 
activity, health and from a feeling of “belonging” to the social group, where the last component is 
assumed to depend on the individual’s sexual behaviour. Hence, the individual is assumed to 
                                                 
21 This is the only theory that our literature review identified that addresses social pressure and social norms. Other 
theories looked only at social norms, hence making this theory most compatible with our study.The theory founded 
by Mannberg and Sjögren (2010) was originally developed for labour economics to explain the increase in female 
labour supply. The intuitive reasoning for the increase in female labour supply is changes in gender norms. The 
theory is founded on psychological literature that emphasises the importance of personal identities and social 
interaction in human behaviour. 
22 If the individual has hyperbolic time preferences and the social cost/benefit of sexual consumption occurs in the 
future while the private benefit occurs in the present, a naive individual will conform relatively less to the socially 















maximize utility in terms of choosing the optimal number of sexual partners (y)  We assume that 
there is an offer on sex in a pool of exogenous supply of attractive and willing sexual partners. In 
this pool of available sexual partners each individual chooses the number of sex partners23. For 
simplicity, we also assume that nothing else contributes to an individuals’ utility24. The utility 
function is assumed to be additively separable and made up of both a private utility and a social 
utility component. The former is referred to as the private utility as it captures only individual 
choices, while the latter comprises of the influence from choices of members in the social group 
through social interaction. Private utility is represented by a standard utility function:  
    ( )     ( )                                                                                                          (2.1) 
where,   
 ( )      
  ( )   ,   
 ( )    and   
  ( )   . In other words, we assume that the number 
of sex partners increases utility in time period 1 but reduces it in time period 2 in terms a reduction 
in health.25  Hence, the individual maximizes utility by equating the marginal utility of sexual 
consumption in time period 1,   
 ( ), to the discounted marginal health cost in time period 2, 
   
 ( ).  
The social utility component captures the utility derived from interacting with other members in the 
social group. Recall that social norms are rules governing social behaviour within a group as a 
consequence of social interaction. Through this social interaction the individual’s decision is 
affected by the prevailing social norms in the social group. In this model the social norm is captured 
by the average number of sex partners in the group denoted by  ̅ . Conformity to social norms is 
driven by either the fear of social sanctions for non-compliance, or by the desire to belong to the 
social group. In both cases, the perceived behavioural heterogeneity for a given activity in the social 
group will affect the degree of social pressure that the individual experiences to comply with the 
norm. A functional form that captures both the presence of a social norm and the degree of social 




  (    ̅  )                                                                                                                             (2.2) 
where    is a measure of the spread of the distribution of sexual behaviour in the social group and 
where  (    ̅ )    is the social sanction function. It is assumed that    
 (    ̅ )    if     ̅ , 
while  ( )     
 (    ̅ )    if     ̅ . In other words, an increase in the number of sex partners 
                                                 
23 This approach simplifies the analytics by excluding the sexual bargaining process between sex partners, where 
each individual evaluates, anticipates and incorporates their sex partners’ behaviours into their own choice set. See 
Mannberg (2010) and Mannberg (2012).  
24 For example the costs associated with searching for a sex partner, availability of different types of sexual partners 
and preference for type of sexual partners to maintain simplicity. 
25 It should be noted that, to be correct, the reduction in future health is not certain since probability of acquiring a 















reduces the social cost if the individual has less sexual partners than the average in the social group, 
and has no effect if the individual has more sexual partners. In other words, there is no “bliss” or 
cost associated with having “too many” sexual partners. We further assume that       
  (    ̅ )   . 
Hence, the marginal cost of deviating from the social norm increases the farther away from the 
mean the individual is. Finally, we assume that   ̅ 
 (    ̅ )    and     ̅ 
  (    ̅ )    for     ̅ . 
In other words, an increase in the average number of sexual partners in the social group increases 
the cost of having few sexual partners. Concerning the parameter  ̅ , we have that a reduction in the 
heterogeneity (a reduction in the spread) of sexual behaviour within the social group increases the 
cost of diverging from the social norm. 
 
  
 thus measures the social pressure in the social group. 
Combining the private utility and social utility we obtain the total utility function which is depicted 
in equation (2.3). 
     (  )  
 
  
  (    ̅ )     (  )                                                                                   (2.3) 
Equation (2.3) is maximised with respect to    to derive the first order condition which is presented 
in equation (2.4). 
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 (  )                                                                                (2.4) 
In other words, the individual maximizes utility such that the marginal disutility of reduced future 
health is balanced by the direct marginal utility of sexual activity and the avoided social cost arising 
from non-complying behaviour. The question asked in this paper relates to how social norms and 
social pressure affects sexual risk taking. In terms of our simple model, this implies how changes in 
   and  ̅  affect the optimal choice of   . Let us therefore differentiate equation (2.4) with respect to 
  ,   ̅  and    respectively. This gives us,  
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since    
  ( ),   
  ( ),       
  ( ̅     )    by assumption. In other words, an increase in the average 
number of sex partners in the social group increases incentives to have many sexual partners, while 
an increase in the spread of the number of sexual partners (heterogeneity within the group) reduces 















naturally implies that     
 
  
  ⁄   The interaction effect between  ̅  and    is given by equation 
(2.7).  
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Hence, an increase in the social pressure, in terms of a reduced in the spread of sexual partners in 
the social group, increases the marginal benefit of complying with the social norm. Equations (2.5)-
(2.7) constitute the theoretical hypotheses to be tested in the empirical model. It is worth noting that 
the model presented here involves decision making regarding number of sex partners on the 
condition that there is an offer on sex. That is we assume that there is an exogenous supply of 
attractive and willing sexual partners, and given this pool of sexual partners each individual chooses 
the number of sex partners. This approach is based on the modelling ideas of Mannberg (2010) and 
Mannberg (2012) and excludes the sexual bargaining process between sex partners. We do 
acknowledge that sex and sexual relationships in general are more complex. In the literature most 
authors make assumptions and acknowledge that their models are a mere simplification of sexual 
behaviour, for example (Philipson and Posner, 1995; Mannberg, 2010; Oster (2012) and Mannberg 
(2012)26. Similarly, we also acknowledge that our model is clearly a simplification of these sexual 
relationships in so far that we have disregarded the complex bargaining process between sexual 
partners, the search costs of sexual partners, coercion between partners, availability of different 
types of sexual partners and preference for type of sexual partners (see Philipson and Posner 1995; 
Schroeder and Rojas 2002; Mannberg 2012 for some of these discussion). Ideally sexual behaviour, 
which is different from other behaviour such as smoking, as it involves more than one participant, is 
likely to be better presented as a bargaining game between sex partners. For example a game where 
each individual incorporates their sex partners’ or potential sex partners’ various risky sexual 
behaviours such as the possibility of other sex partners into their choice set. However, this falls 
outside the scope of the current paper27. Overall given the aforementioned assumptions and 
                                                 
26 For instance Philipson and Posner (1995) note that, ‘The modelling of human behaviour as a reflection of a 
rational calculus of gains and losses may not provide a complete satisfactory explanation of individuals’ actions or 
even of the aggregate outcomes of such actions. Such modelling however provides valuable insights into the 
understanding of human phenomena, insights often inaccessible to traditional modes of social analysis, sexual 
behaviour is no exception’ (Philipson and Posner 1995: p. 835). 
27
 We do believe that the sexual bargaining process modelled as a theoretical game, and not included in this current 
paper, offer a great area for future research when combined together with social norms and social pressure related 
to number of sex partners. Especially given the presence of asymmetric sexual power, particularly in the sub-
Saharan Africa context, see Christensen (1998); Wojcicki and Malala (2001); Harvey et al. (2002); Pettifor et al 
(2004); Wingood and DiClemente (2000); Jewkes and Morrell (2010); Wechsberg et al. (2010) and Oster (2012). The 
aforementioned literature highlights the lack of sexual power among women irrespective of their social or economic 
position. Most importantly the literature shows that women’s negotiating power is likely to further decrease with 
decreases in economic status or upon increasing economic dependence on men. For instance Pettifor et al. (2004), 
referring to a study of a Xhosa township, note that ‘the study showed pervasive male control over almost every 
aspect of women’s early sexual experiences, enacted in part through violent and coercive sexual practices’ (Pettifor 















simplification of the model, the main contribution of our model is that it describes how social norms 
and the associated social pressure will affect an individuals’ choice of number of sex partners. 
However, we are unsure how the results will change when some of the assumptions are changed, for 
example the introduction of sexual bargaining process and asymmetric power into our model, hence 
our reason for highlighting this as an important area for future research. 
2.6 Empirical Framework 
The section describes our estimation strategy. Firstly a brief description of the data is provided. 
Thereafter, the proxies used to capture our main variables are characterised. The social groups 
which are the source of social interaction are then defined. The section then ends by providing a 
description of our econometric modelling strategy to circumvent the identification problem. 
2.6.1 Area of Study and Sources of Data 
The data utilised is the Cape Area Panel Study28 (CAPS). CAPS is a longitudinal study of young 
adults in Metropolitan Cape Town, South Africa. The datasets capture information on young adults 
schooling, work, health and sexual attitudes and behaviour. There are a total of four waves of CAPS 
data, the first wave was conducted in 2002, while the most recent wave occurred in 200629.  The 
study used wave 1 (2002), wave 3 (2005) and wave 4 (2006). The utilisation of different CAPS 
datasets allows us to employ both cross sectional and panel data methods of analysis. Additionally, 
this permits us to observe the findings in different geographical and demographical settings. Table 
2.A1 in Appendix 2.A shows the characteristics of CAPS dataset.  
2.6.2 Variable Specification 
2.6.2.1 Multiple Partnerships 
Ideally an outcome variable that captures multiple concurrent partnerships in line with the 
qualitative literature is needed. However, the only variable available in all our datasets is number of sex 
partners in the last 12 months. This variable only captures multiple partnerships without distinguishing 
                                                                                                                                                
man may expect to lead and control sexual relations and his woman partner to comply and he may feel entitled to 
have sex with other women, but expect her to remain faithful. There is strong evidence that gender power inequality 
in relationships, which is a cause of intimate partner violence, places women at enhanced risk of HIV infection’ 
(Jewkes and Morell 2010: p. 2). Likewise, Wechsberg et al. (2010) states that ‘the highly unequal sociocultural and 
economic status faced by many South African women places them at a disadvantage in their ability to be sexually 
assertive with regard to practising safer sex, discussing sexual risk, negotiating condom use with primary male 
partners and avoiding sexually coercive situations (Wechsberg et al. 2010: p. 133). 
28  http://www.caps.uct.ac.za or http://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za 















whether this is multiple concurrent partnership or serial partnership30. Hence our outcome variable 
in this study is multiple partnerships. It is worth noting that the literature on sexual behaviour has 
alluded to the fact that men on average have more sex partners than women. See for example 
Wellings et al. (2006) who offers a global view of sexual behaviour including the differences in 
number of sex partners between male and females. Some of the reasons for these discrepancies are 
the influence of sexual relationship between men and commercial sex workers or between men and 
younger girls, what is commonly referred to as ‘sugar daddies’. See Hunter (2002), Kaufman and 
Stavrou (2004), Leclerc-Madlala (2008). Going from the literature to the data, we can easily show 
how it is possible that men have more sex partners than women. The CAPS datasets consist of 
young adults. The average age is between 15 to 26 years and the average age gap between sexual 
partners is between 4 to 5 years. As such it is possible that the males in the datasets are having 
sexual relationships with younger females who are below the cut off age (younger than 15), that is, 
sugar daddy relationships. Ragnarsson et al (2009) and Ragnarsson et al (2010) show that often men 
prefer younger sex partners, additionally Selikow et al (2009) show that sexual relationship do occur 
in young people even as young as 13 years old. Another possibility could be the fact that these men 
are having relationships with individuals above the cut off age (older than 26), that is, sugar 
mummies or even sex workers.    
Nevertheless this variable is not without flaws. Firstly, the variable is likely to experience recall bias, 
given that it is easier for a monogamous individual to remember the number of partners they have 
had in the last 12 months, than for those who are usually in serial or concurrent relationships, hence 
creating a bias towards those who are monogamous. Secondly, there is usually over reporting of 
number of sex partners in males and under reporting in females especially in SSA (Dinkelman et al. 
2007; Wellings et al. 2006), which makes our outcome variable prone to reporting bias. Our strategy to 
overcome this bias is to use an alternative outcome variable in our regression which is a binary 
variable where one represents whether a respondent has more than one partner and zero otherwise. 
A third kind of bias which is seldom addressed in the literature is the age bias brought about by age 
and experience, that is, the older you are the more likely you are to have more sex partners (Bezabih 
et al. 2010). To address these flaws we normalise our dependent variable by dividing the variable 
with age.  
2.6.2.2 Social Norms 
In empirical application social norms are commonly represented as endogenous social interaction 
(Grodner and Kniesner 2006; Fischer and Huddart 2008; Blume et al. 2010), where the average 
occurrence of the behaviour is used as a proxy for social norms (Durlauf and Ioannides 2010). For 
                                                 
30 Concurrent partnerships are sexual relationships with more than one person. This is contrasted with sequential or 
serial partnerships whereby an individual engages in a sexual relationship with only one partner, with no overlap in 















example Etile (2007)’s measure of social norms is the average weight in the reference group. Along 
similar lines Trogdon et al. (2007) uses the average weight of peers as the proxy. Giorgi et al. (2010) 
follows the trend and adopts the average subject chosen by the group, while Munshi and Myaux 
(2006) proxy the norm with the average contraceptive usage in the community. In Gaviria and 
Raphael (2001) and Fletcher (2009)’s work the authors use the average number of students who 
smoke as a proxy, while Lundborg (2006) measured group effects by using the average number of 
students who participated in binge drinking. Following these approaches social norm is defined as the 
average number of sex partners in a social group. 
2.6.2.3 Social Pressure 
While there exists a rich theoretical and empirical literature on social norms, the same cannot be stated 
about social pressure. The current empirical literature covers subjective measures of social pressure. 
Maassen et al. (2004) for example assesses the effect of subjective norms, and subjective social pressure 
on smoking behaviour. Mahonen et al. (2010) looks at the effects of perceived normative pressure 
on adolescent attitudes towards immigrants. While Urizar et al. (2010) measures the effects of socio-
cultural pressure to be thin on eating disorders and Helfert et al. (2011) explores the effects of 
appearance related social pressure on body dissatisfaction in adolescents31. Because our datasets do not 
contain any subjective social pressure, an objective social pressure is an alternative measure. 
Therefore in looking for an objective proxy measure for social pressure social psychological literature 
is utilised since the perspective that social pressure can influence behaviour is a social psychological 
phenomenon32. Given the social psychological perspectives outlined in section 2.4 on the 
relationship between social norms and social pressure, and the fact that the proxy for the social norms is 
the mean behaviour, the deviation from the mean33 is used as a proxy for social pressure.  
2.6.2.4 Social Groups  
First and foremost, it is important to point to the fact that in this paper we create a proxy social 
group using the available information in our dataset. We do this mainly because we do not have any 
information on social group composition in our datasets. In modelling these social groups we refer 
to qualitative research on social norms related to number of sex partners. Secondly and also worth 
noting is the fact that the literature on social interaction is relatively new in the economics field and 
gaining an exponential interest in economic research. However, much attention has been devoted to 
theoretical research, while empirical research still falls behind. The dominant reason behind this 
                                                 
31 A common trend in these studies is that they depict a positive relationship between social pressure and the 
behaviour in question. 
32 We rely on an objective proxy because the current datasets do not contain any subjective measures of social 
pressures. 















trend is the fact that social interaction models are perhaps the most difficult to identify (Brocks et al., 
2001; Fletcher et al., 2006; Grodner et al., 2006; Lindbeck et al., 2009; Durlauf et al., 2010). This is 
further exacerbated by the fact that social interactions models in general lack consensus on how to 
best examine interdependence between individuals (Manski, 1993, 2000; Moffit, 2001; Grodner et 
al., 2006). Hence the current empirical studies are overflowing with critiques regarding lack of sound 
econometric theory (See Manski 1993, 2000; Moffit 2001; Grodner et al 2006 for some of the 
critiques). Currently, some of the most influential literature on the application of social interaction 
literature include the work of Manski (1993, 2000, 2003); Moffit (2001); Grodner et al., (2005); Brock 
et al., (2004); Durlauf et al., (2006) and Blume et al., (2010).   
The social interaction literature states that for the identification of social interaction, social norms and 
social pressure, to be plausible the social groups need to be appropriately defined (Manski 2000; Etile 
2007; Blume et al., 2010). However, the current data, like most data used in the analysis of social 
interaction, is deficit data in that it does not contain any information on the social groups which are 
the source of social norms and social pressure affecting multiple partnership choices. Manski (2000) 
notes that under such circumstance one needs to relay on a prior knowledge on the mechanism that 
constitute social interaction and use this prior knowledge to make assumptions regarding the social 
group composition given the deficit data. Despite this strong consensus, most of the current studies 
on social interaction that use such deficit data lack this prior knowledge. For example De Giorgi et al., 
(2010) note that the definition of groups varies from the most comprehensive groups such as same 
race groups to very restrictive groups such as roommates. This lack of prior knowledge is likely to lead 
to the improper definition of social groups and thereby lack of identification. This is a major source 
of measurement error in studies of social interaction (Manski 1993; Lundborg 2006; De Giorgi et al., 
2010; Fletcher 2010; Durlauf and Ioannides 2010; Blume et al., 2010). To aid in the appropriate 
definition of social groups this study relies on a prior knowledge grounded on the social interaction 
and qualitative literature which motivated the quantitative analysis of the current research problem 
relating multiple partnerships to the existing social norms and social pressure. 
2.6.2.4.1 Prior Knowledge on Social Group Composition 
The prior knowledge concerning our research problem relating social norms and social pressure to multiple 
partnerships is founded in qualitative research. The compelling evidence in these qualitative studies 
suggests that the social groups that influence multiple partnerships are likely to consist of individuals 
with similar socioeconomic attributes. See Hoff et al., (2002); Liljeros et al., (2003); Carter et al., 
(2007); Kohler et al. (2007); Selikow et al., (2009); Ragnarsson et al., (2009); Ragnarsson et al., (2010); 
Lynch et al., (2010); Townsend et al., (2011) and Gilbert and Selikow (2011). The rationale behind 















sexual behaviour. In simple terms the probability of relational ties is likely to increase as the 
characteristics of individuals increase in similarity.  
For instance, Kohler et al. (2007) in their review of social networks and HIV/AIDS risk perception 
states that: “…the networks with whom respondents discuss issues of family planning and AIDS are 
characterised by a tendency to discuss these topics with others who are perceived to be similar (‘like 
me’)” (Kohler et al. 2007: p. 4). In a similar vein, Ragnarsson et al., (2009) and Ragnarsson et al., 
(2010) describes the social groups as consisting of males with similar socioeconomic conditions. 
Like Ragnarsson et al., (2009) and (2010), Lynch et al., (2010) referring to the ‘real man’ (where 
masculinity is characterised by multiple partners) states that this masculinity is constructed by 
various factors such as race and class. See also Latkin and Knowlton (2006); Carter et al., (2007); 
Kohler et al. (2007); Selikow et al., (2009); Gilbert and Selikow (2011) and Townsend et al., (2011) for 
similar literature. 
Smith and Christakis (2008) in a review of the impact of social networks on health state that: 
“Sociologist are particularly well positioned to consider and shed light on how race, gender and class 
might interact with network processes” (Smith and Christakis 2008: p. 406). They go further to state 
that “…individuals may select their network partners on the basis of qualities such as sex, 
socioeconomic status…” (Smith and Christakis 2008: p.417). Finally, Liljeros et al., (2003) note that: 
“These studies demonstrate that assertive interaction is structured across sociological variables, i.e., 
people are more likely to sexually interact with people from the same social class, age group and 
ethnic group” (Liljeros et al., 2003: p. 190). 
2.6.2.4.2 Supporting Literature to our Prior Knowledge: Social Space and Similar Others 
As previously stated it is important to have a prior knowledge of the formation of the social groups. 
The previous section identified the social groups under the concept of similar others based on 
qualitative insights. In this section we refer to additional literature that supports the formation of 
such a social group. We begin by identifying a social space and relate this social space to the similar 
others social group concept. 
Social Space 
In this sub-section social space is invoked to help understand the mechanisms behind social 
interactions. First and foremost it is important to note that most literature states that social 
interaction occurs when individuals are close together within an abstract social space (Akerlof 1997; 
Etile 2007; Durlauf and Ioannides 2010). It is this social space that in turn influences their decision 
making process (Akerlof 1997; Conley and Topa 2002; Grodner et al., 2006; Etile 2007; Durlauf and 
Ioannides 2010). From a sociological perspective the definition of a social space is: “man’s social 















towards its members” (Sorokin, 1927 cited in Prandy and Lambert 2003: p 399). On similar lines 
Bourdieu (1987) states that “The social space is constructed in such a way that the closer the 
agents, groups, institutions which are situated within this space, the more common properties they 
have and the more distant the fewer (Bourdieu 1987: p16). It is this social proximity between 
individuals that is likely to lead to social interaction. Examples of these social proximities include 
social networks or social groups (Akerlof, 1997). 
Secondly, it is important to note that this social space may contain many dimensions (for example 
physical geography, ethnicity, gender or education)34 that may at times overlap with each other. 
Because of the fact that the social space can comprise of these many dimensions it becomes pivotal to 
identify the dimensions that are significant in defining the social interaction in the research problem 
(Durlauf and Ioannides 2010). Relevant to this study, this implies identifying the dimensions that 
determine the social groups related to our research problem of social norms, social pressure and multiple 
partnerships.  
Thirdly, it is also worth noting that social space implies that physical geography is not a prerequisite 
for social interaction. Indeed some sociologists are of the opinion that physical geography has 
become redundant in today’s social interaction needs (Conley and Topa 2002). This sociological 
view is now supported by a large body of literature. For example, Manski (2000) notes that 
advancement in modern telecommunication technology such as cell phones, internet and social 
networks has drastically diminish the role of physical geography in social interaction. Likewise, Urry 
(2003) notes that the average distance (physical geography) between people in their social networks 
has drastically increased as a result of motorisation, urbanisation, airline deregulation, advancement 
in internet and telecommunication. Along similar lines, Xu et al., (2010) notes that social networks 
have expanded due to increases in migration.  
Similar others 
The aforementioned qualitative studies argue that these social norms and social pressure related to 
multiple partnership occur amongst similar others35. The same observation is made in social 
interaction literature arguing that in general individuals who are similar are likely to interact socially. 
While sociologists refer to this similar other tendency as inbreeding or homophily, economists refer 
to this as positive matching or assortative matching (Conley and Topa 2002). The most recent 
                                                 
34 For example Case et al., (1991) in their study use city blocks as the reference groups, while Conley and Topa 
(2002) constructs a social space based on physical geography, ethnicity similarity and socioeconomic similarity. 
Grodner and Kniesner (2005) group is based on individuals who are similar in age, family structure and location. 
Munshi et al., (2006) uses religion in their group formation. On the other hand Fletcher (2009) and Giorgi et al., 
(2010) use classmates as groups, while Etile (2007) and Grodner (2006) use individuals of the same occupation, 
gender and age as the group characteristics. 
35 The concept of similar others is distinguishable from significant others, whereas similar others is based on similar 















studies at the nexus of social group and similar others can be found in Etile (2007) when analysing the 
norms related to body weight. Other studies that have also relied on the similar others concept are 
peer effect studies where the group is usually represented by classmates, under the assumption that 
students interact because they share similar courses/classrooms. See De Giorgi et al., (2010); Fletcher 
(2010) and Lundborg (2006). There are groups that have been formed based on religious similarity 
see Munshi (2006). Vendrick (2003) has also alluded to the fact that social groups are made of 
individuals with similar characteristics such as age, education and number of children. Others such as 
Liljer et al., (2003) have noted that individuals are likely to interact if they are of the same social class, 
age group and ethnic group, while Carter et al., (2001) notes age, gender and religious similarity. 
The importance of similar others is accentuated in social network research. For instance Moody 
(2001) notes that social network research focus on peer group similarity where groups are similar in 
multiple dimensions. Conley and Topa (2002) note that: “even causal observation suggests that 
personal networks may be stratified along specific socio-demographic attributes such as race, 
ethnicity, religious affiliation, language, age, race, gender and education levels, in other words, agents 
are likely to draw a disproportionate share of their social contacts among sets of people that are very 
similar to themselves” (Conley and Topa 2002: p. 309). 
The principle behind similar others has also been applied to peer educators so as to change risky 
behaviours within certain groups, such as men who have sex with men, commercial workers and 
drug users. Such peer educators are selected on the basis of sharing similar attributes to the target 
groups. These attributes usually include age, gender, socio-economic background and ethnicity. By 
using such peer educators with similar attributes, these interventions have proven to be successful in 
reducing the risky behaviours of the target group. See Lugalla et al., (2004) and Latkin and Knowlton 
(2006).  
2.6.2.4.3 Social Group Composition 
To summarise this section, in unfolding the literature, it became apparent that proper definition of 
social group improves identification and eliminates measurement errors in models of social 
interaction. Secondly, the literature shows that individuals interact in a social space and that this 
social space encompasses varies dimensions. Thirdly, the literature also shows that physical 
geography is not a prerequisite for social interaction to take place. Finally, the literature also shows 
that the social interaction related to social norms and social pressure on multiple partnerships occurs 
within individuals with similar socioeconomic characteristics.  
Guided by the above insights we construct the social groups based on similar others using the 
following dimensions: age, race, income and gender giving us a total of 95 social groups. This is on 















in relation to norms related to multiple partnerships. Moreover, the importance of these 
socioeconomic similarities is also evident in the literature regarding gender and sexual behaviour in 
sub-Saharan Africa (see Akwara et al., 2003; Wellings et al., 2006; Benefo et al., 2008). Further to this, 
Kohler et al. (2007) observed that women in Thailand, Ghana and Kenya interact with each other on 
various behaviours such as family planning, sexual partnership and HIV/AIDS. Kohler et al. (2007) 
go on further to say that “The networks are highly gendered: men talk with men, women with 
women” (Kohler et al. 2007: p. 11). Conley and Topa (2002) in their review found social groups to 
be homogenous along socio-demographic attributes such as ethnicity, race, religion, age, gender and 
education levels. Race and ethnicity were particularly favourable attributes in these social contacts, in 
that interactions often occur along these lines. This is also evident in South Africa, hence making 
race a justifiable characteristic to include in the social group as a result of the apartheid regime that 
caused social division between racial groups (Emmett, 2003; Seekings et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 
2007). Whereas age and income are more common characteristics, such that individuals of the same 
economic status or of the same age cohort are more likely to interact with each other. 
It is worth noting that given the structure of our social groups (place of residence is not included in 
the construction of the social group) one would ask how the members of the social groups become 
aware of the existing social norms and how they would experience the social pressure in the group. An 
example of such a possibility is the influence of the popular internet social networks. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that access to internet social networks is possible not only through 
computers but via cell phones as well and where there is a high prevalence of cell phone usage in 
both advantaged and disadvantaged communities. See Skuse (2007), Kreutzer (2009) and Dlodlo 
(2009). As such social networks have made it possible for people to interact without geographical 
proximity. This has somewhat revolutionised social interaction (and made the model in this thesis 
plausible) with the idea that people can interact based on any attributes. For this literature refer to 
the works of Subrahmanyann et al. (2008); Wellman et al. (1996); Csanyi and Szendroi (2004); Hu 
and Wang (2011); Young and Rice (2011); Thelwall (2008) and Singla and Richardson (2008). Hence 
the aforementioned assertion that increases in residential mobility and technological advancement in 
communication have to some extent weakened the importance of physical geography in social 
interaction is supported by this literature. 
It is given that age, gender and race are likely to be exogenous characteristics. The question then 
becomes is income also exogenous? Social interaction literature states that it is plausible for some 
endogenous variables to be exogenous characteristics in group formation. For example Blume et al., 
(2010) note that: “In social interaction models, groups are typically defined in terms of exogenous 
categories such as ethnicity, gender or religion or endogenous categories such as residential 
neighbourhoods, schools and firms. The former, of course, may not literally be exogenous, but 















predetermined from the perspective of the behaviours under study” (Blume et al., 2010: p. 2). 
Similarly Brock and Durlauf (2004) state that: “The discussion assumes that the rules by which 
individuals are sorted into groups has no implication for empirical analysis, such an assumption 
implies that the group formation rule is independent of the determinants of individual choices” 
(Brock and Durlauf 2004: p. 3328).  
Thus according to Brock and Durlauf (2004) and Blume et al., (2010) the key is to consider the 
context under which the characteristics are assumed to be exogenous. That is, whether group 
formation (clusters based on socioeconomic characteristics) occurs and subsequently affect 
behaviour (norms related to number of sex partners) producing exogenous groups, or whether group 
formation occurs simultaneously with behaviour, where in this case there is a coevolution of social 
groups and behaviour producing endogenous groups. The key is then to look at the relationship 
between social norms related to number of sex partners (behaviour) and income (group characteristic). 
The problem then becomes that very little literature exists on social norms related to number of sex 
partners (Ragnarsson et al. 2010).  
The literature that does exist mentions that social groups are based on socioeconomic characteristics 
(see Selikow et al. 2009; Ragnarsson et al., 2009, 2010; Townsend et al. 2011; Gilbert and Selikow 
2011) but does not state whether the groups are predetermined. As a result we turn to literature on 
number of sex partners and income, since the social norms that we are interested in are norms related to 
number of sex partners. In the current literature we find that income is likely to be a determinant of the 
number of sex partners an individual has (Ragnarsson et al. 2010). For example Ragnarsson et al. (2010) 
in their qualitative study record the following verbatim ‘I can make an example about me, because I 
have eight girlfriends. It is my style and what I wear, my clothes and my money, because I have 
money’ (Ragnarsson et al. 2010: p. 1255). This relationship is also likely to be observed in sexual 
relationships driven by financial gains. In such relationships we find that the more the income the 
more number of sex partners an individual is likely to have. See Hunter (2002), Kaufman and Stavrou 
(2004), Leclerc-Madlala (2008). 
The problem however is that we also observe in the literature that the number of sex partners is likely 
to influence income. One such channel is sexual relationships driven by financial gains, where the 
more the number of sex partners the more income an individual is likely to spend to sustain these 
relationships. Additionally, in the literature we also find that number of sex partners has been associated 
with AIDS related illness and is therefore likely to affect an individuals’ income, see Philipson and 
Posner (1995) and East et al. (2009). We do however recognise the on-going debate regarding the 
perceived lack of sufficient evidence to support the role of multiple partnerships in HIV 
transmission, see Mah and Halperin (2010a, 2010c); Lurie and Rosenthal (2010a, 2010b); Morris 















Given the aforementioned evidence from literature, we see that income is likely to influence number of 
sex partners and by the same token number of sex partners is likely to influence income. Thus a likely 
coevolution exists between this group characteristic (income) and behaviour (number of sex partners). 
This indicates the likelihood of endogenous group formation in so far as income is concerned. Thus 
unlike race, age and gender which are unlikely to produce this coevolution with behaviour and thus 
produce exogenous groups, income is likely to be endogenous as it is likely to co-evolve with 
behaviour. It is our view that the relationship between social norms related to number of sex partners 
and income would make a great area for future research. Especially empirical research that can 
establish whether these social groups, based on socioeconomic characteristics, are predetermined or 
not. Additionally, more literature is needed in the area of social interaction especially on how to best 
estimate such models, with practical application. 
2.6.2.5 Covariates 
These variables are standard in sexual behaviour research outlined in the literature and include 
educational attainment, knowledge of HIV prevention methods, and knowing someone with 
HIV/AIDS or someone who has died of AIDS.  
2.6.3 Econometric Modelling 
As indicated earlier the novelty of this study lays in its quantitative analysis of social norms and social 
pressure in influencing multiple partnerships. Section 2.1 introduced the qualitative literature findings 
that inspired the current study. This was followed by section 2.4 where the relationship between 
social norms and social pressure was provided. Section 2.5 detailed our chosen theoretical framework 
used to guide our expectations regarding the relationship between social norms, social pressure and 
number of sex partners. Using this theory together with the qualitative literature a hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between the social norm and number of sex partners and also between social 
pressure and number of sex partners was derived. This section presents the econometric modelling of 
this hypothesis. The section also highlights the identification challenges that our econometric model 
is likely to encounter and then proceeds to discuss our estimation strategy to overcome these 
challenges.  
The hypothesis regarding the effects of social norms and social pressure on number of partners suggests 
the application of Manski’s (1993) linear-in-means model as depicted by equation (2.8), where    is the 
normalised36 number of sex partners belonging to individual i a member of social group g,    are the 
individual level characteristics,  ̅  is social norms in group g, (  ⁄ )  ̅   is the interaction of social 
                                                 
36 Recall that we normalise the outcome variable (multiple partnership) by dividing this value with the age quartile so as 
to eliminate bias, see section 2.6.2.1. Additionally, recall that we also use an additional outcome variable which is a 















pressure and social norm variable in group g, given that equation (2.2) in the theoretical section suggests 
an interaction effect between these two variables.    is the social group characteristics included to 
avoid omitted variable bias (Manski 1993; Moffit 2000) and    is the error term. In this model the 
unit of analysis is an individual.  
                  ̅      (  ⁄ )  ̅                                                                            (2.8) 
2.6.3.1 Econometric Model Identification 
Although it is widely acknowledged that social interaction models37 are perhaps the most difficult to 
identify, over the years there has been a growing amount of econometric literature covering 
estimation challenges and how best to overcome these challenges. The following discussion draws 
from the influential literature of Manski (1993, 2000, 2003); Moffit (2001); Brock and Durlauf 
(2004); Durlauf and Ioannides (2010) and Blume et al. (2010). In addition, we also make reference to 
empirical studies of Grodner and Kniesner (2005); Munshi and Myaux (2006); Etile (2007); Giorgi et 
al. (2010) and Grodner et al. (2011). Our econometric model is likely to face three identification 
challenges that need to be addressed.  
The first being simultaneity and the related reflection problem, the second challenge relates to the 
influence of unobservable group level effects, and the last challenge is the effects of social group selection 
bias (Manski, 2000; Blume et al., 2010). The reflection problem arises from the fact that the social 
interaction regressors, for example social norm and group characteristics, are collinear, and as a 
result of this linear dependence equation (2.8) becomes unidentifiable. For instance recall from 
equation (2.8) that    is the number of sex partners individual i in group g engages with,  ̅  is the 
social norm,    are individual characteristics and    are group characteristics. According to Manski 
(1993)  ̅     , implying that the social group characteristics (  ) is equal to the average of the 
individual characteristics in the group:  ̅  
 
 
 ∑      . Also in equilibrium each individual’s average 
behaviour will be equal to the expected behaviour (Blume et al. 2010): 
 ( ̅ )   ̅  
       ̅     (  ⁄ )  ̅       
    
                                                                          (2.9) 
That is, equation (2.9)38 states that individual i who is a member of group g’s expectation of the 
average behaviour of the group ( ( ̅ )) is equal to the average behaviour of the group ( ̅ ), and this 
                                                 
37 Empirical research on social interactions can be grouped into three hypotheses: endogenous interactions/simultaneity 
where an individuals’ behaviour varies with the behaviour of the group, secondly, contextual/exogenous interactions 
where behaviour varies with the exogenous characteristics of the group, and thirdly correlated effects/endogenous 
membership where individuals in the same group behave the same as a result of being in the same environment. 
Whereas endogenous and contextual interaction explains social influence, the correlated interaction explains non-
social interactions (Manski 1993, 2000; Moffit 2001). 
38 According to Blume et al., (2010) the requirement that      is guaranteed to hold, since    maps the marginal 















average behaviour is a linear function of  (  ⁄ )  ̅ ,  ̅  and   . Since  ̅  is the average individual 
characteristic in the group, it is possible to substitute  ̅  with    (Manski’s (1993) assumption), 
which implies that equation (2.9) can be re-written as (Blume et al. 2010):  
 ̅  
       ̅        (  ⁄ )  ̅      
    
   
         (  ⁄ )  ̅  (     )  
    
                                                (2.10) 
Equation (2.10) shows that the regressor  ̅   is a linear function of the other social interaction 
regressors. This linear dependence makes identification impossible and holds for all other social 
interaction regressors. That is, the co-movement makes it impossible to disentangle the respective 
influence of social interaction regressors  ̅ , (  ⁄ )  ̅  and    on our outcome variable    in 
equation (2.8). This is what Manski (1993) named the reflection problem39 where changes in    could be 
as a result of  ̅  or it could be a result of  ̅  reflecting the changes in    (Blume et al. 2010). Brock 
and Durlauf (2004) and Blume et al. (2010) suggest the use of instruments to overcome the 
reflection problem. 
The second identification challenge is the possible influence of unobservable group level effects which 
may result in similarity in behaviour. Unobservable group level effects are environmental or institutional 
conditions such as schools, healthcare or recreational activities. Recall from section 2.6.2 that the 
social groups were formed based on age, gender, race and income. Our social groups therefore do 
not contain any information on the place of residence which typically captures environmental and 
institutional conditions, and are usually the main source of unobservables (Blume et al., 2010). The 
advancement in modern telecommunication technology40 such as cell phones, internet and social 
networks have drastically diminished the role of physical geography in social interaction, and have 
thus made such social group clusters plausible. See Manski (2000), Conley and Topa (2002), Urry 
(2003) and Xu et al., (2010). The social grouping has therefore had the effect of neutralising 
geographically related unobservables by assigning individuals into new communities41. Table 2.B1 in 
Appendix 2.B shows the distribution of the original communities and the new communities that have 
been formed as a result of the grouping.  
                                                 
39 One of the proposed solutions to this reflection problem has been to estimate a ‘composite coefficient’ that includes 
both endogenous and exogenous effects. For example instead of estimating equation (2.8) we instead estimate the 
following equation;                                         where    measures social interaction in general. 
Hence    allows one to determine whether social interaction is present in the model (Manski 1993; Moffit 2000), one 
can then proceed to measure the impact of social interaction without being able to distinguish the source of this 
interaction. 
40 It is worth noting that some of the internet channels such as online chat-rooms individuals are unlikely to disclose 
their real information, hence grouping based on such information is likely to be tainted by such false information. 
41 The ‘new’ communities are defined by individuals that make up the social group, column 1 of table 2.A in 
Appendix 2. For example social group 54 comprises 17 individuals who were originally from the following 
communities; 3 from Cape Town; 3 from Goodwood; 1 from Beacon Valley; 1 from Eastridge; 2 from Tafelsig; 1 in 
Westridge; 1 in Woodlands; 1 in Simonstown; 2 from Wynberg; 1 from Malmesbury and 1 from Wynberg Non-















In this study we have ruled out the influence of geographically related unobservables. We can 
however not rule out the likelihood of our social groups being influenced by non-geographically 
related unobservables. This is based on the fact that the groups consist of individuals of the same 
age, gender, race and income. Such similarity implies that each social group consist of individuals 
who are alike, and as such these similar individuals are likely to face similar unobservable 
backgrounds (such as similar family structure or composition) thus causing these individuals to 
behave the same. Hence we need to remove this influence to ensure that it is the social norm that is 
causing the similarity in behaviour and not the fact that the individuals in the social group are 
behaving the same simply because they have similar unobservable family composition.  
For instance the similar race characteristic in the social groups implies that the groups are 
fragmented along racial lines. As such the Black race social group for example are likely to be 
influenced by such unobservables as family practice of polygamy whereas monogamous family 
practices may influence the White race social groups. Another example is the influence of magazines 
and television programmes which usually differ along age lines, gender lines, income and even racial 
lines. Hence it is plausible that individuals may behave the same as a result of these non-
geographically related unobservables. We eliminate this unobservable influence as well, as we want 
to ensure that the only influence emanates from social norms and the related social pressure. See Brock 
and Durlauf (2004) and Blume et al. (2010).  
The third likely challenge is with regards to social group selection bias which arises when individuals 
are (un) intentionally sorted into social groups. In our case the selection bias is due to the non-
random assignment of individuals into social groups where we clustered these individuals into 
similar socioeconomic characteristics. Hence it is difficult to view this clustering as untainted by 
selection bias. See Angrist and Pischke (2008) on selection bias and randomisation. 
2.6.3.2 Final Models Used For Estimation 
We test different model specifications. The first set of models is cross-sectional in nature using 
CAPS wave 3 datasets. We apply both the linear-in-means model (where the outcome variable is 
number of sex partners) and a non-linear-in-means (binary variable where one represents more than 
one partner and zero otherwise) model. This part of the analysis is based on equation (2.8). The 
second set of models utilises the panel nature of CAPS data where we employ wave 1, 3 and 4. In 
this model we employ equation (2.11) which is based on individual fixed effects where   
  is the 
normalised sex partners belonging to individual i a member of group g at time t,  ̅ 
  is the relevant 
social norm in group g in time t,  (  ⁄ ) 
   ̅ 
   is social pressure interacted with social norm in group g, 
  
  are the group characteristics,    
  are the individual characteristics,    is the social group dummy 
capturing the effect of time-invariant unobservable,    is the year dummy that controls for variation 
across the years and   
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                                         (2.11) 
2.6.3.3 Instrumental Variable Strategy 
It is widely recognised that finding valid instruments in models of social interaction is a difficult task 
due to the fact that social interaction models are generally open-endness42 in nature (Manski, 2000; 
Blume et al., 2010). The section outlines the instrumental variable (IV) strategy. An instrumental 
variable must be correlated with the endogenous regressor but be uncorrelated with the error term, 
that is, the IV needs to be redundant in the main equation. The narrative below provides an 
argument to support the proposed IV. In doing so we follow Wooldridge (2002); Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005) and Murray (2006), noting in particular Murray (2007) who states that the amount of 
credence granted to IV depends partly on the quality of the arguments.  
The trendsetter of the norms IV is the instrumental strategy that we adopt. The proposed trendsetter of the 
norms IV extends the work of Grodner and Kniesner (2005) and Etile (2007)43. The key to the IV 
strategy is social grouping. Recall that the social groups consist f individuals with similar 
socioeconomic attributes (gender, race, age and income). The trendsetter of the norms IV is founded on 
the premise that the older social groups are more likely to be trendsetters for younger groups in similar 
socioeconomic neighbourhoods (that is, same income, race and gender). As such older social group 
behaviour44 can be used as IVs for younger social groups whereas the opposite is unlikely to hold. 
In simple terms    ( ̅             ̅             )       ( ̅                      )   ,  whereas,  
   ( ̅                      )   . 
We believe that the trendsetter of the norms IV is correctly excluded from the main equation because 
norms and the fear of sanctions predict that the only thing that matters for an individual is the 
behaviour of the social group they belong to. See Fisher (1988); Bernheim (1994); Akerlof (1997); 
Cialdini and Trost (1998); Munshi and Myaux (2006); Fletschner and Carter (2008) for a discussion 
on norms and fear of sanctions. For example Fisher (1988) states that: ‘People often conform to the 
attitudinal and behavioural norms of their reference group or social network-such norms constitute 
a potent source of social influence. That group norms affect individuals’ behavioural choices 
regarding prevention has been documented. One reason why people adhere to group norms and 
                                                 
42 Blume et al. (2010), define ‘open-endness’ as models lacking theoretical structure that can naturally identify variables 
that can be included (and those that can be excluded) from the empirical model. 
43 Grodner and Kniesner (2005) and Etile (2007) IV is based on instrumentation of a variable by its lags in panel 
data analysis. Specifically, given an individual i of age Ai, then all same socio-economic individuals j with age Aj such 
that            belong to social group Ri. Then same socio-economic individuals k such that      
        belong to Rj but not Ri. Then the social norm of individuals k should be correlated with social norms 
of individuals j. Symmetrically,              for all of j’s in Ri. Therefore, adjacent group behaviour to the 
left and to the right of the social group can be used as IVs allowing for overidentification of the model. 
44 Social group behaviour in this case refers to both the social norms ( ̅ ) and the related social pressure, (  ⁄ )  ̅ , which 















espouse group values is because they fear sanctions for nonconformity (Fisher 1988: p. 914). In 
section 2.4 we provide literature on social norms. Hence the reason why the 
   ( ̅                      )   . That is, the social norm of another group (older group social norm) 
will not affect the individual simply because an individual is unlikely to face sanctions if they deviate 
from the norm of the older group. However because of the fact that the older social groups in the 
same socioeconomic background are likely to be the trendsetter of the norms implies that 
   ( ̅             ̅             )   . Admittedly the idea that older social groups are more likely to be 
trendsetters for younger groups in similar socioeconomic neighbourhood is not new but rather a 
reorientation of literature. 
Indeed, support of the trendsetter concept comes from a series of literature. The key insights in this 
literature is that social behaviours are usually initiated by and manifested in a particular sub-culture 
or group before spreading to other groups in the social system or culture. The early adopters or 
initiators of the behaviour are the so called trendsetters of the behaviour (Pinkerton et al. 1995; 
Bertrand, 2010; Salvini and Vignoli 2011). Hence, the argument here is that behaviour in a group 
does not just appear but rather it emerges in some sub-groups and diffuses to other sub-groups. The 
importance of trendsetter is accentuated by Bertrand (2010), for instance, who contends that a new 
behaviour diffuses into a social system through trendsetters who usually model a new behaviour in the 
social systems. For example Kelly (1993) state that ‘In experimental community-level tests of 
interventions intended to change HIV risk behaviours have relied on a diffusion of innovation 
model that posits that population behaviour and norm perceptions can be influenced by innovative 
trends initially exhibited and communicated by trendsetters in the population: overtime, these new 
trends diffuse and become normative throughout the population’ (Kelly 1993: p. 2017). This is 
further supported by Mahdavi (2009) in a study consisting of young adults who were identified as 
trendsetters for youth in Tenran, Iran in relation to sexual, cultural and social revolution occurring in 
Iran. The same concept of trendsetting has been applied to influence changes in sexual behaviours 
related to HIV/AIDS, see Kelly et al. (1992), Kelly et al. (1993), Pinkerton et al. (1995), Geary et al. 
(2006), and Bertrand (2010).  
The trendsetter notion is also found in literature on smoking, where the supposition is that young 
adults who smoke usually influence the smoking behaviours of youth. Based on this supposition 
Hendlin et al. (2009) observed that the trendsetter concept is employed by tobacco companies by using 
young adults to recruit and influence youth to adapt smoking behaviours. See also Alexander et al., 
(2001) for a similar argument. For instance Hendlin et al. (2009) note that ‘Since 1998 Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA) severely restricted under-18 directed tobacco advertisement, the 
major tobacco companies have increasingly targeted young adults who represent an important 
market for tobacco companies and also set trends for adolescents, the small segment of the 















the rest of society’ (Hendlin et al. 2009: p. 213). Another example rests in the fashion industry where 
underweight models and celebrities, have been described as trendsetters of clothes and body image for 
teenagers (Dragone and Savorelli 2012). Along similar lines trendsetters have been noted to be 
responsible for marital disruption and changes in fertility patterns, see Salvini and Vignoli (2011) 
and D’Addato et al., (2008) respectively. Meanwhile, another study by Neubourg and Vendrik (1994) 
further emphasises the concept of trendsetters related to norms affecting labour force participation45. 
The limitation of the trendsetter of the norms IV is that it excludes the oldest group46 as it will not have 
an older group that can be used as IV47. Furthermore the IVs make these models exactly identified. 
Importantly, our IVs depend on social groups, this implies that if the assumptions that we placed on 
the social grouping (for example, proper definition of the social groups, the right demarcation of age 
between groups) do not hold, this will in essence affect our IVs strategy such that we are likely to 
have redundant instruments. In Appendix 2.E we adopted the adjacent group IV from the works of 
Grodner and Kniesner (2005) and Etile (2007). Our last IV, the lagged values is applied in the panel 
data analysis and consists of one year lag and two year lag as instruments in Appendix 2.F. The lagged 
values IV extends the fear of sanctions argument and assumes that although past behaviour in the 
group is likely to be correlated with present behaviour, fear of sanctions dictates that it is only the 
current behaviour of the group that will influence behaviour of an individual. Hence past behaviour 
is correctly excluded from the main equation. 
2.6.3.4 Including the Population that is not Sexually Active 
The analysis thus far has concentrated on the sexually active population. This section extends the 
analysis to include the sexually inactive population. This study defines sexually inactive population as those 
individuals who have never had sex. This information is derived from the following questions: 
“Have you ever had sex? By sex we mean full penetration. The responses included, yes or no.” In 
contrast the sexually active population refers to those who have had sex before. The motivation behind 
including this population is based on the fact that abstinence as an approach to protective sexual behaviour 
                                                 
45 It is worth pointing out that some behaviours are likely to be set by younger groups and adopted by older groups, 
such that the younger groups become the trendsetters for the older groups, for example social media. Also some 
trends are influenced by other factors, apart from age, for example the banking sector has been described as a 
trendsetter in adopting IT, see Anandarajan et al. (2000). Another example is United States of America being seen as 
a trendsetter for other countries, see Rind (2010). 
46 We have assumed a 5 year age demarcation between social groups. Such that group g+5 is the older group of g.  
47  
We include the ‘extended’ trend setter of the norm IV based on trend setter of the norms IV. The difference between the two 
is that the omitted oldest social group is included by instrumenting this group with another oldest social group with 
different characteristics such as income. This is to allow the inclusion of the omitted social group since this IV 















is possibly more effective than, condom use or one sex partner approaches. That is the sexually inactive 
population are likely to have no risk of HIV/AIDS contraction (we do not include the risk of 
HIV/AIDS from needle sharing or blood transfusion). However the minute an individual becomes 
sexually active, that is in the sexually active population HIV/AIDS risk is introduced, and this risk varies 
depending on an individuals’ choice of sexual behaviour. For example condom use versus not using 
a condom, or sex with a spouse versus a commercial worker or even having had sex once in your 
life time in comparison to having had sex more than 20 times in your life. All these examples 
introduce different variations of the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS. Thus our classification of 
sexually inactive population containing individuals with no risk and sexually active population consisting of 
individuals with various HIV/AIDS risk levels. 
The motivation behind including this population is based on the fact that abstinence as an approach 
to protective sexual behaviour is similar to, and possibly more effective than, condom use or one sex partner 
approaches. Table 2.C1 in Appendix 2.C compares the characteristics of the sexually active population 
to that of the sexually inactive population. Since the mean age of sexual debut in the sexually active 
population is lower than the mean age of the sexually inactive population, is more likely to imply a choice 
of abstinence hence supporting our argument. Therefore the exclusion of this population in sexual 
behaviour research is likely to eliminate important analytical information related to individuals who 
pursue protective sexual behaviour.  
The second motivation for including the sexually inactive population relates to the theme of social norms 
and social pressure in this study. Following from this theme the argument is that it is likely that the 
sexually inactive population face social norms and social pressure comparable to the sexually active population 
due to social interaction. Hence by eliminating this population from the analysis we would in 
essence be creating a utopian world where we assume the sexually active population only interact with 
others who are sexually active, while the sexually inactive population interact among themselves. The 
third motivation has its origin in econometric modelling and the implication thereof for non-
random sample selection. Since being sexually active is likely to be correlated with unobservables 
that affect the number of sex partners, constraining the sample to only the sexually active population is 
likely to produce biased estimators. 
However, the inclusion of the sexually inactive population in the analysis introduces two estimation 
challenges. The first challenge relates to missing information (and therefore missing variables) 
related to sexual behaviours among the sexually inactive population, for example condom use, 
relationship type, relevant to this study is information on multiple partnerships. The second challenge 
relates to taking into consideration the fact that there are underlying factors that cause individuals to 
become sexually active. That is, the choice to become sexually active or remain abstinent is not 















To overcome the above mentioned challenges the analysis follows Wooldridge (2002); Greene 
(2004); Okten and Osili (2004); Bushway et al. (2007); Garcia et al. (2008); Bezabih et al. (2010) and 
Bollinger and Hirsch (2012) and adopt the censored two stage model (CTSM) as this model includes 
all observations from the two populations and missing outcome information are given zero values. 
In the first stage a PROBIT model for sample inclusion involving whether you are sexually active or 
not is conducted and the inverse Mills ratios are then included in the second stage IVTOBIT model 
as an additional regressor. 
The analysis in this section follows from the linear-in-means model in equation (2.8), the only 
difference is that    the number of sex partners, is observed if individual i is sexually active as 
depicted by equation (2.12). Equation (2.13) depicts our selection equation outlining whether 
individual i is sexually active or not. Finally   is a vector of determinants of the decision to become 
sexually active and include individual characteristics namely age, income, gender, education and 
knowledge of HIV/AIDS. The exclusion restriction is a dummy variable capturing whether 
abstinence is acknowledged as an HIV prevention method. 
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                                                                                                                        (2.12) 
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                                                                                          (2.13) 
where                   ̅      
 
 
 ̅        . In summary our estimation strategy accounts 
for the fact that number of sex partners will depend on whether you are sexually active or not.  
2.7 Estimation Results 
2.7.1 Regression Results 
Table 2.1 shows the results from the linear-in-means model of equation (2.8). The analysis is based on 
CAPS wave 3 dataset. The models in Panel A represent the entire sample size, that is, they include 
both the sexually active population and those who have not had sex, that is, the sexually inactive population. 
Panel A’s results are based on the second stage of the censored two stage model (CTSM) which 
involves using the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage model as an additional regressor in the 
second stage as depicted in Panel A. This is so as to eliminate the sample selection bias brought 
about by including the sexually inactive population. The first stage Heckman model is shown in Table 
2.D1 in Appendix 2.D.  
The non-linear-in-means model in columns 1 to 2 uses a censored dependent variable that captures the 
number of sex partners in the last 12 months and is represented by 0 for those in the sexually inactive 















model that captures the censored nature of the dependent variable is utilised. The linear-in-means-
model in columns 3 to 4 of panel A continues to use the censored dependent variable used in the non-
linear-in-means model. The only difference is that the GMM is used following Angrist and Pischhke 
(2008) who have found that similar results are obtained with OLS or 2SLS estimation as with 
PROBIT or TOBIT models when the dependent variable is binary or censored. As such we use 
GMM estimation especially given that the linear models in STATA are less constrained and allow 
the use of the Sargan-Hansen statistics test for identification which is only available in linear models. 
Furthermore, linear models allow for easier inference than the nonlinear models.  
Panel B includes only the sexually active population, that is, those individuals who indicated that they 
have had sex. The non-linear in means model in columns 5 and 6 uses a binary outcome variable 
representing 1 if an individual has multiple partners and 0 otherwise derived from the variable 
number of sex partners in the last 12 months. The linear-in-means-model in column 7 to 8 uses the actual 
number of sex partners in the last 12 months as the outcome variable among the population that is 
sexually active. Lastly, using both the linear-in-means-model and non-linear-in-means model allows us to 
determine how the model would behave given that the non-linear-in-means model has different 
requirements for identification from the linear-in-means-model. Brock and Durlauf (2004); Durlauf and 
Ioannides (2010) and Blume et al. (2010) indicate that nonlinearity improves identification. 
The models presented in this paper are based on robust standard errors with clustering at the social 
group level. For a discussion on robust standard errors and clustered data see Moulton (1990); 
Williams (2000) and Wooldridge (2003). The discussion is on biasedness of standard errors in 
estimation models with aggregated data and micro observations. In our model this relates to the 
social norms and social pressure regressors which are aggregated at the social group level and where 
our unit of analysis is an individual (recall from section 2.6 that the aggregation of the social groups 
is based on individuals with similar socioeconomic characteristics). To take into account the 
aggregated nature of the data we used robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at social group 
level. It is worth noting that estimation models fitted with robust standard errors unadjusted for 
clustering produced consistent results. The results presented in this paper are based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the social group level. 
We tested for model identification using the Anderson canon correlation test under the null 
hypothesis that the model is underidentified, all our models reject the null hypothesis, as shown  in 
the last rows of all the tables. Our estimation results using the adjacent social group age bracket IV are 
displayed in Appendix 2.E. This instrument allows for overidentifying restrictions, as such we used 
the Sargan-Hansen test in the GMM models and Amemiya-Lee Newey in the 
IVTOBIT/IVPROBIT models on the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, that is, 















The results are displayed in the last rows of the tables. Overall the models are overidentified. 
Appendix 2.F shows the results by gender. Specifically table 2.F1 is based on the male population 
while table 2.F2 is based on the female population. Similar results for both genders are observed, 
indicating that social norms and social pressure are significant across gender. 
The final analysis is based on panel data using CAPS waves 1 (2002), 3 (2005) and 4 (2006). These 
results are depicted in Table 2.2. The first column of this table is based on the fixed effects model of 
equation (2.11) using wave 1, 3 and 4. Column 2 is based on wave 3 where we use wave 1 as a 
lagged instrument for the endogenous social interaction regressors in wave 3. In column 3 we use 
the variables of wave 3 as instruments for endogenous variables of wave 4. Column 4 uses a two year 
lag as instruments. As such the analysis is based on wave 4 where wave 1 is used as the two year lag 
instrument. As shown in the table the panel data analysis also support our hypothesis of a positive 
relationship between social norms, social pressure and sex partners. 
In general the results vary by type of instrument, type of population and type of model specification. 
The results also show that the social norm which captures the average number of sex partners in the 
social groups has a positive and significant influence on individual own choice of number of sex 
partners. This effect is enhanced as social pressure mounts for any given social norm prevalent with the 
social group. This is shown by the positive coefficient on the interaction term between social norm 
and social pressure. The dispersion and the mean behaviour, therefore play pivotal roles in influencing 
an individual’s tendency to conform to the prevailing social norm within a group. In any of our 
models either the social norm itself or the interaction between the social norm and the social pressure 
prevalent in the social group is positive and significant. 
It is worth noting that given the structure of our social groups (place of residence is not included in 
the construction of the social group) one would ask how the members of the social groups become 
aware of the existing norms and how they would experience the social pressure in the group. An 
example of such a possibility is the influence of the popular internet social networks such as 
Facebook and Twitter, where individuals are exposed to the same norms without necessarily being 
in the same place of residence. Social networks have made it possible for people to interact without 
geographical proximity. This has somewhat revolutionised social interaction (and made the model in 
this thesis plausible) with the idea that people can interact based on any attributes. In this paper we 
argue interaction is driven by people with similar socio-economic background, motivated by the 
















Table 2.1: Social Norm and Social Pressure Results  
● Robust Standard errors in parentheses        
  
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
● Majority population reference is Black 
● Instrumented for social norm and social norm*social pressure 
● Not that the excluded instruments: social norm of older social group, social norm*social pressure of older social group  
  
 Panel A Panel B 
 Both  Sexually Active Population  and Sexually 
Inactive Population  
Sexually Active Population Only 
 IVTOBIT GMM IVPROBIT GMM 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage   
 Nonlinear in means 
model 
Linear in means model Nonlinear model Linear in means model 
   No. of sex partners  
incl. not sexually active 
 No. of sex partners  
incl. not sexually active 
Multiple Partnership 
(0/1) 
No. of sex partners 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Social norm  1.191*** 1.076*** 0.0218 0.0991 1.372*** 1.486*** 0.0105*** 0.0137*** 
 
(0.321) (0.243) (0.216) (0.174) (0.246) (0.225) (0.00365) (0.00301) 
Social norm*social pressure 0.451 0.822* 3.027*** 3.029*** 12.18** 11.57** 0.424*** 0.414*** 
 
(0.580) (0.432) (0.397) (0.312) (4.937) (5.126) (0.0952) (0.0878) 
Social group characteristics -0.00323 -0.0165 0.0616 0.0316 0.0534 0.138 0.00122 0.00134 
 
(0.0776) (0.0680) (0.0542) (0.0505) (0.134) (0.151) (0.00231) (0.00224) 
Education years -0.00829 -0.00884 -0.00570 -0.00684 -0.00272 -0.0103 -5.14e-05 -0.000233 
 (0.0120) (0.00933) (0.00836) (0.00689) (0.0332) (0.0325) (0.000540) (0.000452) 
Mills ratio 75.50*** 61.86*** 38.44*** 34.44***     
 (11.86) (9.289) (7.707) (6.501)     
HIV prevention, abstain 0.291*** 0.242*** 0.170*** 0.149*** -0.0178 -0.0162 -0.000496 0.000469 
 (0.0478) (0.0377) (0.0331) (0.0277) (0.120) (0.117) (0.00213) (0.00178) 
HIV prevention, one partner -0.139* -0.129** -0.0336 -0.0399 -0.0551 -0.00433 0.00180 0.00147 
 (0.0749) (0.0594) (0.0514) (0.0434) (0.195) (0.192) (0.00339) (0.00285) 
Knows someone died of AIDS 0.146*** 0.112*** 0.108*** 0.0864*** 0.00197 0.0320 0.00138 0.000961 
 (0.0515) (0.0403) (0.0363) (0.0302) (0.128) (0.125) (0.00218) (0.00183) 
Majority population, Coloured -0.0267 -0.0263 -0.316*** -0.252*** -0.0145 -0.0297 -0.00537 -0.00502 
 
(0.129) (0.0920) (0.0872) (0.0670) (0.222) (0.226) (0.00379) (0.00347) 
Majority population, White 0.0424 0.0692 -0.433** -0.305* -0.125 -0.328 -0.00191 -0.00245 
 (0.273) (0.237) (0.188) (0.175) (0.440) (0.481) (0.00754) (0.00721) 
HIV prevention, condom     -0.169 -0.187 -0.00463 -0.00475* 
     (0.209) (0.206) (0.00330) (0.00271) 
Constant -11.55*** -9.456*** -5.205*** -4.699*** -2.913*** -2.948*** 0.0414*** 0.0401*** 
 (1.736) (1.358) (1.127) (0.948) (0.538) (0.529) (0.00855) (0.00739) 
Observations 2,302 2,769 2,302 2,769 1,524 1,962 1,524 1,962 
R-squared   0.161 0.181   0.106 0.121 
Anderson canon correlation statistics 
(p-value) 















Table 2.2: Panel Data Analysis  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE Model1 2SLS2 2SLS3 2SLS4 
 Based on  
wave 4, 3 and 1 
Based on  
wave 3 and 1 
Based on  
wave 4 and 3 
Based on  




1 year lag 
IVs 
1 year lag 
IVs 
1 year lag 
IVs 
2 year lag 
No. of sex partners (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Social norm  1.131 0.896*** 0.907*** 1.060*** 
 (0.926) (0.163) (0.159) (0.263) 
Social norm*social pressure 0.539** 0.170 0.0818 0.347* 
 (0.268) (0.245) (0.0849) (0.194) 
Social group characteristics 0.212 -0.00975 -0.0164 0.151** 
 (0.586) (0.0295) (0.0572) (0.0730) 
Education years -0.107 -0.000308 -0.0375*** -0.0286** 
 (0.105) (0.00586) (0.0114) (0.0119) 
Knows someone died of AIDS -0.0957* 0.0474* 0.0526 0.0679 
 (0.0526) (0.0260) (0.0517) (0.0547) 
Majority population, Coloured  0.00414 -0.0104 0.204** 
  (0.0354) (0.0723) (0.0879) 
Majority population, White  0.0332 0.0249 0.361** 
  (0.0676) (0.150) (0.181) 
year -0.0816    
 (0.0821)    
Constant 0.860 0.0311 0.432** -0.000791 
 (1.043) (0.0950) (0.184) (0.215) 
     
Observations 3,071 1,289 1,782 1,280 
R-squared  0.375 0.277 0.274 
Number of person id 2,094    
Anderson canon correlation statistics (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
● Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
● Instrumented for social norm and social norm*social pressure 
● Excluded instruments:  lag social norm and lag social norm*social pressure  
1 The Fixed Effects (FE) model uses CAPS waves 1, 2 and 3, where the endogenous variables are instrumented for 
by one year lags. Wave 4 lacks information on HIV prevention; hence we have not included this wave in the panel 
data analysis. Further the panel data models are exactly identified that is, they have the exact number of 
instrumental variables for our endogenous variables, hence we cannot derive the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 
and the Sargan Hansen tests. However, all the models pass the Anderson canon LM statistic test, implying that the 
model is identified. 
2 This model is based on wave 3, and in this model we instrument for the endogenous variables using a one year 
lag (that is, the values in wave 1). 
3 The wave 4 dataset was used in this model, where the endogenous variables were represented by a one year lag as 
instrumental variables (wave 3 values). 
4 The analysis is based on wave 4, however in this model instead of a one year lag as before the endogenous 
















2.7.2 Social Group Falsification Test 
The current empirical literature covers various factors that have been used to define groups48. For 
example, ethnicity, socioeconomic position and close proximity in the study by Conley and Topa 
(2002). In another study ethnicity and religiosity were used to construct a group, see Manski and 
Mayshar (2003). Grodner and Kniesner (2005) defined groups using demographic similarity and 
close proximity, while Etile (2007)’s groups were based on gender, age and occupation. Classmates 
were used in a study by Fletcher (2009) and students taking the same courses form the basis of 
groups in Giorgi et al. (2010). Census tract is another example, see Reagan and Salsberry (2005). 
Finally communities have also been used to define groups (Bezabih et al. 2010). A major criticism of 
social interaction models is the existence of measurement error caused by lack of distinction a priori 
concerning appropriate definitions of social groups (Manski 1993; Blume et al. 2010). Another 
criticism is that most of the empirical studies do not offer evidence that supports their definitions of 
the social groupings. 
The purpose of this section is to validate our social group composition. To achieve this, the 
motivation of our social group composition is first outlined, thereafter the section proceeds to 
perform a social group falsification test by constructing a placebo social group using ad hoc 
characteristics to determine whether evidence of social interaction will be found when ad hoc 
information for our social group composition. Lastly a comparison of the social group and the 
placebo social group using various sexual behaviour variables is offered. 
As previously mentioned a major criticism of empirical models is their lack of clear, a priori 
mechanisms of social interaction. Unlike most studies, the advantage of our study is the existence of 
sufficient background information to create a valid social group composition. This background 
information is based on qualitative research, which suggests that social groups consist of individuals 
with the same socioeconomic status. Furthermore the characteristics of our social group are 
supported by the literature, for example Akwara et al. (2003); Wellings et al. (2006) and Benefo 
(2008). 
The next step is to test whether there is evidence of social interaction if different social group 
composition is used. This social group falsification test is conducted using ‘placebo treatments’ 
following Lavy and Schlosser (2007). The test is based on ensuring that the social interaction 
evidence found from the proposed social grouping is not a result of measurement errors, such as 
omitted unobservable confounders. As such the expectation is that insignificant social interaction 
will be found when ad hoc variables are used to construct social groups (Lavy and Schlosser 2007).  
                                                 
48 Researchers studying social effects rarely offer empirical evidence to support their reference-group specifications. 
If researchers do not know how individuals form reference groups and perceive reference-group outcomes, then it 















A similar approach was adopted by Fletcher (2009) and Giorgi et al. (2010). Giorgi et al. (2010) study 
sought to determine how student’s choice of courses affected individuals’ main course selection 
(where the groups consisted of students in the same class taking the same courses). Thus for the 
falsification test Giorgi et al. (2010) replaced the groups with placebo groups that were composed by 
randomly and artificially allocating students to hypothetical classes. The placebo social grouping 
findings showed no evidence of peer effects as per the authors’ expectations. Fletcher’s (2009) study 
analysed how classmates’ smoking behaviour influences youth smoking decisions. For the 
falsification test Fletcher (2009) replaced classmates (peers who smoke) with those in lower or 
higher grades from the same school. The author found no evidence of peer effects when lower or 
higher grades classes are used.  
Recall that our social groups are based on the similar others (age, race, income and gender) concept 
on the assumption that individuals who have these similar attributes are likely to interact in relation 
multiple partnerships. In this vein, the falsification test uses placebo social groups which assign 
individuals into groups using ad hoc similar others variables. Basically we are arguing that not any 
similar others attributes will lead to social interaction that can produce social norms and social pressure 
related to multiple partnerships. These placebo similar others variables include: whether the youth 
shops for the household; chances of living in Cape Town three years from now; and young adults’ 
month of birth. Our expectation is that there should be no evidence of social interaction based on 
this similar others placebo social groups. Table 2.2 shows the results based on the placebo social groups49. As 
is evident from the table we find no significant effects of social interaction (social norms and the 
interaction between social norms and social pressure) variables on number of partners. This confirms 
that our findings in table 2.1 are not spurious but are indeed picking up the effects of social 
interactions. 
  
                                                 

















Table 2.2: Falsification Test - Placebo Social Groups Results  
 Panel A Panel B 
 Both  Sexually Active Population  and Sexually Inactive 
Population  
Sexually Active Population Only 
 IVTOBIT GMM IVPROBIT GMM 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage   
 Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear model Linear in means model 
   No. of sex partners  incl. 
not sexually active 
 No. of sex partners  incl. 
not sexually active 





















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Social norm  1.407 0.861 2.665 1.793 -0.0902 -0.0475 8.942 -4.003 
 (1.809) (0.892) (2.588) (1.238) (0.375) (0.343) (16.93) (17.51) 
Social norm*social pressure -2.381 -0.0596 -4.466 -0.830 0.0898 0.0476 -3.808 7.129 
 (4.674) (0.810) (6.760) (1.115) (0.279) (0.245) (12.58) (12.41) 
Social group characteristics 0.238 0.139 0.371 0.224 0.00420 0.0108 -0.153 -0.0835 
 (0.274) (0.144) (0.394) (0.198) (0.00888) (0.0261) (0.419) (1.354) 
Education years -0.0297** -0.0332*** -0.0276 -0.0324*** -0.000798 -0.00170 -0.0492 -0.0812 
 (0.0126) (0.00877) (0.0179) (0.0119) (0.000761) (0.00140) (0.0376) (0.0730) 
Mills ratio 32.91*** 32.79*** 63.70*** 63.02***     
 (10.98) (7.062) (16.14) (10.13)     
HIV prevention, abstain 0.152*** 0.120*** 0.285*** 0.248*** -0.000975 0.00111 0.0844 -0.0536 
 (0.0438) (0.0340) (0.0617) (0.0464) (0.00283) (0.00297) (0.141) (0.155) 
HIV prevention, one partner -0.0194 -0.0419 -0.118 -0.116* 0.00443 0.00112 0.0892 -0.0682 
 (0.0683) (0.0466) (0.0968) (0.0639) (0.00444) (0.00384) (0.236) (0.202) 
Knows someone died of AIDS 0.124*** 0.0748** 0.178*** 0.121*** 0.00534* 0.000781 0.135 -0.0245 
 (0.0478) (0.0321) (0.0663) (0.0431) (0.00291) (0.00195) (0.143) (0.102) 
Majority population, Coloured -0.281*** -0.282*** -0.481*** -0.443*** -0.00515 -0.0108 -0.185 -0.280 
 (0.0596) (0.0540) (0.0846) (0.0735) (0.00337) (0.00683) (0.172) (0.356) 
Majority population, White -0.250* -0.222** -0.491*** -0.417*** -0.000204 -0.00725 0.0997 0.0291 
 (0.130) (0.108) (0.188) (0.148) (0.00609) (0.0168) (0.288) (0.868) 
HIV prevention, condom     -0.00748* -0.00694** -0.0646 -0.248 
     (0.00411) (0.00309) (0.211) (0.176) 
Constant -3.967** -4.351*** -8.730*** -9.306*** 0.0962 0.0957 -5.898 0.190 
 (1.561) (1.066) (2.293) (1.525) (0.172) (0.171) (7.763) (8.754) 
Observations 1,408 2,739 1,408 2,739 1,030 2,063 1,030 2,063 
R-squared 0.051 0.089   0.025 0.005   
Anderson statistics (p-value) 0.0159 0.0000   0.0003 0.0320   
● Standard errors in parentheses      ● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%           
● Definition of instruments follows from table 2.2.            
● Majority population reference is Black 
1 The analysis in this table replaces our original social groups (income, gender, race and age) with placebo social groups using 
















Our last falsification test of our social group composition involves using alternative variables in our 
datasets. Specifically, data from two questions in the CAPS wave 3 questionnaire is used: “Have you ever 
had sex?” where the response option were yes or no and the second question is “How many of your friends 
have had sex?” where the response options were “most of them”, “some of them”, “few of them”, and “none of 
them”. Our first expectation is that there is likely to be a strong positive correlation between these two 
questions as a result of social interaction. That is, whether the young adult is sexually active will be 
correlated with whether the young adult’s friends are sexually active. Secondly, if the average of the 
first question (“Have you ever had sex?”) by our social groups is derived, then this average behaviour 
should also be correlated with the first question. That is, if our social grouping is a true representation 
of the youths’ social circle then the average behaviour of the social group in terms of how sexually active 
the youths are will also be correlated with whether the youth is sexually active. Thirdly, if indeed our 
social grouping is a true representation of the youths' social circle, then the average behaviour based on 
the placebo social grouping will not be correlated with whether the youth is sexually active or not. Table 
2.3 depicts the correlation of the above scenarios. 
Table 2.3: Tetrachoric Correlation1 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Have had sex (1) Tetrachoric correlation 1.000 
     Standard error 0.000 
     
      Friends have had sex (response from young adult) (2) Tetrachoric correlation 0.695 1.000 
    Standard error 0.021 0.000 
    2-sided exact P2 0.000 
     
      “Friends” have had sex (average of social group) (3) Tetrachoric correlation 0.568 0.428 1.000 
   Standard error 0.025 0.024 0.000 
   2-sided exact P 0.000 0.000 
    
      “Friends” have had sex (average of placebo social group) (4) Tetrachoric correlation 0.251 0.288 0.178 1.000 
  Standard error 0.031 0.028 0.029 0.000 
  2-sided exact P 0.000 0.000 0.000   
● Number of observation: 2919 
1 Tetrachoric correlation is specifically designed for measuring correlation between binary variables. We therefore converted the responses 
from “How many of you friends have had sex?” to binary representing “none of my friends” and “some of my friends”. Tetrachoric correlation is 
the only one applicable to our data which is mostly categorical in nature, the other correlations offered by STATA are designed for 
continuous data (pairwise correlation, and partial correlation), and hence using the correlation would bias our results.  
2 The p-value is based on the null hypothesis that the variables are independent (2-sided exact P); that is, 1 and 2; or 2 and 3; or 3 and 4; or 1 
and 4.  
 
As can be seen and as per our expectation the correlation between whether the young adult has had 
sex (1) and whether their friends have had sex (2) is quite high at 0.695, furthermore the p-value of 
0.0000 implies the failure to accept the null hypothesis of independence between (1) and (2).  
Additionally and as per our expectation the correlation between whether the youth has had sex (1) and 
the average of whether the social group is sexually active (3) is also relatively high, 0.568, and positive 















Finally the correlation between whether the youth has had sex (1) and the average of the placebo social 
group (4) is as expected very low, 0.251. These findings imply that the social group radius and the youth 
friendship radius are likely to be equivalent, hence validating our social group classification. 
2.8 Conclusion 
To reiterate, this study sought to investigate whether social norms and the associated social pressure 
influence an individuals’ choice to engage in multiple sexual partnerships. To address the question 
alternative estimation strategies are used. These included using different estimation strategies – cross 
sectional and panel data methods to establish whether our findings will be consistent. The data used is 
the CAPS data on young adults in Cape Town, South Africa. Further to this, the analysis was based on 
different types of populations, namely the sexually active population and the sexually inactive population. To 
control for sample selection bias which can occur as a result of including the sexually inactive population a 
censored two stage model (CTSM) is employed, where in the first stage the Mills ratio is derived and 
then used as an additional regressor in the second stage outcome model (Wooldridge 2002; Greene 
2004; Okten and Osili 2004; Bushway et al. 2007; Bezabih et al. 2010).  
To circumvent the identification problem inherent in models of social interaction various model 
specifications and a menu of IV strategies are employed. The model specifications include using both 
linear-in-means models and non-linear-in-means models owing to the fact that these models require 
different identification requirements (Blume et al., 2010). These different model specifications are 
deployed in both cross sectional and panel data methods taking advantage of the cross sectional 
nature of the CAPS (wave 3) data and the panel nature of CAPS (using waves 1, 3 and 4).  
The instruments based on the work of Grodner and Kniesner (2005); Etile (2007) and Grodner et al. 
(2011) include the trend setter of the norms, adjacent social group age bracket and one and two year lags. After 
providing a background to the validity of our instruments the Anderson canon correlation statistics 
test of underidentification and the Sargan-Hansen and Amemiya-Lee Newey statistics test of 
overidentification were employed. Lastly to validate our social grouping the falsification test of a 
‘placebo treatment’, based on the work of Lavy and Schlosser (2007) is employed, where social groups are 
constructed using ad hoc variables. Under this specification no evidence of social interaction is 
expected.  
The current literature on multiple partnerships discusses the persistent lack of change in multiple 
partnerships in sub-Saharan Africa (Wellings et al. 2006; Morris 2010). The literature also points to the 
fact that 80% of new infection is through heterosexual transmission (UNAIDS 2010a). As such the 
role of multiple partnerships in driving heterosexual transmission of HIV/AIDS has been at the heart 















disentangle multiple partnership prevention from HIV/AIDS prevention in regions such as sub-
Saharan Africa.  
A question that has persisted over time is what drives multiple partnerships in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Most studies have in the past looked at individual level factors. The study explores the possibility of 
social interaction being an equally powerful determinant. The results do indeed show that social norms 
and social pressure that occurs as a result of social interaction are significant in influencing multiple 
partnerships. The same conclusion is obtained using alternative estimation strategies. As such our 
findings shed some light on the reasons for the persistence of multiple partnerships in sub-Saharan 
Africa by going beyond an investigation of individual level factors. 
The results support the findings of the current qualitative research of Ragnarsson et al. (2009), Selikow 
et al. (2009) and Ragnarsson et al. (2010) that suggest that social norms and the related social pressure are 
responsible for multiple partnerships. In addition the results also show that for both men and women 
the choice of number of sex partners is affected by prevailing social norms and social pressure. These 
findings confirm the results of studies in Latkin et al. (2005)’s literature review and also qualitative 
research by Selikow et al. (2009). From a policy perspective this has important implications for HIV 
prevention initiatives such as the ‘zero new HIV infection’ vision promoted by UNAIDS. This is because 
the social norms influence the number of sex partners an individual is likely to have. As such it becomes 
apparent that in order to change sexual behaviour such as multiple partnerships and achieve a zero 
new infection rate interventions that can change prevailing social norms need to be established. 
We acknowledge the following methodological limitations. Firstly, it is well documented that data and 
modelling limit the social interaction empirical literature. Our dataset is not an exception in that it 
does not provide information on social groups. As such great efforts were placed in modelling these 
social groups. However, although all efforts were made to construct the relevant social groups we 
cannot deny the fact that theory open-endness (Blume et al., (2010) defines open-endness as social 
interaction models lacking theoretical structures that can naturally identify variables that can be 
included or excluded in the empirical model.) on social interaction literature makes it difficult to 
determine social groups composition with certainty. This makes it easy for such social interaction 
models to be vulnerable to measurement error. This problem continues to plague social interaction 
models. A further limitation is that we do not have any information that can substantiate that 
individuals do indeed interact based on the aforementioned characteristics in our dataset, for example 
evidence from telephone records. As such our groups are only proxies for social groups and should be 
taken as just that. Future research could overcome this limitation by using datasets that contains social 
network data, especially social network data that are not geographically influenced, for example social 
interactions via Facebook dataset as modelled (where geography is not a determinant in social group 
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Appendix 2.A: Characteristics of our Sample 
 
Table 2.A1: Overall Characteristics of the CAPS Surveys 
 
2002 (wave 1) 
 Black Colured White Total Male Female 
Age (mean) 18.1 17.9 17.8 18.0 17.911 18.015 
Education (mean years) 8.9 9.3 10.4 9.3 8.9751 9.4764 
Household per capita income (mean) 423.82 977.88 3814.48 1112.24 1176.4 1055.2 
Marital status (%yes) 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.9 
Has had sex (%yes) 61.6 34.2 28.6 46.0 45.8 46.2 
Age of first intercourse (mean) 16.8 18.1 19.3 17.4 17.3 17.5 
Partners in past 12 months (mean) 1.52 1.49 1.54 1.51 2.0 1.1 
Knows someone with AIDS (% yes) 21.0 10.1 9.9 15.0 13.2 16.4 
Knows someone died from AIDS (% yes) 33.0 13.6 6.7 21.5 18.6 23.9 
AIDS: abstain  (% yes) 37.3 47.2 55.1 43.7 40.1 46.7 
AIDS: use condom  (% yes) 92.4 87.8 87.1 89.8 90.3 89.4 
AIDS: one sex partner  (% yes) 14.4 19.4 24.8 17.8 19.6 21.1 
AIDS: limit partners (% yes) 4.2 6.0 13.8 6.2 5.2 7.0 
 
2005 (wave 3) 
  Black Colured White Total Male Female 
Age (mean) 21.13 20.76 20.76 20.92 20.86 20.98 
Education (mean years) 9.90 10.20 11.61 10.24 9.98 10.46 
Household per capita income (mean) 602.73 1244.68 5787.96 1411.01 1517.5 1321.2 
Marital status (%yes) 0.9 3.9 0.0 2.4 1.4 3.3 
Has had sex (%yes) 88.2 63.6 51.9 73.3 74.1 72.7 
Age of first intercourse (mean) 18.0 19.9 20.4 18.9 18.951 18.904 
Partners in past 12 months (mean) 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3463 1.0213 
Partners in lifetime (mean) 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.3 2.7732 1.9483 
Condom use with 'last partner'  (% yes)   
    
  
Always 56.2 55.8 61.73 56.22 64.8 47.41 
Usually 5.11 6.91 11.11 6.09 5.61 6.67 
Sometimes 21.02 15.19 16.05 18.71 12.41 25.74 
never 17.66 22.1 11.11 18.53 17.18 20.19 
Relationship with 'last partner'   
    
  
spouse/married 4.77 2.2 0.0 3.3 2.16 4.3 
someone loved but not married to 85.83 67.3 68.18 76.28 67.68 83.82 
someone knew well but didn't love 3.51 19.21 21.59 11.79 17.75 6.57 
someone you knew, but not well 5.89 11.29 10.23 8.63 12.41 5.31 
Time knew 'last partner' (mean)   
    
  
> 1 year 30.1 50.7 47.7 40.6 34.9 45.7 
>1 month but < 1 year 38.3 34.1 42.1 36.7 36.0 37.2 
> 2 days but < 1 month 24.8 10.0 6.8 16.8 20.1 14.0 
two days and < 6.8 5.3 3.4 5.9 9.0 3.2 
Knows someone with AIDS (% yes) 46.5 14.1 10.7 27.7 22.1 32.4 
Knows someone died from AIDS (% yes) 54.9 14.9 10.7 31.7 27.3 35.4 
AIDS: abstain  (% yes) 37.1 45.3 70.2 44.3 46.0 48.8 
AIDS: use condom  (% yes) 89.0 79.7 82.7 84.0 86.8 81.7 
AIDS: one sex partner  (% yes) 9.8 26.6 37.6 20.5 19.6 21.1 
AIDS: limit partners (% yes) 3.6 13.3 26.3 10.4 10.9 10.2 
 
2006 (wave 4) 
  Black Colured White Total Male Female 
Age (mean) 22.03 21.7246 21.761 21.862 21.807 21.911 
Education (mean years) 10.08 10.2849 11.761 10.376 10.112 10.591 
Marital status (%yes) 1.5 6.6 0.0 3.9 2.6 5.6 
Has had sex (%yes) 93.9 70.4 61.2 79.4 82.1 77.0 
Age of first intercourse (mean) 16.6 19.4 22.6 18.0 18.126 17.939 
Partners in past 12 months (mean) 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.9 1.1 

















Appendix 2.B: Distribution of Social Groups 


































































































































































































































































1 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 3 1 0 0 5 ● ● ● 0 7 1 0 2 3 0 4 6 0 1 0 0 2 2 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ● ● ● 63
2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 3 0 2 0 0 1 3 6 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
4 0 0 0 1 3 6 0 4 0 0 0 4 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 3 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42
5 0 0 0 1 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 20
7 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 4 1 2 1 0 0 4 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40
8 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 16
10 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 4 0 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 38
11 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 6 4 3 1 0 0 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 40
12 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
13 1 0 2 0 7 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 29
14 2 1 3 2 5 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 1 2 0 1 0 46
15 2 1 5 2 9 6 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 57
16 2 0 2 0 5 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 49
18 0 0 5 0 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 35
19 6 0 5 1 14 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 5 0 3 1 4 0 1 0 81
20 0 0 3 5 7 5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 44
21 2 0 5 1 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 31
22 5 0 4 1 11 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 47
23 2 0 2 3 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 43
24 3 0 1 1 7 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
25 2 0 1 1 7 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 4 0 3 4 1 0 1 1 40
26 2 0 2 5 3 10 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 49
27 0 0 7 4 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 43
28 0 0 6 3 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 35
29 0 0 5 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 27
30 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 0 3 0 5 0 1 1 1 0 5 7 0 1 0 0 1 6 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56



















Appendix 2.C: Comparison between Sexually Active and Sexually Inactive 
Population 
 








wave 1 (2002)       
age 18.9 16.4 17.3 
population group 1.5 2.0 1.8 
gender 1.5 1.5 1.5 
education in years 9.6 8.7 9.0 
age of sexual debut 17.4 
 
17.4 
wave 3 (2005)       
age 20.8 18.9 20.2 
population group 1.6 2.1 1.8 
gender 1.5 1.6 1.5 
education in years 10.3 10.6 10.4 
















Appendix 2.D: Results of the First Stage CTSM 
 
Table 2.D1: First Stage - Heckman Model   
 (2) 
Dependent variable: Had Sex CAPS 
Age  0.293*** 
 (0.0686) 








HIV prevention, one partner -0.128*** 
 (0.0179) 











HIV prevention, condom -0.0365 
 (0.0750) 






● Standard errors in parentheses        
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
















Appendix 2.E: Social Norm and Social Pressure using adjacent social group 
age bracket IV 
 
In this section we adopt the adjacent social group age bracket IV from the works of Grodner and Kniesner 
(2005); Etile (2007) and Grodner et al. (2011). The assumption is that the behaviour of age group  ̅      
for example will be correlated with behaviour of adjacent age group to the left,  ̅      and to the right, 
 ̅      because of similar socioeconomic neighbourhoods, however the adjacent social group behaviour 
 ̅      and   ̅      are uncorrelated with unobservables of  individuals in social group   ̅      (for example 
unobservables of a 21year old) because these individuals are not members of the adjacent groups 
(Grodner and Kniesner 2005; Etile 2007; Grodner et al. 2011). Therefore, adjacent group behaviour to the 
left and to the right of the social group can be used as IVs. The advantage of the IVs is that it allows for 
overidentification of the models50. The limitation is that the IVs exclude the youngest group and oldest 
group as these groups lack IVs51. 
 
                                                 
50 We also employ the ‘extended’ adjacent social group IV. This is based on adjacent social group age bracket, with the only 
difference being that we include the youngest social group and oldest social group by using social groups with a different 
characteristics, for example replace the oldest social group if males with female oldest social group. This is so as to include 
















Table 2.E1: Social Norm and Social Pressure Results  
● Robust Standard errors in parentheses         ● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
● Majority population reference is Black 
● Instrumented for social norm and social norm*social pressure 
1 Excluded instruments: social norm of left social group, social norm of right social group, social norm*social pressure of right social group and social norm*social pressure of left social group.  
2 Excluded instruments: social norm of older social group, social norm*social pressure of older social group  
 
 Panel A Panel B 
  Both  Sexually Active Population  and Sexually Inactive Population  Sexually Active Population Only 
  IVTOBIT GMM IVPROBIT GMM 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage   
Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear model Linear in means model 
  No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active  No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active Multiple Partnership (0/1) No. of sex partners 








































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Social norm  0.754*** 1.138*** 1.191*** 1.076*** 0.546*** 0.538*** 0.0218 0.0991 4.550* 1.190*** 1.372*** 1.486*** 0.0200 0.00964*** 0.0105*** 0.0137*** 
 
(0.186) (0.251) (0.321) (0.243) (0.155) (0.184) (0.216) (0.174) (2.634) (0.183) (0.246) (0.225) (0.0288) (0.00309) (0.00365) (0.00301) 
Social norm*social pressure 2.445*** 0.740 0.451 0.822* 3.138*** 2.050*** 3.027*** 3.029*** 15.48 13.01** 12.18** 11.57** 0.490*** 0.405*** 0.424*** 0.414*** 
 
(0.851) (0.467) (0.580) (0.432) (0.707) (0.341) (0.397) (0.312) (13.82) (5.640) (4.937) (5.126) (0.136) (0.0837) (0.0952) (0.0878) 
Social group characteristics -0.109 0.00425 -0.00323 -0.0165 -0.137 0.157** 0.0616 0.0316 -1.330 0.650 0.0534 0.138 -0.00156 0.0106* 0.00122 0.00134 
 
(0.111) (0.0933) (0.0776) (0.0680) (0.0919) (0.0672) (0.0542) (0.0505) (1.836) (0.461) (0.134) (0.151) (0.0194) (0.00629) (0.00231) (0.00224) 
Education years -0.0120 -0.00942 -0.00829 -0.00884 -0.00557 -0.0142* -0.00570 -0.00684 0.123 -0.0507 -0.00272 -0.0103 6.83e-05 -0.000957 -5.14e-05 -0.000233 
 (0.00889) (0.00990) (0.0120) (0.00933) (0.00739) (0.00725) (0.00836) (0.00689) (0.137) (0.0469) (0.0332) (0.0325) (0.00143) (0.000643) (0.000540) (0.000452) 
Mills ratio 41.19*** 61.66*** 75.50*** 61.86*** 28.74*** 33.16*** 38.44*** 34.44***         
 (7.245) (9.298) (11.86) (9.289) (5.848) (6.532) (7.707) (6.501)         
HIV prevention, abstain 0.120*** 0.244*** 0.291*** 0.242*** 0.0832*** 0.152*** 0.170*** 0.149*** -0.0946 0.0200 -0.0178 -0.0162 -0.000357 0.00116 -0.000496 0.000469 
 (0.0290) (0.0377) (0.0478) (0.0377) (0.0242) (0.0279) (0.0331) (0.0277) (0.248) (0.122) (0.120) (0.117) (0.00272) (0.00184) (0.00213) (0.00178) 
HIV prevention, one partner -0.104** -0.126** -0.139* -0.129** -0.0768** -0.0255 -0.0336 -0.0399 -0.220 0.0877 -0.0551 -0.00433 0.000374 0.00316 0.00180 0.00147 
 (0.0469) (0.0600) (0.0749) (0.0594) (0.0390) (0.0440) (0.0514) (0.0434) (0.488) (0.212) (0.195) (0.192) (0.00516) (0.00307) (0.00339) (0.00285) 
Knows someone died of AIDS 0.0343 0.114*** 0.146*** 0.112*** 0.0151 0.0979*** 0.108*** 0.0864*** -0.343 0.115 0.00197 0.0320 -0.00214 0.00230 0.00138 0.000961 
 (0.0316) (0.0410) (0.0515) (0.0403) (0.0266) (0.0307) (0.0363) (0.0302) (0.316) (0.141) (0.128) (0.125) (0.00332) (0.00200) (0.00218) (0.00183) 
Majority population, Coloured -0.121 -0.0245 -0.0267 -0.0263 -0.143** -0.218*** -0.316*** -0.252*** 1.814 -0.674 -0.0145 -0.0297 -0.00285 -0.0167** -0.00537 -0.00502 
 
(0.0781) (0.0874) (0.129) (0.0920) (0.0647) (0.0644) (0.0872) (0.0670) (2.363) (0.592) (0.222) (0.226) (0.0250) (0.00823) (0.00379) (0.00347) 
Majority population, White 0.163 0.0156 0.0424 0.0692 0.188 -0.596*** -0.433** -0.305* 3.859 -1.760 -0.125 -0.328 0.00400 -0.0287 -0.00191 -0.00245 
 (0.295) (0.301) (0.273) (0.237) (0.242) (0.216) (0.188) (0.175) (5.072) (1.332) (0.440) (0.481) (0.0535) (0.0182) (0.00754) (0.00721) 
HIV prevention, condom         -0.478 -0.142 -0.169 -0.187 -0.00727* -0.00398 -0.00463 -0.00475* 
         (0.463) (0.211) (0.209) (0.206) (0.00423) (0.00276) (0.00330) (0.00271) 
Constant -6.155*** -9.458*** -11.55*** -9.456*** -4.262*** -4.655*** -5.205*** -4.699*** -7.009* -2.015** -2.913*** -2.948*** 0.0350 0.0569*** 0.0414*** 0.0401*** 
 (1.063) (1.358) (1.736) (1.358) (0.858) (0.953) (1.127) (0.948) (3.939) (0.930) (0.538) (0.529) (0.0414) (0.0131) (0.00855) (0.00739) 
Observations 1,256 2,769 2,302 2,769 1,256 2,769 2,302 2,769 1,016 1,962 1,524 1,962 1,016 1,962 1,524 1,962 
R-squared      0.162 0.174 0.161 0.181     0.097 0.099 0.106 0.121 
Anderson canon correlation statistics 
(p-value) 
        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000         0.0283 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)      0.9636 0.4115        0.9229 0.4684   
Amemiya-Lee Newey statistic (p-
value) 















Appendix 2.F: Social Norm and Social Pressure Results by Gender 
Table 2.F1: Social Norm and Social Pressure Results among the Male Population   
 Both Sexually Active and Not Sexually Active Population Sexually Active Population Only 
 IVTOBIT GMM GMM IVPROBIT 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage   
 Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model 
  No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active   No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active   No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active  No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active 
 (1)1 (2)2 (3)3 (4)4 (5)1 (6)2 (7)3 (8)4 (9)1 (10)2 (11)3 (12)4 (13)1 (14)2 (15)3 (16)4 
Social norm  2.821 2.853** 3.035*** 3.303*** 0.689 0.922** 0.995** 1.006* 49.33** 4.352 18.17** 10.08 3.968 3.990** 8.041 1.388 
 (1.979) (1.432) (0.798) (1.136) (1.222) (0.441) (0.491) (0.543) (24.01) (10.77) (9.038) (9.295) (6.403) (1.755) (27.88) (0.885) 
Social norm*social pressure 0.778** 1.365** 0.804*** 0.772** 0.181 0.0747 0.0632 0.0656 0.127 1.619** 0.658*** 0.803*** 0.242 1.262 0.156 0.0996 
 (0.340) (0.561) (0.236) (0.361) (0.549) (0.492) (0.145) (0.139) (0.426) (0.644) (0.204) (0.188) (0.489) (1.166) (0.569) (0.153) 
Social group characteristics -0.00868 0.0483 0.0591 0.0772 -0.0456 0.0207 0.0490 0.0533 -0.965* -0.253 -0.0331 0.00976 -1.731* -0.553 0.332 -0.0688 
 (0.454) (0.115) (0.128) (0.151) (0.415) (0.0866) (0.0815) (0.108) (0.565) (0.211) (0.133) (0.153) (1.016) (0.599) (0.933) (0.264) 
Education years -0.0108 -0.0269* -0.0164 -0.0211 -0.00155 -0.0197 -0.00914 -0.00900 0.0383 0.0118 -0.00756 -0.00577 0.118* 0.0562 0.0299 0.0247 
 (0.0404) (0.0151) (0.0183) (0.0230) (0.0372) (0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0159) (0.0316) (0.0154) (0.0130) (0.0163) (0.0715) (0.0510) (0.0560) (0.0313) 
Mills ratio 105.5*** 64.33*** 104.5*** 121.4*** 59.99*** 48.42*** 58.62*** 62.44***         
 (19.67) (16.38) (18.65) (23.13) (14.11) (13.29) (12.70) (14.70)         
HIV prevention, abstain 0.223*** 0.146** 0.225*** 0.260*** 0.127** 0.102** 0.131*** 0.140** -0.0376 -0.0292 -0.0101 -0.0333 -0.396 -0.423 -0.111 -0.142 
 (0.0708) (0.0580) (0.0691) (0.0856) (0.0518) (0.0484) (0.0502) (0.0587) (0.0702) (0.0443) (0.0499) (0.0615) (0.271) (0.321) (0.233) (0.213) 
HIV prevention, condom         -0.191 -0.171* -0.0624 -0.0597 0.0851 0.101 0.131 0.0933 
         (0.139) (0.0921) (0.0860) (0.110) (0.157) (0.156) (0.121) (0.116) 
HIV prevention, one partner -0.148 -0.111 -0.139 -0.145 -0.0802 -0.0729 -0.0719 -0.0678 -0.178 -0.0109 0.00804 0.0249 -0.354 0.0875 0.0173 -0.0232 
 (0.120) (0.0893) (0.109) (0.134) (0.0869) (0.0743) (0.0782) (0.0909) (0.159) (0.0733) (0.0829) (0.0989) (0.291) (0.269) (0.227) (0.189) 
Knows someone died AIDS 0.121 0.0498 0.123 0.161* 0.0968* 0.0241 0.0978* 0.124* -0.0954 -0.0714 0.0218 0.0458 -0.239 -0.162 0.0436 -0.0155 
 (0.0761) (0.0632) (0.0757) (0.0959) (0.0562) (0.0530) (0.0562) (0.0672) (0.103) (0.0586) (0.0553) (0.0694) (0.242) (0.191) (0.146) (0.129) 
Majority population, Coloured 0.0114 -0.0936 -0.0458 -0.0521 0.000233 -0.0532 -0.0499 -0.0378 1.476* 0.275 0.159 0.0903 2.391 0.732 -0.799 -0.0685 
 (0.336) (0.131) (0.161) (0.201) (0.291) (0.112) (0.135) (0.133) (0.823) (0.310) (0.198) (0.223) (2.008) (0.837) (1.120) (0.390) 
Majority population, White 0.137 -0.0784 -0.0198 -0.0564 0.142 -0.0356 -0.0423 -0.0314 3.185* 0.763 0.316 0.164 5.272 1.882 -1.355 0.0266 
 (0.978) (0.270) (0.348) (0.375) (0.897) (0.224) (0.249) (0.235) (1.769) (0.638) (0.426) (0.481) (3.722) (1.793) (2.640) (0.816) 
Constant -16.12*** -9.956*** -15.99*** -18.54*** -8.556*** -6.758*** -8.470*** -9.062*** -3.546* -0.184 -0.686 -0.192 -8.352 -7.243*** -1.158 -2.750** 
 (2.773) (2.430) (2.729) (3.451) (1.942) (1.932) (1.863) (2.194) (2.016) (0.817) (0.612) (0.655) (8.983) (2.688) (1.601) (1.304) 
Observations 1,225 549 1,225 1,030 1,225 549 1,225 1,030 873 458 873 691 873 458 873 691 
Anderson canon correlation 
statistics (p-value) 
    0.0089 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0362 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000     
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)     0.7711 0.7006   0.1970 0.6308       
Amemiya-Lee Newey (p-value) 0.7813 0.3582            0.8709   
● Standard errors in parentheses      ● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%            ● Definition of instruments follows from table 2.2 in section 2.7.1  
















Table 2.F2: Social Norm and Social Pressure Results among the Female Population  
 Both Sexually Active and Not Sexually Active Population Sexually Active Population Only 
 IVTOBIT GMM GMM IVPROBIT 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage   
 Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model 
  No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active   No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active   No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active  No. of sex partners  incl. not sexually active 
 (1)1 (2)2 (3)3 (4)4 (5)1 (6)2 (7)3 (8)4 (9)1 (10)2 (11)3 (12)4 (13)1 (14)2 (15)3 (16)4 
Social norm  2.588*** 2.666*** 2.206*** 2.069*** 0.956*** 1.149*** 0.897*** 1.006* 28.57*** 0.401 33.51*** 139.3** 0.391 9.304** -1.203 -2.349 
 (0.612) (0.704) (0.494) (0.333) (0.259) (0.317) (0.343) (0.543) (8.720) (0.455) (12.76) (65.59) (1.410) (4.430) (1.004) (1.557) 
Social norm*social pressure 0.925*** 1.663*** 0.720*** 0.793*** 0.0377 0.0109 0.0670 0.0656 0.612 2.521*** 0.610 -4.722 0.500 3.015 4.461 6.472 
 (0.182) (0.546) (0.196) (0.141) (0.129) (0.324) (0.107) (0.139) (0.549) (0.780) (0.846) (3.435) (3.889) (6.058) (2.943) (4.166) 
Social group characteristics 0.120 0.117 0.0188 0.00967 0.0411 0.125 0.0286 0.0533 0.271*** 0.0419 -0.192*** -0.164*** -0.850*** 0.617 0.645* -0.0444 
 (0.142) (0.103) (0.0667) (0.0509) (0.0781) (0.0886) (0.0713) (0.108) (0.0832) (0.0315) (0.0644) (0.0621) (0.327) (0.462) (0.340) (0.251) 
Education years -0.0155 -0.0233** -0.00448 -0.00771 -0.00607 -0.0227** -0.00501 -0.00900 -0.0341*** -0.00928 0.00395 -0.0527 0.0916* -0.0985 -0.0174 0.0180 
 (0.0149) (0.0116) (0.0143) (0.0110) (0.00943) (0.00959) (0.00819) (0.0159) (0.00989) (0.00642) (0.0109) (0.0324) (0.0485) (0.0659) (0.0420) (0.0477) 
Mills ratio 44.15*** 41.83*** 52.92*** 43.29*** 26.72*** 31.42*** 26.59*** 62.44***         
 (10.15) (9.361) (13.08) (10.07) (6.921) (7.247) (6.936) (14.70)         
HIV prevention, condom         0.0288 0.0247 -0.0159 -0.0121 -0.0705 0.0599 0.0289 -0.138 
         (0.0251) (0.0195) (0.0229) (0.0437) (0.147) (0.214) (0.141) (0.161) 
HIV prevention, abstain 0.297*** 0.188*** 0.349*** 0.291*** 0.203*** 0.159*** 0.203*** 0.140** -0.0286 -0.0303 -0.0230 0.00475 -0.425* -0.417 -0.431* -0.507* 
 (0.0439) (0.0404) (0.0558) (0.0430) (0.0310) (0.0322) (0.0309) (0.0587) (0.0339) (0.0271) (0.0311) (0.0651) (0.253) (0.378) (0.247) (0.288) 
HIV prevention, one partner -0.139** -0.129** -0.169* -0.154** -0.0851* -0.0892* -0.0868* -0.0678 0.0892** 0.00534 0.00425 0.0822 0.104 0.407 0.344 0.145 
 (0.0701) (0.0630) (0.0871) (0.0677) (0.0487) (0.0502) (0.0485) (0.0909) (0.0417) (0.0324) (0.0397) (0.0829) (0.278) (0.373) (0.273) (0.288) 
Knows someone died AIDS 0.125*** 0.0871** 0.148** 0.115** 0.0852** 0.0732** 0.0840** 0.124* 0.0537** -0.00378 -0.00987 0.0433 -0.0720 0.180 0.142 0.119 
 (0.0473) (0.0413) (0.0577) (0.0449) (0.0334) (0.0334) (0.0326) (0.0672) (0.0264) (0.0190) (0.0233) (0.0467) (0.143) (0.196) (0.143) (0.152) 
Majority population, Coloured -0.0794 -0.221** -0.0754 -0.0471 0.0168 -0.0727 0.0118 -0.0378 -0.173 -0.0355 0.393*** 0.815*** 0.493 -0.264 -1.176*** -0.316 
 (0.0987) (0.102) (0.116) (0.0802) (0.0679) (0.0886) (0.0755) (0.133) (0.110) (0.0680) (0.0616) (0.298) (0.446) (0.899) (0.416) (0.406) 
Majority population, White -0.276 -0.356 -0.0392 -0.0207 -0.0350 -0.224 -0.0154 -0.0314 -0.807*** -0.165* 0.486*** 0.648** 2.307** -2.384 -2.183** -0.323 
 (0.358) (0.257) (0.198) (0.156) (0.186) (0.195) (0.150) (0.235) (0.233) (0.0910) (0.159) (0.307) (0.908) (1.503) (1.080) (0.631) 
Constant -6.915*** -6.456*** -8.176*** -6.675*** -3.854*** -4.382*** -3.812*** -9.062*** -0.408 0.0442 -1.433*** -5.922** -3.500*** -10.16** -0.573 -0.866 
 (1.502) (1.425) (1.924) (1.483) (1.025) (1.088) (1.060) (2.194) (0.409) (0.428) (0.453) (2.847) (0.889) (4.350) (0.767) (0.671) 
Observations 1,544 707 1,272 1,544 1,544 707 1,544 1,030 1,090 559 1,090 834 1,090 559 1,090 834 
Anderson canon correlation 
statistics (p-value) 
    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)     0.6852 0.8656   0.0112 0.0000       
Amemiya-Lee Newey (p-value) 0.3692 0.5685            0.9320   
● Standard errors in parentheses      ● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%            ● Definition of instruments follows from table 2.2 in section 2.7.1  
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Appendix 2.H: Social Norm and Social Pressure using Placebo groups 
Table 2.H1: Placebo Social Groups 
 Placebo Social Group 
 Both Sexually Active and Not Sexually Active Population Sexually Active Population Only 
 IVTOBIT GMM IVPROBIT GMM 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage   
 Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear model Linear in means model 









































 (1)1 (2)2 (3)3 (4)4 (5)1 (6)2 (7)3 (8)4 (9)1 (10)2 (11)3 (12)4 (13)1 (14)2 (15)3 (16)4 
Social norm  1.766 1.818 1.407 0.861 3.747 0.596 2.665 1.793 -0.0407 0.0698 -0.0902 -0.0475 12.64 -2.757 8.942 -4.003 
 (3.972) (12.20) (1.809) (0.892) (5.623) (16.79) (2.588) (1.238) (0.215) (0.114) (0.375) (0.343) (12.30) (6.016) (16.93) (17.51) 
Social norm*social pressure -0.336 -0.700 -2.381 -0.0596 -1.602 0.105 -4.466 -0.830 0.0355 -0.0340 0.0898 0.0476 -3.901 5.393 -3.808 7.129 
 (3.224) (8.990) (4.674) (0.810) (4.590) (12.37) (6.760) (1.115) (0.122) (0.101) (0.279) (0.245) (6.596) (5.366) (12.58) (12.41) 
Social group characteristics 0.235 0.226 0.238 0.139 0.436 0.0703 0.371 0.224 0.00624 0.00245 0.00420 0.0108 -0.322 0.0552 -0.153 -0.0835 
 (0.521) (1.374) (0.274) (0.144) (0.738) (1.891) (0.394) (0.198) (0.00863) (0.00283) (0.00888) (0.0261) (0.487) (0.151) (0.419) (1.354) 
Education years -0.0248* -0.0339 -0.0297** -0.0332*** -0.0199 -0.0295 -0.0276 -0.0324*** -0.00100 -0.00127*** -0.000798 -0.00170 -0.0458 -0.0863*** -0.0492 -0.0812 
 (0.0139) (0.0219) (0.0126) (0.00877) (0.0189) (0.0301) (0.0179) (0.0119) (0.000857) (0.000469) (0.000761) (0.00140) (0.0453) (0.0247) (0.0376) (0.0730) 
Mills ratio 31.97** 31.25 32.91*** 32.79*** 58.68*** 64.79** 63.70*** 63.02***         
 (14.41) (19.89) (10.98) (7.062) (20.73) (27.49) (16.14) (10.13)         
HIV prevention, abstain 0.194*** 0.123 0.152*** 0.120*** 0.350*** 0.238** 0.285*** 0.248*** 0.00574 0.000399 -0.000975 0.00111 0.312 -0.0387 0.0844 -0.0536 
 (0.0587) (0.0822) (0.0438) (0.0340) (0.0807) (0.113) (0.0617) (0.0464) (0.00389) (0.00187) (0.00283) (0.00297) (0.214) (0.0989) (0.141) (0.155) 
HIV prevention, one partner -0.0248 -0.0399 -0.0194 -0.0419 -0.145 -0.122 -0.118 -0.116* 0.00511 0.000387 0.00443 0.00112 0.0684 -0.0556 0.0892 -0.0682 
 (0.0914) (0.0653) (0.0683) (0.0466) (0.126) (0.0895) (0.0968) (0.0639) (0.00590) (0.00296) (0.00444) (0.00384) (0.332) (0.158) (0.236) (0.202) 
Knows someone died of AIDS 0.147** 0.0691 0.124*** 0.0748** 0.192** 0.127 0.178*** 0.121*** 0.00992*** 0.000723 0.00534* 0.000781 0.210 -0.0212 0.135 -0.0245 
 (0.0628) (0.0731) (0.0478) (0.0321) (0.0845) (0.1000) (0.0663) (0.0431) (0.00371) (0.00191) (0.00291) (0.00195) (0.192) (0.100) (0.143) (0.102) 
Majority population, Coloured -0.240*** -0.275*** -0.281*** -0.282*** -0.436*** -0.435*** -0.481*** -0.443*** -0.00425 -0.00881*** -0.00515 -0.0108 -0.177 -0.322*** -0.185 -0.280 
 (0.0644) (0.0339) (0.0596) (0.0540) (0.0875) (0.0460) (0.0846) (0.0735) (0.00402) (0.00219) (0.00337) (0.00683) (0.219) (0.119) (0.172) (0.356) 
Majority population, White -0.119 -0.219 -0.250* -0.222** -0.344** -0.382 -0.491*** -0.417*** 0.00907 -0.00209 -0.000204 -0.00725 0.0866 -0.0713 0.0997 0.0291 
 (0.105) (0.192) (0.130) (0.108) (0.147) (0.265) (0.188) (0.148) (0.00701) (0.00367) (0.00609) (0.0168) (0.353) (0.191) (0.288) (0.868) 
HIV prevention, condom         -0.00304 -0.00730*** -0.00748* -0.00694** 0.0697 -0.236 -0.0646 -0.248 
         (0.00600) (0.00283) (0.00411) (0.00309) (0.311) (0.166) (0.211) (0.176) 
Constant -5.052* -4.633 -3.967** -4.351*** -10.17*** -9.009* -8.730*** -9.306*** 0.0739 0.0374 0.0962 0.0957 -8.584 -0.0869 -5.898 0.190 
 (2.665) (3.421) (1.561) (1.066) (3.773) (4.720) (2.293) (1.525) (0.113) (0.0490) (0.172) (0.171) (6.497) (2.575) (7.763) (8.754) 
Observations 824 2,739 1,408 2,739 824 2,739 1,408 2,739 613 2,063 1,030 2,063 613 2,063 1,030 2,063 
R-squared 0.091 0.082 0.051 0.089     0.043 0.028 0.025 0.005     
Anderson statistics (p-value) 0.0000 0.5336 0.0159 0.0000     0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0320     
Sargan-Hansen (p-value) 0.8797 0.7224       0.8048 0.9338       
Amemiya-Lee Newey (p-value)     0.6838 0.9098       0.7289 0.6281   
● Robust Standard errors in parentheses         ● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
● Majority population reference is Black 
● Instrumented for social norm and social norm*social pressure 
1 Excluded instruments: social norm of left social group, social norm of right social group, social norm*social pressure of right social group and social norm*social pressure of left social group.  















‘Know Your Epidemic’: The Effects of Expected 
Health and Contextual Effects of Health Uncertainty 




This paper measures the effects of expected income, expected health and the contextual effects of health 
uncertainty on sexual behaviours associated with the risk of HIV infection using six cross sectional 
Demographic and Health Surveys. We argue that the concept of social interactions as critical guiding 
individual behaviour is applicable to our analysis of the determinants of sexual behaviour. We apply an 
alternative estimation strategy from the current existing literature to overcome the identification 
problem arising from selection bias, unobservables and simultaneity, which is often ignored. As 
expected the results show a significant negative relationship between expected health and risky sex and a 
significant positive relationship between health uncertainty and risky sex. The results show exposure to 
HIV information and education as important determinants of risky sexual behaviour, although to a 
lesser extent. These results point to the fact that limited economic prospects and uncertain future 
health status are even more important factors in engaging in risky sexual behaviour than the widely 
held view that lack of information and education contributes to deadly diseases such as HIV infection. 
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“While we cannot hold that uncertainty is something specific to Africa alone, the scale and impact of various kinds 
of catastrophes on the continent has been disproportionately huge….on one hand recurrent phenomena across the 
continent such as drought, famine and epidemics of various kinds and on the other predictable consequences of poor 
government and civil wars…resulted in a weakening of social fabric and traditional support networks, making life 
uncertain for the majority of Africans” (Haram and Yamba, 2009, p. 11). “Interviewer: Why is that, men think 
about pleasure first before thinking about their health? Informant: The dangers and risks of the job we are doing 
are such that no one can afford to be motivated with life-so the only thing that motives us is pleasure” (Interview 
with South African mine worker, Campbell 1997, p. 227 cited in Mannberg 2010). 
3.1 Introduction and Structure of the Study 
A number of studies point to the importance of the local social and physical environment in shaping sexual 
behaviour in general (Adimora and Schoenbach, 2005; Peterman et al., 2005) and HIV/AIDS in 
particular (Gabrysh et al. 2008; Nattrass 2009).  These observations are also complemented by policy 
measures in which HIV/AIDS prevention initiatives are called on to match underlying contextual 
factors, particularly known as the United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) ‘know the 
local epidemic’52 (UNAIDS, 2007; 2008). Approaches focusing on individual behaviour are unlikely to 
produce improvements in sexual health. This is particularly true in poor countries where personal 
choice is more constrained than in wealthier countries. Numerous calls have been made to pay greater 
heed to the local social and physical environment within which sexual intercourse occurs. Most economic 
research on behaviour is however mainly methodologically individualistic (Logan et al. 2002; Coates et 
al. 2008; Benefo 2010; Durlauf and Ioannides 2010), as famously cited, ‘economics is all about how 
people make decisions, sociology is about how they have no decisions to make’ (Duesenberry 1960 
cited in Morgan and Niraula 1995: p. 542). 
In this vein, this study examines individual risky sexual behavioural responses to expected income, expected 
health and the contextual effects of health uncertainty. The study is closely aligned to the empirical studies 
of Oster (2009, 2012) and Bezabih et al. (2010). The novel feature of this study however is in the 
application of an alternative estimation strategy to overcome the identification problem arising from 
selection bias, unobservables and simultaneity. The analysis is based on data from six cross sectional 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), three from East Africa (Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda) and 
the others from Southern Africa (Swaziland, Lesotho and Zimbabwe) to establish whether the 
findings are similar by region. Taking a different approach from most of the sexual behaviour 
literature our outcome variable is a risky sex index. The risky sex index is an aggregation of various 
sexual behaviours namely relationship with last partner, condom use with last partner, number of sex 
partners and age of sexual debut using confirmatory factor analysis (Bezabih et al. 2010). The rationale 
for this approach is that individuals who perceive themselves as practicing more risky sexual behaviour, 
                                                 
52  This means knowing where the epidemic exists (regional realities and populations most affected) and also what are its 
main drivers and where it is moving. In-depth understanding of the social and behavioural context is central to knowing your 
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are more likely to adopt other protective sexual behaviour to counteract their overall riskiness. As such it 
becomes paramount to aggregate behaviours and establish overall sexual risk. 
In addition, individuals who are not sexually active should also be included in the analysis as the 
decision to abstain also constitutes a protective sexual behaviour (Bezabih et al. 2010). However, their 
inclusion in our model implies the presence of sample selection bias, because the decision to become 
sexually active is non-random. To overcome this we use a censored two stage model (Greene 2002; 
Wooldridge 2003; Bushway et al. 2007; Bezabih et al. 2010). In the first stage a selectivity model for 
sample selection is estimated and the inverse Mills ratios used as an additional regressor in the second 
stage model.  
The main regressors in this model are expected income, expected health and the contextual health uncertainty. 
The study uses two different proxies for expected income: household income and wealth indices. To 
obtain household income the regression based approach is adopted using the Living Standards 
Measure Surveys (LSMS) following the work of Grim et al. (2006) and Oster (2009), while the wealth 
indices are calculated following the work of Rusten and Johnson (2004) and Grim et al. (2009). The 
departure from their work is based on the fact that confirmatory factor analysis is used to derive the 
indices, instead of principal component analysis since principal component analysis produces biased 
estimates in the case of categorical data (Kolenikov 2009a; Bezabih et al. 2010).  
The second main regressor is expected health. Our proxy measure for expected health is life expectancy 
following Bezabih et al. (2010). However, because DHS datasets do not contain any information on 
life expectancy the INDEPTH model life tables are used. In this case Oster’s (2009) work is extended 
by calculating three different life expectancies which vary by mortality rates and the life table pattern. 
The first life expectancy is named HIV-life expectancy 2 and this is based on the HIV mortalities (using 
2000s DHS data) and pattern 2 of the INDPETH model life tables, where pattern 2 captures the East 
and Southern African regions. The HIV-life expectancy 2 is unlikely to be non-HIV life expectancy since 
HIV mortalities and pattern 2 of East and Southern African regions with high HIV rates were used. As 
such instruments are used in the final analysis when using this proxy.  
The second life expectancy is called HIV-life expectancy 1 and this is based on the HIV mortalities with 
the only difference being that pattern 1 of the INDPETH model life tables which is based on West and 
Central African regions with low HIV rates is used. The HIV-life expectancy 1 is also unlikely to be non-
HIV life expectancy as the current mortality rates that are likely to be influenced by HIV/AIDS are 
utilised. However the reverse causality is likely to be ‘lower’ compared to the HIV-life expectancy 2 
because pattern 2 is employed. The third and final life expectancy is the pre-HIV-life expectancy 1. This is 
calculated using the mortality rates of DHS data from the 1980s, what is called the pre-HIV mortalities 
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expectancy is likely to be non-HIV life expectancy and thus does not require instruments in the final 
analysis.  
The last main regressor captures the contextual effects of health uncertainty. Three proxies of health 
uncertainty are tested which are captured by the variance of life expectancy following Bezabih et al. 
(2010) and derived from the three measures of life expectancy described above. The departure from 
Bezabih et al. (2010) is that while they calculated this at the community level the current proxy is 
instead calculates at a social group level. This is because place of residence brings with it 
geographically related unobservables (Blume et al. 2010) resulting in the identification problem. 
Following the literature by Manski (1993, 2000, 2003); Moffit (2001); Brock and Durlauf (2004); 
Grodner and Kniesner (2005); Brock and Durlauf (2007) and Blume et al. (2010) the social space is 
represented by a social group and not represented by a community. The social groups consist of 
individuals with the same gender, age and income and this eliminates any trace of geographically 
related unobservables associated with place of residence. As such the study looks at the social 
environment and not the physical environment. The instruments used to circumvent the identification 
problem are based on the works of Grodner and Kniesner (2005); Etile (2007) and Grodner et al. 
(2011). The study deploys two types of instruments. The first is the trend setter IV which extends the 
aforementioned works and the second instrument used is the adjacent social group age bracket IV is 
borrowed from the wok of Etile (2007). 
The health uncertainty proxy was tested by comparing the performance of the proxy with other 
indicators of health uncertainty such as World Health Organisation (WHO) mortality rates (Montgomery 
and Casterline 1996) of each country and we found a similar pattern. The social group composition 
was tested using the ‘placebo treatment’ which creates social group falsification tests following Lavy and 
Schlosser (2007). The results from the selected DHS data generally reveal a significant negative 
relationship between expected health and risky sex and a significant positive relationship between health 
uncertainty and risky sex. Our findings do indeed support Mannberg’s (2010) theoretical framework. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section 3.2 gives a brief background and provides details 
on current existing empirical studies in sub-Saharan Africa and the contribution of the current study. 
This is followed by section 3.3 which outlines the theoretical model. Section 3.4 discusses the 
estimation challenges and the approach used to circumvent them. Section 3.5 shows the results, and a 
conclusion is provided in section 3.6. 
3.2 Background, Motivation and Contribution of the Study 
‘This place is killing me’, a captivating title of a relatively recent research by Peterman et al. (2005) that 
points to the fact that the local social and physical environment may have a role to play in influencing the 
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context is significant in determining sexual behaviours. Similarly, Gabrysh et al. (2008) found that 
contextual factors influence HIV risk in Zambia. In response to such evidence the UNAIDS initiated 
a project ‘Know your epidemic, know your response’, calling for countries to match their HIV/AIDS 
prevention initiatives to the underlying contextual factors that may be driving their local epidemic 
(UNAIDS 2007; 2008). This approach is not surprising because after more than thirty years of 
HIV/AIDS initiatives, the world still remains challenged by the epidemic, with sub-Saharan Africa 
remaining the most affected region.  
Nattrass (2009) established that contextual factors play a significant role in the African epidemic, 
concluding that results do offer support for the validity of UNAIDS ‘know the local epidemic’ challenge. A 
comprehensive study by Wellings et al. (2006) reviewed global sexual behaviour patterns and found 
that social context does play a role in HIV/AIDS transmission53. The same view is shared by amongst 
others Gillespie et al. (2007); Wilson and Halperin (2008); Mah and Halperin (2010a) and Mannberg 
(2010). However, there is a paucity of quantitative empirical literature in this area (Macintyre et al. 
2002; Morisky et al. 2006; Benefo 2008; Coates et al. 2008; Painter et al. 2008; Burgard and Lee-Rife 
2009). To fill this gap, this study examines individual sexual behavioural responses to expected income, 
expected health and the contextual effects of health uncertainty54 using Mannberg’s (2010) theoretical 
framework.  
The aforementioned arguments have long been put forth by sociologists who have often argued that 
an individual’s health and health related behaviour are affected not only by their individual characteristics 
but also by the local social and physical environment (Macintyre et al. 2002; Diez-Roux and Aiello 2005; 
Gabrysch et al. 2008; Dembo 2009; Durlauf et al. 2010; Diez-Roux 2010), resulting in individuals from 
the same region having correlated health outcomes (Macintyre et al. 2002; Gabrysch et al. 2008; 
Dembo 2009). Therefore it is argued that, in order to understand individual health outcomes, it is 
useful to analyse the local soc al and physical environment (UNAIDS 1999; Diez-Roux 1998; Logan et al. 
2002; Jipguep et al. 2004; Adimora and Schoenbach 2005; Painter et al. 2008; DeRose 2009). Research 
dating back to the early twentieth century has demonstrated the importance of the local social and 
physical environment in determining an individual’s health outcomes. For example, Goldberger in 1916 
found the risk of pellagra to be related to the availability of fresh fruits and vegetables at the village 
                                                 
53 ...approaches focusing on individual behaviour are unlikely to produce improvements in sexual health. They are 
especially inappropriate to a poor country... In wealthier countries, personal choice is greater than in poor 
countries....Numerous calls have been made to pay greater heed to the social context within which sexual intercourse 
occurs (Wellings et al. 2006: p.1716). 
54 Health uncertainty has been highlighted as an influence on various health and health related behaviours, such as higher birth 
rates in younger women from disadvantaged populations (Geronimus 1996, Geronimus et al. 2006). Another example 
is parental uncertainty regarding HIV/AIDS status which has been associated with a decrease in children’s school 
enrolment (Grant 2008). Correspondingly, in relation to sexual behaviour, the high prevalence of uncertainty of future 
health outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa implies that the perceived future benefits of abstaining from risky sexual 
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level, independent of individual incomes, illustrating a link between individual and village level factors 
(Macintyre et al. 2002).  
It is only relatively recently that their incorporation into economic literature gained favour (Macintyre 
et al. 2002; Obermeyer 2005; Morisky et al. 2006; Benefo 2008; Coates et al. 2008; Painter et al. 2008; 
Burgard and Lee-Rife 2009). To date the general consensus is that, to understand individual health and 
health related behaviour, it is imperative to go beyond the study of individual characteristics (UNAIDS 
1999; Diez-Roux 1998; Jipguep et al. 2004; Adimora and Schoenbach 2005; Painter et al. 2008; DeRose 
2009; Diez-Roux 2010). However, as earlier mentioned empirical literature still lags behind (Macintyre 
et al. 2002; Morisky et al. 2006; Coates et al. 2008; Painter et al. 2008; Burgard and Lee-Rife 2009). 
The most recent studies that are closely related to the current research theme of health and sexual 
behaviour are that of Oster (2009, 2012); Mannberg (2010) and Bezabih et al., (2010). Oster’s (2009) 
theory suggests that responsiveness of sexual behaviour to HIV/AIDS will be lower for individuals 
with lower income and lower life expectancy. To test this theory Demographic Household Surveys 
(DHS) data for the periods 1998 to 2003 were utilised which include Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The theory is based on the following 
proposition: 
   
  
  , 
      
  
   and 
      
  
  , where    is the sexual partners,   is the HIV 
prevalence,   is the life expectancy and   is income. On the other hand, Oster (2012) includes 14 DHS 
datasets from the following countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In this study the theory 
measures responsiveness of sexual behaviour to HIV prevalence, life expectancy and HIV/AIDS 
knowledge. In this study the theoretical framework is based on the following proposition replacing 
income from the previous study with HIV/AIDS knowledge: 
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where   is the HIV/AIDS knowledge.   
Mannberg (2010) contends that it is not only expected health and expected income that influence sexual 
behaviour but also health uncertainty and extends Oster’s (2009; 2012) theory by including the 
contextual effects of health uncertainty. The theory postulates that in poor countries, the future is more 
likely to be uncertain. Individuals in these countries are therefore less likely to invest in their health 
and instead live for the present. Their sexual behaviours are therefore more likely to be risky. The 
study is based on the following proposition: 
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 , where     is unsafe sex,   
is uncertainty of future health,  ̃  is future health/life expectancy and   is income. Lastly, Bezabih et 
al. (2010) applied Mannberg’s (2010) theory using data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) of 
young adults in the Metropolitan area of Cape Town, South Africa. They found that indeed the greater 
the uncertainty with regard to future health the more risky the sexual behaviour, although their 
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3.3 Theoretical Framework 
This study adopts the theoretical framework of Mannberg (2010), to include contextual effects of 
health uncertainty in previous models of health and sexual behaviour.  
The theory is based on a utility maximising individual who trades off future health for pleasure derived 
from sexual activities in the present. The theory considers a two period utility model where an 
individual consumes goods (c), health (h) and sex (x). The preferences in period t are captured by the 
following lifetime utility function:   (          ), where   (     ) is consumption of goods in 
period one and two:   (     ) is consumption of health:    (         ) is consumption of safe sex 
and     (           )  is consumption of risky sex. The utility function is assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable, increasing in each argument and strictly concave. The consumption of 
risky sex yields more utility than the consumption of safe sex. Furthermore the consumption of safe sex 
and risky sex are assumed to be additively separable. In addition to this, the consumption of risky sex in 
period two does not have any implication on health since the individual only lives for two periods 
(Mannberg 2010). 
The theory further assumes that the individual faces two types of risks. The first being the risk of 
contracting HIV and the second is the exogenous risk associated with a change in health due to a 
stochastic health shock. The probability of HIV infection through unprotected sex is   (   ), while 
    (   )    is the probability of not being infected and hence staying HIV negative. However, if 
infected an individual is assumed to die in period one and therefore does not reach period two. On 
the other hand, the changes in health brought about by the stochastic health shock are reflected by 
high or low health represented by probability   and (   ) respectively. Additionally, the difference 
between high and low health, which Mannberg (2010) refers to as the ‘spread’ is given by   
(          ). Finally, if the individual lives up to period two then the expected value of future health 
in period two,  ̃  implies that        ̃  (   )     and       ̃      . This suggests that 
expected utility in period one can be expressed formally as follows:  
 [ ]   (  )    (   )     (    )        [ (     )]                                                                      (3.1) 
From equation (3.1)       is the scale factor of the utility of safe sex and        is the 
exogenous discount parameter55. Subsequently, the expected utility in period two is depicted in 
                                                 
55 According to Mannberg’s (2010) theory living in an area with a high risk of dying from causes other than AIDS 
implies that there is no guarantee of returns on investing in protective sexual behaviour. The implication is that the 
presence of future health uncertainty may result in risk averse individuals acting short-sightedly and practicing riskier 
sexual behaviours. Mannberg (2010) acknowledges that practicing riskier sexual behaviours may be the results of hyperbolic 
discounting, that is, present bias preference. The theory however does not include this in an individuals’ sexual 
behaviour decision. Furthermore, Mannberg (2010) argues that hyperbolic discounting is likely to be present in all 
cultures and that there is lack of evidence to show that individuals who are susceptible to HIV have a higher 
hyperbolic utility function. Hence the theory omits present bias preference from the analysis and concentrates on a 
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equation (3.2), while the inter-temporal budget constraints in period one and two are shown in 
equation (3.3) and (3.4) respectively: 
 [  (     )]        [    (        )   (   )   (       )]                                                         (3.2) 
                                                                                                                                 (3.3) 
   (   )                                                                                                                             (3.4) 
In the equation above p and q are the price of protected sex and unprotected sex respectively. 
Therefore the first order conditions for safe sex, risky sex and savings take the following form as 
revealed in equation (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) respectively: 
  [  ]
   
                                                                                                                        (3.5) 
  [  ]
    
                       ( ) 
    [      (        )   (   )     (       )]          (3.6) 
  [  ]
  
            
    [      (        )   (   )     (       )]                                      (3.7) 
Accordingly the model yields the following predictions: 
    
  
      
    
  ̃ 
   and 
    
   
  . That is, an 
increase in uncertainty of future health reduces the incentives to abstain from risky sex. Secondly, an 
increase in the expected level of future health increases incentives to abstain from risky sex. Finally, an 
increase in future income has ambiguous effects on incentives to engage in risky sexual practices 
(Mannberg 2010). The theoretical framework implies the following econometric model that specifies 
the relationship between risky sex, expected income, expected health and health uncertainty. 
          ̃                   [  ]      
                                                                          (3.8)                                                                                                
Where    is risky sex,  ̃  is expected health,         is health uncertainty,  [  ] is expected income,   are our 
control variables, and    is the error term. 
3.4 Empirical Framework 
The following sub-section introduces the data. The second part of this section describes in more detail 
the methodology used to define proxies for expected health, health uncertainty and expected income. The final 
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3.4.1 Area of Study 
The data employed in the analysis is the Demographic and Health Surveys56 (DHS). The surveys focus 
on population, nutrition and health, with recent surveys collecting data on HIV/AIDS including 
knowledge of the disease and sexual relationships, and in some countries the survey incorporates HIV 
testing.  In order to account for heterogeneity in HIV prevalence in the African continent (James et al, 
2006; UNAIDS, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010b), we include Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda in East Africa; 
and Swaziland, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe from Southern Africa. The  focus is on the Southern African 
and East African regions given that the Southern African region has the highest HIV prevalence of 
the  African regions (James et al. 2006; UNAIDS 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010b), in contrast  in East Africa  
the prevalence  is much lower. Table 3.A1 of Appendix 3.A depicts the characteristics of the DHS 
data. 
3.4.2 Variable Specification 
3.4.2.1 Risky Sex Index 
The outcome variable in this study is the risky sex index. This index is derived by aggregating different 
sexual behaviours for each individual. This section outlines the motivation for this approach. We then 
proceed to identify the types of sexual behaviours included in the index. Thereafter the procedure 
used to aggregate the index is provided. We also give our rationale for including the population that is 
not sexually active. 
While most sexual behaviour studies have in the past concentrated on measuring HIV risk using 
isolated individual behaviours, such as condom use, sexual debut, and multiple partners. However, this 
study adopts the view of Bezabih et al. (2010) that to gain a more accurate understanding, one needs to 
aggregate these individual behaviours. The main advantage of such an aggregation is that individual 
measures are unlikely to represent the full range of actions that reflect sexual behaviour that an 
individual takes. For example an analysis of condom use that divides the population according to non-
users (risky behaviour) and users (safe behaviour) is unlikely to present the overall HIV riskiness or 
safeness of the behaviour of populations. This is because an individual who does not use a condom 
with a spouse might not have the same risk as another individual who does not use a condom with a 
commercial sex worker. Further to this, individuals who deem themselves as practicing more risky 
                                                 
56 DHS are cross sectional surveys conducted in low and middle income countries in five year intervals. The 
surveys focus on population, nutrition and health, with recent surveys collecting data on HIV/AIDS including 
knowledge of the disease and sexual relationships, and in some countries the survey incorporates HIV testing.  
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sexual behaviour, are more likely to adopt other protective sexual behaviour to counteract their overall 
riskiness57.  
Notwithstanding, the aggregation of sexual behaviours is a relatively new phenomenon, and those 
who have attempted to do so have used ad hoc methods to allocate weights to the different types of 
sexual behaviour. Bezabih et al. (2010) recently constructed a risky sex index using LISREL 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assign weights to different variables. Hence following Bezabih et 
al. (2010) a risky sex index is constructed to capture the overall riskiness of an individual’s sexual 
choices. The variables used to calculate this index include type of relationship with last partner, 
number of sex partners, condom use with last partner and age of sexual debut. The STATA CFA 
package58 is used to construct our risky sex index because principal component analysis (PCA) will 
yield biased estimates because our sexual behaviour variables are categorical in nature (Kolenikov 
2009a; Bezabih et al. 2010). Further details of the CFA procedure are provided in Appendix 3.C, while 
Table 3.C1 of the same Appendix shows the CFA output. 
It is worth noting that rational individuals with many partners are likely to use condoms more 
consistently (Bezabih et al. 2010). Due to this correlation condom use will have a positive loading in 
the CFA analysis and might be wrongly interpreted as an increased risk in the construction of the 
index (Bezabih et al. 2010). Condom use is therefore not included in the CFA index59 because it is 
likely to be correlated with the number of sex partners. Bezabih et al., (2010) rely on qualitative 
aggregation and qualitative weights when including the behaviour associated with condom use in the 
CFA index. As such condom use is included in the index using qualitative weights, the index is then 
multiplied by 1 if condoms were used and 0 otherwise. 
Another sexual behaviour worth noting emanates from those who have not had sexual intercourse. 
Bezabih et al. (2010) put forth two arguments why this population should be included in the analysis. 
Firstly the decision to abstain also constitutes an HIV prevention strategy and secondly, sexual debut 
is likely to be influenced by age, such that older individuals are more likely to be sexually active than 
                                                 
57 A typical example is the relationship between condom use and type of sex partner. The data shows that there is very 
low condom use with the ‘last partner’ (15.9% of the total sample size). This is quite surprising considering that 77.8% 
believe that one of the methods to prevent HIV is to use a condom every time you have sexual intercourse. A further 
analysis of condom use by marital status showed that condom use was highest among those who have never been 
married (52.7%), followed by the divorced (31.4%), not living together (29.0%), widowed (25.9%), living together 
(10.3%) and lowest among the married (6.3%).  
We also created an indicator for multiple concurrent partners (MCP) by establishing the number of sex partners 
among those who have been married for more than 12 months. We find that 6.3% of those who have been married 
have had more than one partner, implying that they are in a MCP. This highlights the link between relationship type 
and sex partners also supporting our construction of an index. 
58 CFA was conducted using the STATA confa package. For more detail please refer to the Stata Journal volume 9 
number 3, further details can be found in the reference section of this paper. 
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young individuals60. Hence these individuals are included and are represented with zeros in the risky 
sex index (Bezabih et al. 2010). Therefore the overall risky sex index implies that the higher the score on 
the index the riskier the sexual behaviour, while zero represents no risk. The distribution of the risky 
sex index is depicted in table 3.C2 in Appendix 3.C61. 
3.4.2.2 Expected Future Health 
This section identifies the proxy used for expected health and outlines the procedure used to derive this 
proxy including the challenges of our proposed proxy.  
The proxy measure for expected health is life expectancy. The rationale being that life expectancy 
represents one of the best indicators of the overall health of a population (WHO 2010). DHS datasets 
do not however have direct questions on life expectancy. Therefore the life expectancy is obtained by 
using the INDEPTH62 model life tables (MLT) 63. Our measure overcomes the drawback of bias in 
self-reported information. The INDEPTH tables are based on the brass relationship life table system 
(BRLTS). The BRLTS assumes that any two mortality patterns are related through the following 
relationship:                 (  )             (   ), where            are the survivorship 
probabilities of the two mortality patterns, and     is the standard survivorship pattern. Given this 
relationship one can determine a complete life table of any population from a standard life table. 
INDEPTH has generated standard life tables specific to sub-Saharan Africa which have been classified 
into pattern 1 and pattern 2. Pattern 1 is based on populations of West and Central Africa where HIV 
prevalence is less than 10%, while pattern 2 depicts those of East and Southern Africa where HIV 
prevalence is usually above 10% (INDEPTH, 2004). Appendix 3.D provides the detailed 
methodology of how the life expectancy was derived. Table 3.D1, 3.D2 and 3.D3 of Appendix 3.D 
shows the distribution of the life expectancies in each country which were calculated using this 
methodology. 
                                                 
60 We tested the argument with DHS data. In these data sources the average age of those who are sexually active is 26 
years while those who are not sexually active have an average age of 18 years. Also 89% of those who are not sexually 
active stated that they intend to postpone sexual intercourse until marriage. 
61 The table shows that the population in the study from East African countries, Kenya (the majority 32.7% in the first 
quartile of the risky sex index), Tanzania (29.8% in the first quartile which represents the majority) and Uganda appear 
to have less risky behaviour than the population in the Southern Africa countries; Lesotho (the majority, 34.8% are in 
the fourth quartile), Swaziland (46.5%), although Zimbabweans appear to exhibit less risky behaviour as well. This is 
consistent with findings recorded in the literature.  
62 http://www.indepth-network.org. We employ INDEPTH tables because they allow the calculation of life tables 
even in cases where not all mortality rates are available for each age/age group, which is the case in the DHS data. 
DHS data only give information on child mortality rates which have been calculated using the reproduction section of 
the women’s questionnaire, capturing data on total child births and deaths. Additionally, although there are other life 
tables (for example the United Nations Model Life Table; The Coale and Demeny Model Life Tables; The Lederman 
Model Life Table System; and The United Nations Model Life Table for Developing Countries), INDEPTH tables are 
specifically designed for SSA countries, hence our preferred option (INDEPTH 2004). 
63 Model life tables present mortality indicators that are typical of given population groups, by levels and patterns of 
the risks of dying, they are a series of reference life tables that can be used to estimate mortality when only a few 
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The challenge is however the reverse causality between the INDEPTH life expectancy and our 
outcome variable risky sex. It is explicitly stated that the INDEPTH standard life tables are influenced by 
the prevailing HIV/AIDS mortality (INDEPTH, 2004) and therefore unlikely to be a non-HIV life 
expectancy. Furthermore the standard life tables have been classified into pattern 1 and pattern 2, where 
pattern 1 is based on populations of West and Central Africa with a HIV prevalence of less than 10%, 
while pattern 2 depicts those of East and Southern Africa where HIV prevalence is usually above 10% 
(INDEPTH, 2004). The section below outlines three different approaches that are employed to 
overcome this problem of reverse causality where we match different mortality rates (pre-HIV mortality 
rates and HIV mortality rates) to either pattern 1 or pattern 2 of the life table.  
The life expectancy that was obtained from the first approach is called HIV-life expectancy 2. This 
follows the work of Oster (2009)64, and the second and third proxies are extensions of Oster (2009) 
work. The child mortality rates from the 2000s DHS datasets (current datasets) are referred to as the 
HIV mortalities. Using these mortalities pattern 2 from the INDEPTH standard life tables is applied which 
corresponds with the dataset from East and Southern Africa and reflects high prevalence rates of 
HIV/AIDS. The HIV-life expectancy 2 is shown in Table 3.D1 in Appendix 3.D. Once this life 
expectancy is calculated, instrumental variables (IVs) are used in our final analysis since HIV-life 
expectancy 2 is unlikely to be non-HIV life expectancy.  The second approach maintains the HIV mortalities 
from the 2000s, although in this case pattern 1 is used instead of pattern 2 of the model life table, which 
is based on low incidence of West and Central African mortality patterns. This is named the HIV-life 
expectancy 1 and is depicted in Table 3.D2 in Appendix 3.D. However, because the HIV mortalities is 
used this life expectancy is also unlikely to be non-HIV life expectancy. Although the reverse causality in 
the HIV-life expectancy 1 is likely to be ‘lower’ than in the first approach since pattern 1 is used.  
The third and final approach uses child mortality rates from the 1980s DHS datasets65 (what we refer to 
as pre-HIV mortality rates) and pattern 1 from West and Central Africa countries with much lower 
prevalence rates than pattern 2 of the Southern and East Africa of the model life table. This is named 
the pre-HIV-life expectancy 1 and this proxy is likely to give us non-HIV life expectancy. As such IVs are 
not used when analysing this measure of life expectancy. Table 3.D3 in Appendix 3.D depicts the pre-
HIV-life expectancy 1.  
The use of the different approaches affords us the opportunity to work with three different types of 
expected health proxies: HIV-life expectancy 2, HIV-life expectancy 1 and pre-HIV-life expectancy 1. It is worth 
noting that life expectancy varies at age-gender-country level; please refer to Tables 3DI, 3D2 and 
                                                 
64 It is worth noting that Oster (2012) uses malaria frequency and child mortality as proxies for life expectancy. 
65 Since DHS surveys were not conducted in Swaziland and Lesotho in the 1980s, we do not have infant and under-
five mortality rates for these periods in these countries. We instead use Botswana 1988 DHS mortality rates as we 
anticipate that these countries had similar health characteristics in the 1980s. The life expectancy for Botswana, 
Swaziland and Lesotho in 1980 was 65, 61 and 60 respectively showing that the countries had similar health indicators 
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3D3 in Appendix 3.D of chapter 3. Based on this and on the fact that the social groups are based on 
income-gender-age and excludes place of residence (country) implies ample variation for analysis. 
3.4.2.3 Uncertainty of Future Health 
In their study Bezabih et al. (2010)’s proxy for health uncertainty is the variance of life expectancy 
calculated at the community level. The likely challenge with this measure is the influence of 
geographical related unobservables as a result of including place of residence (Blume et al. 2010). To 
avoid this we create a social space that is not based on place of residence but rather on the ‘similar 
others’ concept using age, gender and income in the social group formation.  
The concept social space has its origin in sociological literature, the definition of which is: “man’s social 
position is the totality of his relationships towards all groups of population and within each of them, 
towards its members” (Sorokin, 1927 cited in Prandy and Lambert 2003: p 399). This social space may 
contain many dimensions66. However, it is important to note that physical geography is not a 
necessary dimension in a social space. Indeed some school of thought among sociologists is of the 
opinion that physical geography has become redundant (Conley and Topa 2002). This sociological 
perspective is supported by others who cite advancement in transportation, telecommunication such 
as cell phones, internet and social networks as the major players in this perspective. See Manski (2000), 
Urry (2003) and Xu et al., (2010). 
Our social group composition is motivated by the fact that there is a general consensus among social 
proximity literature that individuals who are similar are likely to interact socially. This similar other 
tendency is dubbed as inbreeding or homophily by sociologists, while economists refer to this as 
positive matching or assortative matching (Conley and Topa 2002). The principle behind similar others 
can be found in Etile (2007) analysis of norms related to body weight. In peer effects studies where 
classmates are used as groups, under the proposition that they interact because of sharing similar 
courses/classrooms. See De Giorgi et al., (2010); Fletcher (2010) and Lundborg (2006). The adoption 
of the similar others concept can also be found in the work of Carter et al., (2001); Moody (2001); 
Vendrick (2003); Liljer et al., (2003); Lugalla et al., (2004); Munshi (2006) and Latkin and Knowlton 
(2006). Finally, the importance of similar others is accentuated in Conley and Topa (2002) who note 
that: “even causal observation suggests that personal networks may be stratified along specific socio-
demographic attributes such as race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, language, age, race, gender and 
education levels, in other words, agents are likely to draw a disproportionate share of their social 
contacts among sets of people that are very similar to themselves” (Conley and Topa 2002: p. 309).  
                                                 
66 For example Case et al., (1991) use city blocks, while Conley and Topa (2002) constructs a social space based on 
physical geography, ethnicity and socioeconomic similarity. Grodner and Kniesner (2005) group is based on 
individuals who are similar in age, family structure and location. Munshi et al., (2006) uses religion in their group 
formation. On the other hand Fletcher (2009) and Giorgi et al., (2010) use classmates as groups, while Etile (2007) and 
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Table 3.B1 in Appendix 3.B shows the composition of the social groups. As can be seen in Table 3.B1 
social group 1 for example comprises 59 individuals with similar ages, gender and income. However 
these individuals are dispersed across countries: 15 individuals live in Lesotho, 12 live in Swaziland, 13 
are in Zimbabwe, 8 individuals are in Tanzania, while 6 are Kenyan and finally the remaining 5 are 
Ugandan. Additionally within each country the individuals reside in different regions, for example the 
12 individuals from Swaziland are distributed as follows within Swaziland: 3 individuals reside in 
Hhohho, 1 in Manzini, while 5 live in Shiselwen and the last 3 in Lubombo.  
Thus instead of looking at the physical environment the study looks at the social environment, noting the fact 
that both the social and physical environment can produce contextual effects. In addition, defining health 
uncertainty at group level instead of community level maintains the theoretical framework of Mannberg 
(2010) outlined in section 3.2 where health uncertainty is measured as a contextual factor67. Furthermore 
since contextual effects are present in social and physical environment (Manski 1993), having health 
uncertainty proxy as the variance of life expectancy at social group level suffices68. 
Recall that in the previous section three different life expectancies were created: HIV-life expectancy 2, 
HIV-life expectancy 1 and pre-HIV-life expectancy 1. The fact that our proxy measure for health uncertainty is 
the variance of life expectancy means that there are three proxies. These include variance of HIV-life 
expectancy 2, variance of HIV-life expectancy 1 and variance of pre-HIV-life expectancy 1. 
3.4.2.4 Expected Income 
DHS datasets do not contain any information on either income or expenditure. However, we need a 
measure for expected income as per the theoretical framework. We use different proxy measures of 
expected income. These proxies include wealth indices (DHS wealth indices and own wealth indices) 
and household income. One of the motivations for using different measures is because of the fact that 
these proxies capture essential but different dimensions of expected income. That is, the household 
income is more reflective of the current earning capacity of the household. In this case we use 
household expenditure under the assumption that this is likely to be equal to household income. In 
contrast, durable goods ownership which reflects earnings not easily converted to current income is 
captured by wealth indices better. Another motivation is that these various measures possess different 
                                                 
67 We tested our health uncertainty proxy by comparing it with other indicators of health uncertainty. Montgonery and 
Casterline (1996) found a strong link between subjective health uncertainty and mortality rates. Hence we compare our 
health uncertainty proxy with the WHO mortality rates of each country. Graph 5.A in appendix 5 shows the 
distribution of health uncertainty by country. We find health uncertainty to be highest in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. 
Graph 5.B shows the World Bank mortality rates between 2002 and 2007 in each country. A comparison between the 
two graphs shows a similar pattern amongst the six countries, where Zimbabwe and Swaziland are ranked the highest, 
which validates our health uncertainty proxy. 
68
 In addition, several studies have alluded to the fact that an individuals’ assessment of uncertainty and risk associated 
with HIV infection, and mortality in general, are linked to the uncertainty and risk of the individuals’ social network 
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drawbacks which we discuss below. Lastly, we use these different measures to check robustness of our 
results to different expected income definition. 
The DHS datasets come with information on wealth indices. For a discussion on the DHS wealth 
indices see Rusten and Johnson (2004). However there are two main shortcomings with these indices. 
Firstly, the DHS wealth indices were calculated using dichotomised69 principal component analysis 
(PCA), this is despite the fact that PCA is specifically designed for continuous data. Consequently, 
applying PCA to categorical data is likely to render the indices biased (Kolenikov, 2009b; Bezabih et 
al., 2010). Secondly, in calculating these indices, country specific information on household durable 
goods ownership and housing characteristics is used, which is likely to increase the inaccuracy of 
comparing the wealth indices across countries. 
We derive our own wealth indices following the work of Rusten and Johnson (2004) and Grimm et al. 
(2008). These indices are constructed using household characteristics and durable goods ownership 
data. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), with Satorra-Bertler robust standard errors, is employed to 
aggregate the data into a single index. In the CFA output all the variables had positive factor loading. 
Additionally, although the RMSEA is slightly higher than expected (0.08), the Tucker-lewis non-
normed fit index (TLI) and Bentler’s comparative fit index (CFI) were both 0.9 indicating a relative 
good fit. A more detailed discussion is provided in Appendix 3.5. To address the biasedness of the 
DHS wealth indices we constructed our own indices using CFA, this measure is however not perfect. 
Without purporting to be exhaustive, wealth indices do not capture the differences in the quality of 
durable goods, for example an old black and white television is not distinguished from ownership of a 
seventy two inch colour television. Importantly, the indices do not adequately capture the differences 
in preferences for durable goods, which are more prominent, between the rural and urban areas. That 
is, in rural areas preference is more likely to be towards livestock keeping or farmland ownership 
whereas the durable goods used in wealth indices are more preferred in the urban areas. Additionally, 
provision of electricity, sanitation, water and housing are more likely to take place in urban areas than 
in rural areas in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, making these indices biased against rural areas. 
Moreover, access to services such as electricity depends on the availability of infrastructure which is 
more likely to be available in urban than in rural areas. See Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006); Grimm et 
al (2008); Booysen et al (2008). 
This brings us to the third and final proxy measure, which is household income. To impute the 
household income the regression based approach was used following the procedure of Rusten and 
                                                 
69 The use of dichotomised variables in PCA in the calculation of wealth indices was conceptualised by Filmer and 
Pritchett (2001) where the idea was influenced by the use of dummy variables in regression models. The expectation is 
that the model would have a better fit. However, Kolenikov (2009b) conducted a Monte Carlo simulation and found 
that the ‘Filmer and Pritchett PCA’ was outperformed by the ‘Ordinal PCA’ (variables are grouped according to rank) 
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Johnson (2004); Grimm et al. (2008) and Oster (2009). This approach is based on the assumption that 
households smooth out their consumption and therefore monthly household expenditure is likely to 
be equal to monthly income (Grimm et al. 2008; Oster 2009). In applying the regression based 
approach we use household and income surveys which are nationally representative surveys designed 
to capture consumption, expenditure and income patterns. We use the survey which are available to us 
and include 2008 South African National Income Survey (NIDS) and 2008 Tanzania National Panel 
Survey (TZNPS). Using these surveys, we regress per capita household expenditure on household 
characteristics common in NIDS, TZNPS and DHS datasets: 
    
                                        , where   is household characteristics. Using the 
estimated coefficients we then calculate income:   ̂   
      ̂               . In Appendix 3.F we 
explain this process in detail. One of the major drawbacks of this proxy is that it is based on the 
assumption that household smooth out consumption and as such expenditure is likely to be equal to 
income, if this assumption however does not hold then the proxy is likely to be biased.  Additionally, 
in imputing this proxy we used parameters estimated from external datasets hich raises the question 
of comparability between the DHS datasets and the external datasets. That is, the explanatory 
variables in the regression are likely to be inconsistent between the DHS datasets and the external 
dataset due to either measurement error or differences in the definition of the variables. See Sahn and 
Stifel (2003); Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006) and Grimm et al (2008).  
3.4.2.5 Covariates 
Standard control covariates are used following the standard practice recorded in sexual behaviour 
literature and include: educational attainment, knowledge of HIV prevention methods, and knowing 
someone with HIV/AIDS or someone who has died of AIDS. 
3.4.3 Estimation and Identification Strategy 
The most influential literature that addresses identification problems includes the work of Manski 
(1993, 2000, 2003); Moffit (2001); Grodner and Kniesner (2005); Brock and Durlauf (2004, 2007) and 
Blume et al. (2010). The estimation strategy used here follows their work, in addition to empirical 
works of Grodner and Kniesner (2005); Munshi and Myaux (2006); Etile (2007) and Giorgi et al. 
(2010). Equation (3.9) is the econometric model that measures the relationship between the risky sex 
index, expected health, expected income and health uncertainty. In the equation    is the risky sex index,       
if the individual is sexually active or      if the individual is not sexually active,  ̃  is expected health,    
are individual control variables,  [  ] is expected income,          is health uncertainty in the social group, 
   is social group characteristics which is included to avoid omitted variable bias (Manski 1993; Moffit 
2001), and    is the error term, the unit of analysis in this study is an individual. Equation (3.9) is likely 
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unobservable group level characteristics, the third is social group selection bias, and the fourth 
challenge is simultaneity (Blume et al. 2010). 
The first challenge dealing with sample selection bias is due to the inclusion in our model of the 
population that is not sexually active. The bias arises from the fact that the decision to become 
sexually active or not is non-random as it is likely to be influenced by many factors such as age where 
the older you are the more likely it is that you will be sexually active. To control for sample selection 
bias the study follows suggestions by Greene (2002); Wooldridge (2003); Okten (2004); Bushway et al. 
(2007); Garcia et al. (2008); Bezabih et al. (2010) and Bollinger and Hirsch (2012) and adopt the 
censored two stage model (CTSM) as this model includes all observations from the two populations 
(the sexually active and sexually inactive population) and where missing information are given zero 
values in our outcome variable. In the first stage a PROBIT model for sample inclusion, determining 
whether you are sexually active or not, is estimated (equation 3.10) and the inverse Mills ratios from 
this equation are then included in the second stage IVTOBIT model as an additional regressor. 
  |  
        ̃                [  ]                                                                       (3.9) 
 
  
  { 
             
                
                                           
                                                                                                   (3.10) 
where    
  is dichotomous and takes the value of 1 if individual i is sexually active and 0 otherwise;    
represents the determinants70 of becoming sexually active and include age, income,  gender, education 
and knowledge of HIV/AIDS and    is the error term. The unit of analysis in this study is an 
individual. An exclusion restriction is also included which is a dummy variable capturing whether 
abstinence is acknowledged as an HIV prevention method. The exclusion restriction is meant to 
reduce the high multicolinearity between the inverse Mills ration and the regressors in the model, such 
that if unattended would likely produce unreliable coefficients (Bezabih et al. 2010)    
The second estimation problem concerns our proxy for health uncertainty which, when defined at the 
community level suffers from the effects of geographically related unobservables (Manski 2000; Blume 
et al. 2010). Unobservable group level characteristics are environmental or institutional conditions such 
as healthcare facilities. Instead, and as previously mentioned social groups are defined based on age, 
gender and income across countries. The groups exclude any information on place of residence. Since 
residential information is usually a major source of unobservables, (Blume et al. 2010) our social 
grouping strategy has had the effect of neutralising geographically related unobservables by assigning 
individuals into imagined communities71 based on age, gender and income. It is important to note that 
                                                 
70 Bezabih et al. (2010) caution against using variables from the outcome model in the selection model (in our case 
income or health) as this will result in endogeneity in the selection model. 
71 The ‘imagined’ communities are defined by the individuals that make up the social group, column 1 of table 3.B1 in 
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modern technology advancement which include cell phones, internet and social networks have 
drastically weakened the role of physical geography in social interaction, making such social group 
clusters plausible. See Manski (2000), Conley and Topa (2002), Urry (2003) and Xu et al., (2010). Table 
3.B1 in Appendix 3.B shows the distribution of the original place of residence (country and region) by 
social groups and the new imagined communities that have been formed as a result of the grouping.  
While the geographically related unobservables have been ruled out in the current study, we cannot 
however rule out the likelihood of our social groups being influenced by non-geographically related 
unobservables emanating from the fact that the groups consist of individuals of the same age, gender, 
and income. This similarity means that each social group consist of individuals who are alike, and as 
such these similar individuals are likely to face similar non-geographically related unobservables. An 
example is the influence of unobservable educational outcome such as ability, or cleverness or self-
discipline which is likely to differ along age lines or income lines. Hence it is plausible that individuals 
may behave the same as a result of these non-geographically related unobservables. See Brock and 
Durlauf (2004) and Blume et al. (2010). The third challenge is in relation to social group selection bias 
which arises when individuals are sorted (un)intentionally into groups, yielding biased estimates See 
Angrist and Pischke (2008) on selection bias and randomisation. In the current study selection bias is 
due to the non-random assignment of individuals into social groups because of clustering these 
individuals based on similar socioeconomic characteristics. Hence it is difficult to view this clustering 
as untainted by selection bias. 
The fourth and final challenge is simultaneity between expected health ( ̃ ), and health uncertainty 
( 
       
), and the outcome variable risky sex. In the case of expected health ( ̃ )  simultaneity occurs 
when HIV-life expectancy 2 and HIV-life expectancy 1 proxies are used in the model, where simultaneity is 
a result of the proxy being non-HIV life expectancy. There is likely to be simultaneity between risky 
sex and contextual health uncertainty because while an increase in uncertainty can induce an increase in 
risk, by the same token an increase in risk can increase uncertainty mainly because the uncertainty is 
health related. Furthermore, as previously alluded to health uncertainty is measured by the variance of 
life expectancy, because HIV-life expectancy 2 and HIV-life expectancy 1 have a simultaneity relationship 
with our outcome variable it is likely that the health uncertainty proxies derived from these life 
expectancies will also inherit the simultaneity relationship.  
Recall that instead of considering the physical environment the study is based on the social environment, 
specifically social groups, under the knowledge that both the social and physical environment can produce 
                                                                                                                                                   
originally from the following countries and region, 15 from Lesotho, 12 from Swaziland, 13 from Zimbabwe, 8 from 
Tanzania, 6 from Kenya and the final 5 from Uganda. These individuals have now been grouped into the social group 
1 and ‘imaginary’ community 1. Furthermore within each country the individuals reside in different regions, for 
example the 12 individuals from Swaziland are distributed as follows 3 in Hhohho, 1 in Manzini, 5 in Shiselwen and 3 
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contextual effects. See Manski (1993). The key to our instrumental variable (IV) strategy is social 
grouping. Recall that the social groups consist of ‘similar others’ based on same gender, age and 
income. Each of these social groups contains the average expected health and the health uncertainty which 
is calculated as the variance of life expectancy.  
In this vein, the trendsetter IV is an extension on the work of Grodner and Kniesner (2006); Etile 
(2007) and Grodner et al. (2011). This instrumental variable which introduces trendsetters and age 
variation between social groups is grounded on the premise that older social groups are more likely to 
set the trend for younger groups in similar socioeconomic (gender and income) neighbourhoods. As a 
result it is suffice to say that the older social groups expected health and health uncertainty can be used as 
IVs for younger social groups whereas the opposite is not true, since:  
    (                         )         (                       )     whereas,     (                       )   . 
The assertion that older social groups are more likely to be trendsetters of younger groups in similar 
socioeconomic neighbourhoods is supported by a series of literature. 
First and foremost studies of Helleringer and Kohler (2005), Anglewicz (2006) and Kohler et al (2007) 
have interestingly observed that the HIV/AIDS risk perception even the levels of worry in a social 
network have a strong link with the individuals assessment of their own risk and their level of worry. 
Against this background our argument is that the health related contextual factors of younger social 
groups are likely to be based on health related trends from the older social groups. This is because the 
current literature shows that trends are usually initiated into a particular sub-cultures or groups by 
early adopters or initiators before spreading to other groups in the social system or culture. The early 
adopters or initiators are the so called trendsetters (Pinkerton et al. 1995; Bertrand, 2010; Salvini and 
Vignoli 2011). Consequently, the key insight is that trends do not just appear but rather they emerge in 
some sub-cultures and diffuses to other sub-groups. See Hendlin et al. (2009) and Alexander et al., 
(2001) for trendsetters and smoking; Kelly et al. (1992), Kelly et al. (1993), Pinkerton et al. (1995), Geary et 
al. (2006) and Bertrand (2010)for trendsetters and sexual behaviours related to HIV/AIDS; Dragone and 
Savorelli 2012 on fashion industry and trendsetters; Salvini and Vignoli (2011) in marital disruption; 
Montgonery et al., (1998) and D’Addato et al., (2008) in changes of fertility patterns. As such based on 
this trendsetting concept the     (                         )    . 
The trendsetter IV (older social groups) are correctly excluded because although the contextual factors 
of the young and the old social groups will be correlated, the ‘similar others’ concept dictates that it is 
only the contextual factors in your own group that are likely to influence your own individual 
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is that the oldest social group is always excluded72 as no older social group exists that can be used as 
IV73. Furthermore the IVs make these models exactly identified. We also use the adjacent social group age 
bracket IV based on the work of Grodner and Kniesner (2006); Etile (2007) and Grodner et al. (2011) 
in Appendix 3.I. The Anderson canon correlation test is adopted based on the null hypothesis that the 
model is underidentified, that is, IVs are irrelevant and are not correlated with endogenous regressors. 
The study also tests for overidentifying restrictions using the Sargan-Hansen test on the joint null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid, that is, the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term 
and that the instruments are correctly excluded from our equation as regressors. In the case of the 
non-linear model, IVTOBIT, the Amemiya-Lee Newey statistic test for overidentification which is 
similar to the Sargan-Hansen tests is used.  
Our final estimation model is a selectivity corrected nonlinear-in-means model as depicted in equation 
(3.11).  It is worth mentioning that the standard linear-in-means model of social interactions includes 
as regressors the individual controls, the average outcome of the group (endogenous effect) and the 
group averages (exogenous effect). However, we do not include the average outcome (average risky 
sex) as one of the regressors following our theoretical framework, although this does not violate the 
functional form of the model. 
  |  
        ̃                [  ]                                                                (3.11) 
 
Where    is the risky sex index,       if the individual is sexually active or      if the individual is 
not sexually active,  ̃  is expected health,     are individual control variables,  [  ] is expected income, 
         is health uncertainty in social group g,     is social group characteristics,    is the Mills ratio, and 
   the error term. Our estimation of the selectivity corrected outcome model uses STATA’s IVTOBIT 
model. This is motivated by the fact that the TOBIT model accommodates outcome variables with 
excess zeros, which is the case for our model where the zeros capture those who are not sexually 
active. Angrist et al. (2008) has found that one gets similar results with OLS estimation as with TOBIT 
or PROBIT models. As such we augment the IVTOBIT model with the GMM estimation especially 
given that the linear models in STATA are less constrained and allow for more post-estimation tests.  
                                                 
72  
73 We include the ‘extended’ trend setter of the norm IV based on trend setter of the norms IV. The difference between the two 
is that the omitted oldest social group is included by instrumenting this group with another oldest social group by 
different characteristics such as gender. This is also to allow the inclusion of the omitted social group since this IV 
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3.5 Estimation Results 
3.5.1 Regression Results 
The analysis in Table 3.1 is based on the objective life expectancy calculated using infant mortality, under 
five mortality and INDEPTH Model life tables and depicts the results of our regression equation 
(3.11). In panel A the current child mortality rates (what we refer to as HIV mortalities), and apply 
pattern 2 from INDEPTH life tables since our current dataset (2000s) is from East and Southern 
Africa to derive the HIV-life expectancy 2 used. As such we use IV as it is unlikely to be non-HIV life 
expectancy. In panel B we calculate the life expectancy using pre-HIV mortalities from DHS data from 
the 1980s and pattern 1 of the INDEPTH model life table, which is based on data from West and 
Central Africa. Here the pre-HIV-life expectancy 1 is obtained, and this is likely to give us a non-HIV life 
expectancy. We therefore do not use IV when analysing this measure of life expectancy. 
The results are based on the second stage CTSM model which involves using the inverse Mills ratio 
from the first stage Heckman model as an additional regressor in the models. This is so as to eliminate 
the selection bias in the decision to become sexually active or not, mainly because our sample includes 
all individuals sexually active or not. The results of the first stage Heckman model are shown in table 
3.H1 in Appendix 3.H. Columns 1-2 (Panel A.1) and 5-6 (Panel B.1) of Table 3.1 are based on the non-
linear-in-means models, specifically the IVTOBIT model using the censored risky sex outcome variable 
represented by 0 if an individual is not sexually active and > 0 if an individual is sexually active and 
hence captures the risk associated with sexual behaviour. While columns 3-4 (Panel A.2) and 7-8 
(Panel B.2) use the linear-in-means model as an alternative following Angrist and Pischke (2008) who 
have found that  we obtain similar results with OLS or 2SLS estimation as with PROBIT or TOBIT 
model when the outcome variable is binary or censored. As such the GMM model estimation is used 
especially given that the linear models in STATA are less constraining and allow for more post-
estimation tests like the Sargan-Hansen statistics test for overidentification available in linear models. 
The models presented in this paper are based on robust standard errors with clustering at the social 
group level. See Moulton (1990); Williams (2000) and Wooldridge (2003) for a discussion on robust 
standard errors and clustered data. 
Table 3.1 shows that the sample selection bias correction term, the coefficient of the inverse Mills 
ratio is significant at the 1% level for all models. This indicates that the sample selection bias as a 
result of including the population that is not sexually active is indeed present in the model and that the 
use of the CTSM is warranted. Additionally our main regressors, expected income, expected health and 
contextual health uncertainty are statistically significant at the 1% level and possess the theoretically 
expected signs. Specifically, our first regressor expected income has an ambiguous effect on risky sex. This 
ambiguity persists even after substituting the household income proxy with the wealth index proxy. 
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the results, however, should be interpreted with caution given the drawbacks previously highlighted 
and in light of our assumptions in section 3.4.2.4. 
On the other hand expected health has the negative theoretically anticipated sign. In addition and more 
importantly the variable is significant in determining individual sexual choices, such that as an 
individual’s expected future health improves, they are more likely to revise their sexual behaviours to 
less risky behaviour. The implication is that an increase in future health increases the incentive to 
abstain from unsafe sex as predicted by Mannberg’s (2010) theory. We find consistent results even 
after using three different types of expected health proxies, namely, HIV-life expectancy 2 in panel A, pre-
HIV-life expectancy 1 in panel B and HIV-life expectancy 1. Bezabih et al. (2010) found similar results 
among the youth of Cape Town, although the coefficient was not significant. It is worth noting that 
the expected health proxy was subjective life expectancy while our current measure is an objective 
measure, as such the difference in results could be attributed to differences in the proxy.  
The positive health uncertainty coefficient supports Mannberg’s (2010) theory that the contextual effects 
of health uncertainty is likely to reduce the incentive to abstain from unsafe sex, as the coefficient is 
statistically significant. Similar results were obtained by Bezabih et al., (2010) where health uncertainty 
was defined at community level to be insignificant.  
Another robustness check was to use alternative outcome variables. These alternative variables include 
number of sex partners and condom use where consistent results are found in all models. Table 3.M1 
of Appendix 3.M shows the results based on number of sex partners as the outcome variable, while in 
table 3.M2 the outcome variable is condom use. The study tests for model identification using the 
Anderson canon correlation test, where all our models reject the null hypothesis implying that our 
models are identified, and we show these results in the bottom rows of all our tables. We also test for 
the overidentifying restrictions in the GMM (IVTOBIT) models using the Sargan-Hansen (Amemiya-
Lee Newey) test. Overidentification is only present when the adjacent social group age brackets IVs are 
used. The results are displayed on the last rows of the Tables in Appendix 3.I. Most of the models are 
weakly identified as they fail to accept the null hypothesis. 
Interestingly, the results do not appear to be influenced by the magnitude of sexual risk taking as our 
findings appear to be similar for both the East African and Southern African countries selected. This 
is despite of the fact that the Southern African region is regarded as more risky in the existing 
literature. The results are shown in Table 3.LK1 in Appendix 3.L. 
3.5.2 Social Group Falsification Test 
A final robustness check is performed to validate our social group composition. To achieve this we 
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test is conducted using ‘placebo treatments’ following Lavy and Schlosser (2007) and is aimed at ensuring 
that the social environment effects found from our proposed social grouping  are not the result of 
measurement errors, such as unobservables. Hence the expectation is that insignificant social 
environment effects will be found when placebo social groups are used (Lavy and Schlosser 2007).  
Some of the recent studies that have used this falsification test include the research of Giorgi et al. 
(2010) who sought to explain how students select courses based on the influence of other students 
who took similar courses (where the reference groups consisted of students who took the same 
courses). Thus for the falsification test Giorgi et al. (2010) replaced the groups with placebo groups 
that were constructed by randomly and artificially allocating the students to hypothetical classes. The 
placebo social grouping showed no evidence of peer effects, verifying the authors’ expectations. In 
another study Fletcher (2009) analysed how classmates smoking behaviour influenced youth smoking 
decisions. For the falsification test Fletcher (2009) replaced classmates (peers who smoke) with those 
in lower or higher grades from the same school, as expected the author found no evidence of peer 
effects when lower or higher grade classes were used.  
Following these studies we apply the falsification test where our placebo social groups are assembled by 
randomly assigning individuals to social groups using ad hoc variables. Recall that our social groups 
are based on ‘similar others’ concept on the assumption that individuals who share the same 
socioeconomic characteristics are likely to interact. In this vein, the falsification test uses placebo social 
groups which randomly assign individuals into groups using ad hoc ‘similar others’ variables. Simply put 
we are arguing that not any ‘similar others’ characteristics will lead to social interaction. These variables 
include the day the respondent was interviewed, the respondents’ month of birth and sample weight 
information. Our expectation is that there should not be evidence of social environment effects based on 
these placebo social groups. Table 3.2 shows the results based on the placebo social groups using the trendsetter 
IV, in Appendix 3.J we show the results based on the adjacent social group age brackets IVs. As is evident 
from the table we find no significant effects on the social environment variables, confirming that our 
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Table 3.1: Second Stage CTSM Risky Sex Results 
 Objective life expectancy 
 Panel A Panel B 
 HIV-life expectancy 2 (2000s mortality rates) Pre-HIV-life expectancy 1 (1980s mortality rates) 
 Panel A.1 Panel A.2 Panel B.1 Panel B.2 
 IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT GMM 
 Nonlinear in means 
model 
Linear in means model Nonlinear in means 
model 
Linear in means model 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Expected health -0.179*** -0.404*** -0.240*** -0.522*** -0.0109*** -0.0132*** -0.0137*** -0.0166*** 
 (0.00488) (0.0236) (0.00658) (0.0306) (0.000341) (0.000303) (0.000420) (0.000375) 
Health uncertainty 0.116*** 0.295*** 0.157*** 0.383*** 0.0143*** 0.0128*** 0.0181*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00414) (0.0187) (0.00558) (0.0242) (0.000216) (0.000220) (0.000268) (0.000273) 
Social group characteristics -1.246*** -3.158*** -1.686*** -4.097*** 0.624*** 0.478*** 0.780*** 0.598*** 
 (0.0462) (0.204) (0.0622) (0.265) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0168) (0.0170) 
Expected income 0.0324*** 0.0790*** 0.0439*** 0.103*** -0.0126*** -0.00920*** -0.0157*** -0.0114*** 
 (0.00118) (0.00508) (0.00159) (0.00658) (0.000317) (0.000311) (0.000390) (0.000384) 
Education, years 0.0342*** 0.0470*** 0.0460*** 0.0613*** 0.0169*** 0.0164*** 0.0214*** 0.0208*** 
 (0.00184) (0.00437) (0.00247) (0.00566) (0.000998) (0.000881) (0.00123) (0.00109) 
Mills ratio -68.31*** -30.45 -91.56*** -41.14 -90.88*** -86.69*** -116.9*** -110.8*** 
 (11.43) (25.84) (15.39) (33.47) (6.395) (5.615) (7.928) (6.999) 
HIV prevention, one partner 0.0250** -0.00694 0.0354** -0.00634 0.0384*** 0.0396*** 0.0511*** 0.0520*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0288) (0.0171) (0.0373) (0.00711) (0.00629) (0.00884) (0.00787) 
Healthy looking person, HIV 0.119*** 0.219*** 0.160*** 0.286*** 0.0433*** 0.0508*** 0.0583*** 0.0671*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0301) (0.0171) (0.0390) (0.00695) (0.00617) (0.00865) (0.00772) 
Rural -0.123*** -0.348*** -0.166*** -0.450*** 0.0649*** 0.0552*** 0.0818*** 0.0697*** 
 (0.00995) (0.0299) (0.0134) (0.0387) (0.00515) (0.00460) (0.00633) (0.00568) 
Southern Africa 1.514*** 3.359*** 2.033*** 4.343*** 0.0655*** 0.0722*** 0.0822*** 0.0906*** 
 (0.0440) (0.201) (0.0594) (0.261) (0.00468) (0.00405) (0.00575) (0.00501) 
Constant 10.86*** 10.26*** 14.17*** 13.12*** 10.29*** 9.872*** 12.94*** 12.33*** 
 (1.164) (2.609) (1.568) (3.379) (0.652) (0.573) (0.808) (0.714) 
Observations 48,430 52,155 48,430 52,155 48,430 52,155 48,430 52,155 
Anderson canon correlation 
statistics (p-value) 
  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000 
● Robust Standard errors in parentheses             
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%           
● Rural reference is Urban and region reference is Eastern Africa  
● Instrumented for expected health and health uncertainty in panel A and health uncertainty in panel B 
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Table 3.2: Second Stage CTSM Risky Sex Results using Placebo Social Groups 
 Panel A Panel B 
 HIV-life expectancy 2 (2000s mortality rates) Pre-HIV-life expectancy 1 (1980s mortality rates) 
 Panel A.1 Panel A.2 Panel B.1 Panel B.2 
 IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT GMM 
 Nonlinear in means 
model 
Linear in means 
model 
Nonlinear in means 
model 
Linear in means model 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Expected health 0.158 0.0880 0.213 0.117 -0.196 -0.00990 -0.255 -0.0131 
 (0.611) (0.0972) (0.817) (0.128) (0.300) (0.0103) (0.391) (0.0134) 
Health uncertainty1 0.0124 -0.0145 0.0174 -0.0199 0.128 -0.00176 0.167 -0.00192 
 (0.0979) (0.0340) (0.131) (0.0448) (0.209) (0.00724) (0.273) (0.00941) 
Social group 
characteristics 
-0.102 -0.179 -0.134 -0.242 0.197 0.00323 0.257 0.00470 
 (0.165) (0.282) (0.220) (0.371) (0.320) (0.0147) (0.417) (0.0191) 
Income 0.00309 0.00216* 0.00410 0.00282* 0.00549 0.000949*** 0.00715 0.00124*** 
 (0.00813) (0.00130) (0.0109) (0.00171) (0.00737) (0.000261) (0.00962) (0.000340) 
Education, years 0.0238 0.0188*** 0.0314 0.0246*** -0.00351 0.0202*** -0.00445 0.0264*** 
 (0.0157) (0.00260) (0.0211) (0.00343) (0.0398) (0.00180) (0.0520) (0.00234) 
Mills ratio -252.3 -181.1** -335.6 -238.4** 17.90 -92.46*** 22.52 -121.1*** 
 (531.4) (75.47) (711.0) (99.41) (187.3) (7.471) (244.5) (9.751) 
HIV prevention, one 
partner 
0.256 0.170 0.343 0.225 -0.129 0.0570*** -0.167 0.0757*** 
 (0.716) (0.109) (0.959) (0.144) (0.299) (0.0130) (0.390) (0.0169) 
Healthy looking person, 
HIV 
0.337 0.252 0.451 0.333 0.319 0.0748*** 0.417 0.0999*** 
 (0.935) (0.166) (1.251) (0.218) (0.409) (0.0138) (0.534) (0.0180) 
Southern Africa -1.323 -0.754 -1.789 -1.005 1.737 -0.0187 2.264 -0.0215 
 (4.937) (0.772) (6.607) (1.016) (2.836) (0.0961) (3.703) (0.125) 
Constant 18.51 16.17*** 24.10 20.97*** 1.699 10.47*** 1.986 13.41*** 
 (20.98) (5.706) (28.08) (7.517) (15.23) (0.675) (19.89) (0.882) 
Observations 35,479 52,155 35,479 52,155 35,479 52,155 35,479 52,155 
● Robust Standard errors in parentheses        
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%              
● Definition of instruments follows from table 3.1.  
● Region reference is Eastern Africa 
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3.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of expected income, expected health and the contextual 
effects of health uncertainty on risky sex, an aggregation of risky sexual behaviour. The impetus for this 
study is the current gap in empirical literature that has assessed the role of contextual factors driving 
sexual behaviours associated with the risk of HIV/AIDS. To test this relationship we employ a 
theoretical model formulated by Mannberg (2010). The analysis was made using data from six DHS of 
selected sub-Saharan African countries, namely Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda in East Africa, and 
Swaziland, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe from Southern Africa. Fundamentally, the study differs from the 
conventional sexual behaviour research recorded in the literature and takes the view that to gain a 
more accurate understanding of this topic, one needs to aggregate individual sexual behaviours. This is 
because, intuitively, individuals who deem themselves to be practicing risky sexual behaviour are more 
likely to adopt other protective sexual behaviour to counteract their overall risk (Bezabih et al. 2010). This 
study therefore aggregated the behaviours into a risky sex index and established overall sexual risk 
using confirmatory factor analysis specifically designed for categorical data (Bezabih et al. 2010; 
Kolenikov 2009a). 
In addition, the study includes individuals who are not sexually active in the analysis as we believe that 
the decision to abstain also constitutes a protective sexual behaviour (Bezabih et al. 2010). A censored two 
stage model is used to eliminate sample selection bias (Greene 2002; Wooldridge 2003; Bushway et al. 
2007; Bezabih et al. 2010), where in the first stage a selectivity model for sample inclusion is estimated 
and the inverse Mills ratios are used as an additional regressor in the second stage model. The sample 
selection bias is a result of including the individuals who are not sexually active in the analysis and this 
is because the decision to become sexually active is non-random. 
The study uses two different proxies for expected income, the first is household income which is 
obtained through the regression based approach following the work of Oster (2009) and Grimm et al. 
(2008). The second is wealth indices which are calculated following the work of Rusten and Johnson 
(2004) and Grimm et al. (2009). Our departure from their work is that we use confirmatory factor 
analysis to derive the indices, instead of the principal component analysis due to the bias produced by 
principal component analysis on categorical data (Kolenikov 2009b; Mannberg 2010).  
We follow Bezabih et al. (2010) and proxy expected health with life expectancy. We use the INDEPTH 
model life tables to construct life expectancies because DHS data does not contain any information on 
life expectancy. The proxies which are an extension of Oster (2009) were constructed using alternative 
mortality rates and INDEPTH life tables patterns and include HIV-life expectancy 2, HIV-life expectancy 
1 and pre-HIV-life expectancy 1. The motivation for this is that INDEPTH model life tables are likely to 
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life expectancy will be exogenous in our model, and we believe this to be the case with the pre-HIV-life 
expectancy 1. Our proxy measure for the contextual effects of health uncertainty is the variance of life 
expectancy following Bezabih et al. (2010). The difference with our proxy from Bezabih et al. (2010) is 
that the study calculates this at a social group level, while they calculate their proxy at the community 
level. The reason for this departure is that the place of residence brings with it geographical related 
unobservables (Blume et al. 2010) and presence of unobservables renders the model unidentified. The 
instruments used to circumvent the other identification problem, follow the work of Grodner and 
Kniesner (2005); Etile (2007) and Grodner et al. (2011). Two different IV strategies are employed 
motivated by the social interaction literature and social grouping. The first is the trend setter instrument 
and the second is the adjacent social group age bracket instrument.   
Against this backdrop, the results from the selected DHS data generally reveal a significant negative 
relationship between expected health and risky sex and a significant positive relationship between health 
uncertainty and risky sex. The results do indeed shed some light on the pivotal role played by health and 
the underlying health related contextual factors as predicted by Mannberg (2010)’s theory. 
Interestingly, this pattern was observed for both the East African region and Southern African region, 
despite of the fact that the sexual behaviour of individuals in the Southern African region is regarded 
as more risky than that of individuals in the East African region in existing literature on the topic. This 
observation could be rationalised by the view that health and the associated contextual uncertainty are 
instrumental in influencing sexual behaviour regardless of the magnitude of sexual risk taking. 
Furthermore, the sub-Saharan African region in general is a region possessed by health uncertainty, 
for example uncertainty about the availability and/or affordability of health care including the 
uncertainty of adequate nutrition.  
Our findings are consistent with related studies that have employed data from different sub-Saharan 
African countries as case studies. For example Oster (2009, 2012) using DHS data found low life 
expectancy to reduce the incentive to abstain from safe sex. In turn Bezabih et al. (2010)’s study on 
youth in Cape Town, South Africa found future health to increase the incentive to abstain from sexual 
risk taking, although health uncertainty was found to be insignificant. However, it is worth noting that 
Bezabih et al. (2010) used a subjective measure of life expectancy as a proxy for expected health, while 
our proxy is based on objective measures of life expectancy. We are therefore left to question whether 
the difference in the results could be explained by the differences in proxies. In addition the results are 
similar to other studies in sub-Saharan Africa that have identified increased sexual risk taking in war 
zones areas and among commercial sex workers, for instance in studies by UNAIDS (2002) and Benz 
(2005). Furthermore, these findings are also consistent with qualitative research on uncertainty and 
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Overall our findings support UNAIDS ‘know your local epidemic’ advocacy for  understanding the 
contextual factors related to HIV/AIDS infection, as health and uncertainty appear to be background  
factors hindering the change in sexual behaviour. Consequently, this study points to these factors as 
being pivotal ingredients in the fight against HIV/AIDS, especially given that 80% of new HIV 
infections currently occur through heterosexual transmission (UNAIDS 2010a). One of the main 
arguments for this evolution besides medical advancement is the persistent lack of change in sexual 
behaviour in sub-Saharan Africa (Akwara et al. 2003; Maharaj and Cleland 2004; Wellings et al. 2006; 
Kongnyuy and Wiysonge 2007; Morris 2010). Thus it becomes paramount to look at the context 
within which sexual behaviours can be altered. 
This study is not without limitation. The DHS datasets do not contain any information on income or 
life expectancy. As a result these variables had to be constructed. However, because of the fact that 
our empirical model uses two constructed regressors under the given assumption and if these 
assumptions do not hold, these constructed regressors are likely to be poor proxies. As such one of 
the alternative models used in this paper uses wealth indices that are available in the DHS dataset. 
Hence in such models the only constructed variable becomes the life expectancy. This alternative 
model can be found in Table 3.J1 in Appendix 3.J at the end of chapter 3. 
Additionally, the social groups cannot be identified in the DHS datasets as such great efforts were 
placed in identifying the social groups. However, despite these great efforts we cannot deny the fact 
that theory open-endness of social interaction literature makes it difficult to identify these social groups 
with certainty, and hence makes it easy for such social interaction models to be vulnerable to 
measurement error. This weakness continues to invade social interaction models. Finally, the 
instruments depend on social groups which imply that if the assumptions placed on social grouping 
(that is proper identification of groups and the lack of social group self-selection) do not hold we are 
likely to be faced with weak or even redundant instruments. We do take comfort in the fact that the 
post estimation test revealed that the IVs were uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded 
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Appendix 3.A: Characteristics of the DHS Data 
Table 3.A1: Overall Characteristics of the Selected DHS  
  Kenya Lesotho Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zimbabwe Total East South 
Observation (n) 11,773 9,892 9,143 12,964 11,034 16,082 70,888 35,771 35,117 
Observation (%) 16.6 14.0 12.9 19.0 15.6 22.7 100.0 50.5 49.5 
 Age (mean) 28.5 28.6 27.3 28.2 28.2 27.8 28.1 28.4 27.9 
 Gender (% women) 69.6 71.7 54.5 79.7 77.3 55.4 67.8 75.6 59.8 
 Sexually active population (%) 83.2 82.8 77.1 82.9 84.4 76.8 81.1 83.5 78.6 
 Intention, postpone sex- marriage (%) 
 
90.0 92.6 84.7 89.1 89.3 89.2 89.4 
 Education  
         
no education  13.5 7.3 8.2 22.0 17.4 3.1 11.8 17.8 5.6 
primary  53.3 58.9 33.5 64.0 59.1 31.6 49.5 59.0 39.8 
secondary  25.0 32.2 49.9 11.8 18.9 61.2 34.1 18.3 50.1 
higher 8.21 1.7 8.48 2.16 4.58 4.08 4.73 4.9 4.55 
 Marital status 
         
never married 34.4 38.0 56.5 28.2 26.9 36.7 36.0 29.8 42.2 
married  53.3 49.1 28.6 56.4 49.7 50.7 49.0 53.3 44.5 
living together 3.9 0.8 8.1 6.6 11.9 2.0 5.3 7.4 3.2 
widowed  3.1 7.0 3.6 2.0 3.4 4.7 3.9 2.8 5.1 
divorced  1.6 0.7 0.6 4.0 1.0 3.1 2.0 2.3 1.8 
not living together 3.7 4.4 2.7 2.8 7.1 2.7 3.8 4.4 3.2 
 Age at first marriage (mean) 20.2 19.7 22.9 18.9 18.3 20.3 19.7 19.1 20.6 
 Age of first intercourse (mean) 16.9 18.1 17.9 17.1 16.5 18.5 17.5 16.8 18.2 
 No. of partners in 12 month (%) 
         
mean 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
no partners 15.5 14.5 14.6 10.8 13.5 15.3 14.0 13.2 14.9 
1 partner 79.1 71.4 76.1 81.4 79.4 79.2 78.1 80.0 76.1 
2 and above partners 5.4 14.1 9.3 7.8 7.1 5.5 7.9 6.8 9.0 
 No. of partners lifetime (%) 
         
mean 
 
6.3 4.1 6.6 3.1 3.4 3.9 3.7 4.0 
1 partner 
 
15.3 26.8 18.6 39.3 45.3 35.7 35.5 35.8 
2-10 partners 
 
74.2 67.5 68.6 57.8 50.6 59.2 59.8 58.8 
11-20 partners 
 
6.7 4.2 7.7 2.1 2.7 3.5 3.1 3.7 
21 and above partners 
 
3.7 1.5 5.1 0.9 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.7 
 Condom use, 'last partner'(%) 9.3 18.1 42.5 9.6 9.9 15.6 16.0 9.6 23.7 
 Relationship, 'last partner' (%)  
        
spouse/cohabiting partner  79.2 65.0 53.6 81.6 83.4 81.4 75.7 81.4 69.4 
boyfriend/fiancé 15.8 32.4 42.9 14.9 14.5 17.2 21.4 15.1 28.3 
casual acquaintance  5.0 2.7 3.6 3.6 2.1 1.4 3.0 3.6 2.3 
 Time (days) knew 'last partner'  679.8 882.9 92.4 153.8 526.5 42.1 387.9 443.7 350.5 
 Age of 'last partner' 
         younger 0.4 1.3 37.7 4.6 3.0 3.3 9.2 3.2 10.3 
about the same age 45.7 32.5 5.5 11.7 7.4 3.3 7.9 16.3 6.3 
less than 10 years older 49.6 45.7 51.3 71.9 81.3 74.5 67.8 71.5 67.1 
10 or more years older 3.9 10.0 5.4 9.9 7.6 18.9 14.1 7.9 15.3 
older, don't know difference 0.4 10.5 0.1 1.9 0.7 0.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 
 Alcohol with 'last partner'  




76.1 90.0 79.9 67.4 86.4 
neither drunk, consumed alc. 
 
6.8 0.4 35.1 7.5 0.7 4.2 10.6 0.9 
respondent drunk only 
 
22.2 3.0 8.8 2.6 4.1 4.1 3.3 4.6 
partner drunk only 
 
55.9 3.7 45.4 10.8 4.9 9.7 14.8 7.0 
both drunk 
 
15.1 0.8 10.8 2.9 0.3 2.1 3.8 1.2 
 Knows PLWHA (% yes) 74.0 24.9 50.8 29.4 65.2 29.8 45.8 56.8 34.2 
 Could get a condom  (% yes) 77.2 74.6 87.0 92.2 63.4 89.0 81.9 78.8 84.8 
 Heard of STD  (% yes) 98.7 93.5 99.7 99.2 99.2 98.8 98.3 99.1 97.5 
 Heard of HIV  (% yes) 98.6 92.4 99.6 99.0 99.1 98.3 97.9 98.9 97.0 
 AIDS: abstain  (% yes) 93.5 82.4 94.2 90.6 88.2 84.6 88.6 90.7 86.6 
 AIDS: use condom  (% yes) 72.9 79.9 89.7 75.4 72.3 78.9 77.8 73.6 82.0 
 AIDS: one sex partner  (% yes) 94.2 85.7 92.5 90.0 91.0 84.0 89.2 91.6 86.7 
 Get AIDS: mosquito (% yes) 15.4 36.1 18.9 13.6 27.3 18.8 21.0 18.6 23.5 
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Appendix 3.C: Construction of the Risky Sex Index using CFA 
We use the STATA CFA programme to construct our risky sex index. We hypothesise that there is an 
unobserved factor, the risky sex index, which is related to our sexual behaviour variables (type of 
relationship, number of sex partners and age of sexual debut) as formulated in equation (3.C1). 
        ∑                          
 
                                                                                (3.C1) 
 
Where;               are the observed variables (sexual behaviour variables);            is the 
number of factors, in our case 1 which represents risky sex,      are the factor loading/regression 
coefficients and    is the measurement error. The CFA model usually assumes multivariate normality 
and asymptotic robustness of the observed variables, implying that the log likelihood of the 
observation is: 
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Where S is the maximum likelihood estimate of the covariance matrix,   are the means. The 
maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs),  ̂, can be obtained by maximising equation (3.C2).  
The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix in this case is the inverse of the observed information 
matrix/ negative hessian matrix. However, when the normality assumption is violated,  as in the case 
of our observed sexual behaviour variables as they are categorical in nature, the quasi (MLE) still 
maintains some desirable properties: they are asymptotically normal and the inverse information 
matrix gives consistent estimates of the parameter variance (if the model is correctly specified and the 
error terms are independent). However, when the asymptotic robustness is violated then the variance-
covariance matrix will be inconsistently estimated by the observed information matrix (Kolenikov, 
2010). 
An alternative method that has been proposed for estimating the variance-covariance matrix that will 
ensure asymptotic robustness in the case of non-normal (categorical) data is the Satorra-Bertler 
‘robust’ standard error74. We follow Kolenikov, (2010), for this discussion. The maximum likelihood 
ratio statistics test when the assumptions are not violated is depicted in equation (3.C2) which has 
asymptotic χ2 distribution and the degree of freedom is equal to the number of over-identifying model 
conditions q = p* – t. However when the observed variables violate the assumption the (quasi-) 
likelihood ratio test statistic comprises a mixture of χ2 as depicted in equation (3.C3), implying that the 
(quasi-) likelihood ratio statistics have a non-standard distribution based on the sum of weighted χ2 
variables. 
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Where;    = eigenvalues of the matrix UΓ and        (   )
      . Hence Satora and Bertler 
(1994) conceptualised the Satterthwate-type corrections, which include the Tsc statistic that corrects 
the scale of the distribution and the Tadj statistic which corrects both the scale and degree of freedom. 
This is followed by an additional correction to the T statistic proposed by Yuan and Bentler (1997) 
represented by T2 in equation (3.C7) (Kolenikov 2010).   
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We performed the CFA with Satorra-Bertler ‘robust’ standard errors75 on our observed sexual 
behaviour variables. Root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) which measures the 
absolute fit was conducted to evaluate the model fit, where RMSEA values of 0.05 and less and a 
confidence interval covering this range indicate a good fit. Our RMSEA values fall in this range 
therefore indicating a good fit. We also conducted the Tucker-lewis non-normed fit index (TLI) test 
and Bentler’s comparative fit index (CFI) test where indices close to 0 show a poor fit and those close 
to 1 a good fit. Our TLI and CFI were close to 1 indicating a good fit. Once we had established that 
the model was a good fit we proceeded to obtain the factor scores. To do this we used the regression 
method76, which obtains the estimates of the predicted factor scores by minimising the sum of the 
squared deviation of the factors from the true values. Table 3.C1 shows the output of the 
confirmatory factor analysis.  
  
                                                 
75 Apart from Satorra-Bertler standard errors confa in STATA also provides the Huber Sandwich standard error test 
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Table 3.C1: Risky Sex CFA Output 
 
 


























1 20.357 1.000 1.033 0.077 32.7 29.8 23.6 32.7 26.6 46.7 
2 16.489 1.000 1.050 0.058 17.9 23.1 23.5 15.0 13.7 18.6 
3 14.754 1.238 1.057 0.051 28.7 28.8 36.4 17.6 13.6 16.2 
4 17.026 1.271 3.121 0.474 20.7 18.4 16.6 34.8 46.1 18.6 
Relationship type: 1=spouse, 2=live-in-partner, 3=partner not live in, 4=casual acquaintance 
Condom use: 0=used condom, 1=did not use condom 
  
Test vs independence: LR = 2037.063    ; Prob[chi2( 3) > LR] = 0.0000
No degrees of freedom to perform the goodness of fit test
                                                                              
sex12_quater       0.0907
    rel_type       0.3842
  age_firsex       0.0143
R2            
                                                                              
sex12_quater     .3031461   .0053907    56.24   0.000     .2925806    .3137116
    rel_type      .158308   .0124246    12.74   0.000     .1339562    .1826598
  age_firsex     1.204194   .0050729   237.38   0.000     1.194252    1.214137
Var[error]                
risk~0405201     .0175215    .002512     6.98   0.000     .0125981    .0224448
Factor cov.               
sex12_quater     1.313658   .0861864    15.24   0.000     1.144736     1.48258
    rel_type     2.374513    .286979     8.27   0.000     1.812045    2.936982
  age_firsex            1          .        .       .            .           .
ris~04052011              
Loadings                  
sex12_quater     2.183534   .0026065   837.72   0.000     2.178425    2.188642
    rel_type     1.271164    .002289   555.34   0.000     1.266677     1.27565
  age_firsex      2.61561   .0049897   524.20   0.000     2.605831     2.62539
Means                     
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Satorra-Bentler
                                                                              
















Appendix 3.D: Constructing the Expected Future Health Proxy 
The appendix gives a description of how life expectancy table 3.D1, 3.D2 and 3.D3 was derived.  
Table 3.D1: Life Expectancy, 2000s (calculated from post HIV/AIDS era mortalities & pattern 2) 
Age Kenya Tanzania Uganda Swaziland Zimbabwe Lesotho 
 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
0 55.5 58.6 48.9 55.3 46.2 49.1 58.8 62.0 65.4 65.3 61.5 65.2 
1 59.4 61.6 53.0 58.9 49.7 52.8 62.1 65.6 67.5 67.4 64.5 67.2 
5 58.3 60.2 52.4 58.0 49.2 52.3 60.7 66.0 65.4 66.8 64.2 65.2 
10 54.3 56.0 48.6 53.9 45.5 48.5 56.5 61.9 61.1 62.6 60.1 60.8 
15 49.8 51.4 44.2 49.4 41.1 44.0 52.0 57.4 56.4 58.0 55.5 56.1 
20 45.3 47.0 39.8 45.0 36.8 39.8 47.5 52.9 51.8 53.4 50.9 51.6 
25 41.2 43.1 35.9 41.3 32.9 36.3 43.3 48.6 47.4 49.0 46.5 47.4 
30 37.8 40.1 32.8 38.6 29.9 34.0 39.7 44.4 43.5 44.7 42.2 44.0 
35 34.7 37.4 30.0 36.2 27.3 32.1 36.4 40.3 39.9 40.4 38.2 40.8 
40 31.9 34.5 27.6 33.5 25.1 29.9 33.3 36.0 36.4 36.1 34.2 37.5 
45 29.1 31.2 25.3 30.4 23.0 27.2 30.4 31.9 33.1 31.8 30.5 33.9 
50 26.5 27.8 23.2 27.2 21.1 24.4 27.5 27.8 29.8 27.7 26.8 30.2 
55 23.7 24.2 20.7 23.7 18.9 21.2 24.5 24.0 26.5 23.8 23.3 26.3 
60 20.6 20.7 18.0 20.3 16.3 18.1 21.3 20.6 22.9 20.2 20.1 22.6 
65 17.9 17.3 15.6 17.1 14.2 15.2 18.4 17.3 19.8 16.8 17.2 19.0 
70 15.4 14.2 13.6 14.1 12.4 12.6 15.8 14.6 16.9 14.1 14.8 15.7 
75 13.6 11.7 12.2 11.8 11.2 10.6 13.8 12.7 14.5 12.1 12.7 12.9 
80 12.4 9.2 11.5 9.6 10.9 8.7 12.4 11.4 12.8 11.0 11.9 10.3 
85 11.8 7.8 11.9 8.7 11.9 8.2 11.9 11.4 12.0 11.2 12.7 9.0 
90 5.1 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.5 5.2 5.2 5.4 4.9 5.2 5.2 
95 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 
100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Table 3.D2: Life Expectancy, 2000s (calculated from pre HIV/AIDS era mortalities & pattern 1) 
Age Kenya Tanzania Uganda Swaziland Zimbabwe Lesotho 
 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
0 55.0 58.9 48.5 55.7 45.7 49.7 58.5 61.9 65.0 65.2 61.9 65.3 
1 59.3 62.0 53.0 59.5 49.7 53.7 62.1 65.3 67.5 67.2 64.5 67.4 
5 60.3 62.6 54.8 60.8 51.8 56.0 62.4 63.9 66.7 65.2 62.7 66.9 
10 56.4 58.7 51.3 57.0 48.4 52.5 58.4 59.7 62.4 60.8 58.5 62.6 
15 52.0 54.2 47.0 52.6 44.2 48.2 53.9 55.1 57.8 56.1 53.9 58.0 
20 47.6 49.8 42.7 48.3 39.9 44.1 49.4 50.6 53.2 51.5 49.3 53.5 
25 43.3 45.5 38.5 44.1 35.8 40.1 45.0 46.7 48.6 47.4 45.0 49.0 
30 39.2 41.4 34.7 40.1 32.1 36.3 40.9 43.5 44.3 44.0 41.2 44.7 
35 35.4 37.4 31.2 36.3 28.7 32.7 36.9 40.6 40.1 40.8 37.7 40.5 
40 31.8 33.2 27.8 32.2 25.5 28.8 33.2 37.4 36.1 37.4 34.4 36.1 
45 28.3 29.1 24.7 28.2 22.5 25.1 29.6 34.0 32.2 33.8 31.3 31.9 
50 25.0 25.2 21.7 24.4 19.7 21.5 26.1 30.4 28.5 30.1 28.2 27.7 
55 21.9 21.5 18.9 20.9 17.1 18.3 22.8 26.6 24.9 26.3 25.0 23.8 
60 19.0 18.2 16.4 17.8 14.8 15.5 19.8 22.9 21.5 22.5 21.6 20.2 
65 16.4 15.1 14.2 14.9 12.8 12.9 17.0 19.4 18.4 18.9 18.5 16.9 
70 14.5 12.6 12.7 12.6 11.5 11.0 14.9 16.1 16.0 15.6 15.7 14.1 
75 12.8 10.9 11.5 11.1 10.5 9.8 13.1 13.4 13.8 12.9 13.4 12.1 
80 12.8 9.8 12.1 10.4 11.6 9.6 12.9 10.7 13.2 10.3 11.6 11.1 
85 14.7 9.9 15.2 11.2 15.5 11.0 14.6 9.2 14.4 8.9 10.6 11.4 
90 5.1 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.5 5.2 5.2 5.4 4.9 5.2 5.2 
95 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 
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Table 3.D3: Life Expectancy, 1980s (calculated from pre HIV/AIDS era mortalities & pattern 1) 
  Kenya   Tanzania  Uganda  Zimbabwe  Botswana  
 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
0 55.4 75.5 41.5 47.7 40.6 57.0 52.3 75.5 58.5 57.7 
1 57.8 79.7 47.5 54.5 48.2 59.0 55.1 79.7 59.8 65.2 
5 57.9 78.6 50.9 57.9 52.2 59.3 55.8 78.6 59.0 67.0 
10 53.9 74.2 47.7 54.5 49.1 55.4 52.0 74.2 54.8 63.1 
15 49.5 69.5 43.7 50.3 45.1 50.9 47.7 69.5 50.3 58.7 
20 45.0 64.8 39.5 46.2 40.9 46.5 43.2 64.8 45.7 54.4 
25 40.6 60.2 35.5 42.3 36.9 42.3 38.9 60.2 41.2 50.1 
30 36.5 55.7 31.9 38.6 33.4 38.2 34.9 55.7 37.0 46.1 
35 32.6 51.2 28.7 35.0 30.2 34.3 31.2 51.2 33.0 42.1 
40 29.0 46.6 25.7 31.1 27.1 30.2 27.7 46.6 29.2 37.9 
45 25.5 42.1 22.9 27.4 24.3 26.2 24.4 42.1 25.5 33.8 
50 22.3 37.6 20.2 23.8 21.6 22.3 21.3 37.6 22.1 29.8 
55 19.2 33.3 17.6 20.5 19.0 18.8 18.4 33.3 18.9 26.1 
60 16.4 29.2 15.5 17.7 16.7 15.8 15.8 29.2 16.0 22.7 
65 14.0 25.2 13.5 15.0 14.6 12.9 13.5 25.2 13.5 19.5 
70 12.3 21.5 12.2 12.9 13.2 10.8 12.0 21.5 11.8 16.7 
75 11.0 18.1 11.1 11.5 12.0 9.5 10.8 18.1 10.5 14.5 
80 11.7 15.1 11.9 10.8 12.4 9.3 11.7 15.1 11.4 12.8 
85 15.4 12.5 15.3 11.3 14.9 11.0 15.5 12.5 15.8 11.8 
90 4.6 7.0 4.7 5.0 5.0 4.3 4.5 7.0 4.4 5.9 
95 2.8 3.6 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.6 2.8 3.2 
100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
The life expectancy tables 3.D1, 3.D2 and 3.D3 are calculated using the INDEPTH MLT. The 
INDEPTH tables are based on the Brass relationship life table system (BRLTS). The BRLTS77 assumes 
that any two mortality patterns can be related through the relationship depicted in equation (3.D1): 
                (  )             (   )                                       (3.D1) 
                 are the survivorship probability of the two mortality patterns, with     being the 
standard survivorship pattern (INDEPTH 2004). Given the above relationship one can determine a 
complete life table of any population from a standard life table. INDEPTH tables have generated 
standard life tables for SSA by gender. These tables have been further classified into pattern 1 and pattern 
2. Pattern 1 is based on populations of West and Central Africa, while pattern 2 depicts those of East 
and Southern Africa. Table (3.D4) outlines the infant and under five mortality rates that were used to 
calculate life tables for each country and thereafter life expectancy. The infant and under-five mortality 
are lower in the 1980s than they are currently, except for Tanzania and Uganda. 
  
                                                 
77 A relational model of mortality consists of a life table representing the mortality conditions of a standard population, also 
referred to as a standard life table, along with a mathematical function, which expresses the relationship between the standard 

















Table 3.D4: DHS Infant and Under-five Mortality by Gender and Country 
   Gender Infant mortality (1q0) Under-five mortality (5q0) 
Post HIV/AIDS Era       
 Kenya (2003) Male 84 122 
 
Female 67 103 
 Lesotho (2004) Male 89 109 
 
Female 78 95 
 Swaziland (2006) Male 80 108 
 
Female 73 103 
 Tanzania (2004) Male 83 135 
 
Female 82 130 
 Uganda (2006) Male 98 165 
 
Female 74 132 
 Zimbabwe (2005) Male 51 71 
 
Female 48 68 
Pre HIV/AIDS Era       
 Kenya (1989) Male 63 97 
 
Female 54 86 
 Botswana (1988) Male 46 64 
 
Female 31 47 
 Tanzania (1991) Male 104 160 
 
Female 95 147 
 Uganda (1988) Male 111 196 
 
Female 101 178 
 Zimbabwe (1988) Male 63 91 
  Female 50 79 
 
To outline the procedure that was used to calculate 3.D1, 3.D2 and 3.D3 we use Kenyan women 
(2003) as an example and follow the INDEPTH (2004) methodology. 
Using infant (67) and under-five mortality (103) we first calculate the estimated survival function at age 
zero and age five by subtracting the mortality rates from one, naming them l1 and l5 respectively; 
     
  
    
        and      
   
    
       . We then obtain the standard survival function from 
the standard life table at age zero (ls1) and age five (ls5) from INDEPTH tables; ls1= 0.9224 and 
ls5=0.8766, we then calculate α and β using the following formula:  
  
      (  )       (  )
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            and         (  )  
[      (   )][       (  )]       (  )
      (   )       (   )
               
Thereafter we use α and β to select the relevant estimated survival function (lx) from INDEPTH tables, 
which we depict in column 5 in table (3.D5). The values in this column (lx) although derived from the 
INDEPTH tables, can be calculated from the Brass formula in equation (3.D2) which is derived from 
equation (3.D1).  
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                          (3.D2) 
Because we only have empirical values of l1 and l5, (infant and under-five mortality rate), and not 
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INDEPTH tables has developed correctional factor (γx) depicted in equation (3.D3) to minimise the error 
caused by the difference between observed lx, and the estimated lx as a result of using only l1 and l5:   
   
 
   [    
      (
     
   
)
]
                        (3.D3) 
We therefore select γx corresponding to        from the INDEPTH tables (column 6 of table 
3.D5), we divide this with lx in column 5, to give us column 7, which in essence is a product of 
equation (3.D4), we then calculate the logit of column 7, and put the logit output in column 8 of table 
3.D5.  
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)
]
                         (3.D4) 
Next we calculate the standard survival function obtained from the standard life table as shown in column 9 
of table 3.D5. We then calculate the logit of the standard survival function in column 10, and finally we 
regress logit(lx/  x) on logit(lsx) to obtain new values of  ̂        and  ̂     . With these new values 
we select the new estimated survival function (ĺx) for Kenyan women from INDEPTH tables and depict 
these in column 11 of table 3.D5. 
Table 3.D5: Survival Function for Kenya (2003) Women 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Country Gender Year Age lx γx lx/ γx Logit (lx/ γx) lsx Logit (lsx) ĺx 





Kenya  Female 2003 1 0.93263 1 0.93263 -1.313904 0.9224 -1.2377 0.93556 
Kenya  Female 2003 5 0.89702 1 0.89702 -1.082272 0.8766 -0.9803 0.89666 
Kenya  Female 2003 10 0.88560 1 0.88560 -1.023282 0.8617 -0.9147 0.88386 
Kenya  Female 2003 15 0.87963 1 0.87963 -0.994466 0.8539 -0.8828 0.87713 
Kenya  Female 2003 20 0.87101 1 0.87101 -0.954959 0.8426 -0.8389 0.86735 
Kenya  Female 2003 25 0.85182 1 0.85182 -0.874474 0.8174 -0.7494 0.84538 
Kenya  Female 2003 30 0.81723 1 0.81723 -0.748846 0.7720 -0.6098 0.80528 
Kenya  Female 2003 35 0.77769 1 0.77769 -0.626128 0.7205 -0.4735 0.75895 
Kenya  Female 2003 40 0.74196 1 0.74196 -0.52809 0.6746 -0.3645 0.71689 
Kenya  Female 2003 45 0.71117 1 0.71117 -0.450537 0.6357 -0.2784 0.68065 
Kenya  Female 2003 50 0.68006 1 0.68006 -0.377024 0.5971 -0.1967 0.64414 
Kenya  Female 2003 55 0.65146 1 0.65146 -0.312731 0.5623 -0.1253 0.61076 
Kenya  Female 2003 60 0.61834 1.1 0.56213 -0.1249 0.5229 -0.0458 0.57240 
Kenya  Female 2003 65 0.57766 1.1 0.52515 -0.050333 0.4759 0.04824 0.52586 
Kenya  Female 2003 70 0.52384 1.1 0.47622 0.0476 0.4162 0.1692 0.46546 
Kenya  Female 2003 75 0.44883 1.1 0.40803 0.186063 0.3379 0.33633 0.38399 
Kenya  Female 2003 80 0.36830 1.1 0.33482 0.343236 0.2604 0.52195 0.30072 
Kenya  Female 2003 85 0.25831 1.2 0.21526 0.646758 0.1657 0.80821 0.19522 
 
Thereafter we derive the complete life table for Kenyan women, from ĺx in column 11 of table 3.D5 as 
depicted by table 3.D6, where n in column 5 is age interval, ĺx is number of survivors in age x; ndx= ĺx - 
















of age interval x and xn who died, nmx  
   
             
 is the death rate; nLx = nlx+n + n nax ndx is 
number of person-years lived between age interval x and xn, Tx is number of person-years lived after 
age x, which is an accumulation of nLx from age 100 to x, and    
  
  
  is life expectancy at age x 
(INDEPTH, 2004).   
Table 3.D6: Complete Life Table for Kenya (2003): Women 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Country Gender Year Age n ĺx ndx nax nmx nLx Tx ex 
Kenya  Female 2003 0 1 100000 10689 0.35 0.11487107 93052 4564785 45.6 
Kenya  Female 2003 1 4 89311 6723 0.34 0.019802926 339495 4471733 50.1 
Kenya  Female 2003 5 5 82588 2173 0.5 0.005332417 407508 4132238 50.0 
Kenya  Female 2003 10 5 80415 1132 0.5 0.002835352 399245 3724730 46.3 
Kenya  Female 2003 15 5 79283 1631 0.5 0.004157135 392338 3325485 41.9 
Kenya  Female 2003 20 5 77652 3599 0.5 0.00948947 379263 2933148 37.8 
Kenya  Female 2003 25 5 74053 6318 0.5 0.017823793 354470 2553885 34.5 
Kenya  Female 2003 30 5 67735 6870 0.5 0.021368585 321500 2199415 32.5 
Kenya  Female 2003 35 5 60865 5833 0.5 0.020131669 289743 1877915 30.9 
Kenya  Female 2003 40 5 55032 4721 0.5 0.017926203 263358 1588173 28.9 
Kenya  Female 2003 45 5 50311 4483 0.5 0.01865216 240348 1324815 26.3 
Kenya  Female 2003 50 5 45828 3869 0.5 0.017629034 219468 1084468 23.7 
Kenya  Female 2003 55 5 41959 4185 0.5 0.020995071 199333 865000 20.6 
Kenya  Female 2003 60 5 37774 4728 0.5 0.026704321 177050 665668 17.6 
Kenya  Female 2003 65 5 33046 5602 0.5 0.03704414 151225 488618 14.8 
Kenya  Female 2003 70 5 27444 6692 0.5 0.055539879 120490 337393 12.3 
Kenya  Female 2003 75 5 20752 5926 0.5 0.066625443 88945 216903 10.5 
Kenya  Female 2003 80 5 14826 6340 0.5 0.108785175 58280 127958 8.6 
Kenya  Female 2003 85 5 8486 1536 0.5 0.039804552 38590 69678 8.2 
Kenya  Female 2003 90 5 6950 4365 0.5 0.183120352 23837 31088 4.5 
Kenya  Female 2003 95 5 2585 2269 0.5 0.312994548 7251 7251 2.8 
Kenya  Female 2003 100   315 315.4 
 
  0 0 0.0 
 
The procedure is repeated for each gender in each country to give the complete life table in 3.D1, 
table 3.D2 and table 3.D3. We then create a five year interval of the age variable in our dataset and 
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Appendix 3.E: Validating the Health Uncertainty Proxy 
 
Graph 3.E1: Health Uncertainty by Country  
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Appendix 3.F: Imputing Household Income using Regression Methods 
This Appendix explains the regression based approach that was used to derive the household income. 
The regression based approach is based on the assumption that households smooth out their 
consumption therefore monthly household expenditure should equal monthly income (Grim and 
Gunther 2007; Oster 2009). We apply the regression based approach using the Living Standards 
Measurement Surveys (LSMS) following Grim and Gunther (2007) and Oster (2009). LSMS surveys 
are nationally representative household surveys specifically designed to capture consumption, 
expenditure and income patterns for developing nations78. The LSMS surveys which were available to 
us include the 2008 South African National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) and 2008 Tanzania 
National Panel Survey (TZNPS). Using these surveys, we regress per capita household expenditure on 
a set of household characteristics common to NIDS, TZNPS and DHS, that is,     
            
                            , where   is household characteristics common to DHS, NIDS and 
TZNPS. We then use the estimated coefficients to impute income,   ̂   
      ̂               . In 
this Appendix we explain the procedure in detail. 
We begin by exploring the total expenditure information in both the NIDS and TZNPS. This total 
expenditure includes expenditure on food and rentals. In the NIDS data total monthly food expenditure is a 
summation of the amount spent on food, the gift amount, amount given as payment, and the amount 
produced by the household. Any missing information on any of these categories was imputed using 
either regression methods or the cell median method (Finn et al., 2009). Unlike NIDS, TZNPS does 
not have data on total monthly food expenditure, we therefore need to calculate this using the available 
data. To ensure uniformity between NIDS and TZNPS datasets, we perform the following procedures 
on the TZNPS data; we first add quantity purchased, quantity produced and the gift quantity and 
name this total quantity consumed p r food item. Thereafter we derive the monetary value of each food 
item which is the cost of one gram/millilitre of each food item. Then we calculate the average 
monetary value for each food item79, as depicted in Table 3.F1 at the end of this Appendix.  
We then multiplied the price of one gram/millilitre of each food item with the total quantity 
consumed to obtain expenditure per food item. After this we summed 56 of the 59 food items 
omitting the 3 which comprised expenditure on alcoholic beverages to obtain total weekly food 
                                                 
78 The motivation for using LSMS surveys is that they cover the whole of SSA, they are compatible with DHS data; 
and are reliable and of a high quality. 
79 Of the 59 food items, 11 had a standard deviation of 10, while the rest had on average a standard deviation of 1. 
Food item 22 is an aggregation of honey, syrups, jams, marmalade, jellies and canned fruits, hence the high deviation 
of 83.8 is to be expected. The same holds for food items 21, 23, 24, 42, 43, 53, 55 and 58. However, what is puzzling is 
food item 2 which is rice husk with a deviation of 36; food item 45, fresh milk with a standard deviation of 165; and 
food item 48 cooking oil with a standard deviation of 713. One can only assume that the  large variety of cooking oils, 
from liquid to solid variants from various manufactures/brands is driving this high deviation, the same can be said for 
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expenditure. We imputed the 44 missing values using regression based on the following regressors: 
number of household members, schooling of head of household dummy, household has electricity 
dummy, household has TV dummy, roofing dummy, occupation dummy, and region dummy. The 
model gave an R2 of 0.33, with all variables being statistically significant. This information is captured 
in Table 3.F2 at the end of Appendix 3.F. We later multiplied the total weekly food expenditure by 4 to 
derive the total monthly food expenditure.  
Like the food expenditure section, the NIDS data includes monthly rent information80. From the 
TZNPS data we used the available data to derive a monthly rent variable. The rental section of TZNPS 
asked the following questions: “What is the household tenure status of the residence?”, where households 
choose from the following responses: owner occupied, employer provided, rented, free and nomads. 
Those who indicated that the house was rented were asked to mention the rent amount they pay each 
month. We therefore need to determine the rents for the remaining households who do not pay 
rentals. We do this by regressing log monthly rent on the following regressors: number of rooms, 
number of rooms squared, the head of household has education dummy, household has electricity 
dummy, household has flush toilet dummy, household has piped water, and region dummy. The 
model is depicted in Table 3.F3 at the end of Appendix 3.F. We then added total monthly food expenditure 
and monthly rent to get total household expenditure. We divided this by the number of household members 
to obtain the total household expenditure per capita, our variable of interest. 
Next we identified the household characteristics common in the three datasets (DHS, NIDS and TZNPS). 
These common characteristics include six durable goods ownership variables namely, ownership of 
radio, television, motor vehicle and tractors, motorcycle and bicycle; four housing attributes namely 
type of roof, type of wall, type of toilet facility and whether there is electricity in the house; and four 
variables from the household roster, namely number of household members, age of head of 
household, gender of head of household, occupational and educational attainment of head of 
household. The three datasets were merged keeping total household expenditure and household characteristics 
data, we include the GDP81 and GDP per capita of the relevant countries in our merged dataset. We 
convert the expenditure values to US$82 for 2008, since our data is for 2008, for South Africa  the 
conversion rate was 8.0 while for Tanzania it was 1196.  
Using NIDS and TZNPS household data we regress total household expenditure per capita on the household 
characteristics previously outlined. The output of the regression is depicted in Table 3.F4 at the end of 
this Appendix. The regression output shows that household income per capita as expected is on 
                                                 
80 The monthly rental is derived from households who live in rented houses; households who live in houses which 
they own; and households who live in “free” houses. In cases where an individual indicated that the house was owned 
or free, a rent amount is calculated and any further missing information is imputed using regression methods. 
81 Oster (2009) included GDP and found that this improved the models fit 
















average higher for households where the head of household is male and has a higher education 
qualification. Additionally possessing durable goods such as radio, TV, or car, are significant indicators 
of higher household income. Per capita income is also higher for households with better housing 
conditions, for example having electricity and flushing toilets. We then use the estimated coefficients 
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Table 3.F1: Price of 1 Gram/Millilitre per Food Item 
  Food Item Observation Mean Price Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
1 Rice (paddy) 9 0.7 0.4 0.2 1.3 
2 Rice (husked) 1687 2.1 36.5 0.0 1500.0 
3 Maize (green, cob) 100 0.7 0.6 0.0 5.0 
4 Maize (grain) 229 0.5 0.3 0.0 2.0 
5 Maize (flour) 1679 0.7 0.5 0.0 9.7 
6 Millet and sorghum (grain) 39 0.9 0.5 0.2 2.5 
7 Millet and sorghum (flour) 200 1.0 0.6 0.0 3.0 
8 Wheat, barley grain and other cereals 75 1.1 0.6 0.1 5.0 
9 Bread 831 1.5 0.9 0.0 15.0 
10 Buns, cakes and biscuits 1036 1.9 1.7 0.0 25.0 
11 Macaroni, spaghetti 208 1.7 0.7 0.5 4.8 
12 Other cereal products 89 1.3 0.8 0.4 5.0 
13 Cassava fresh 539 0.5 0.5 0.0 5.0 
14 Cassava dry/flour 179 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.3 
15 Sweet potatoes 410 0.4 0.3 0.0 2.4 
16 Yams/cocoyam 90 0.6 0.4 0.1 2.0 
17 Irish potatoes 801 0.7 0.3 0.1 2.9 
18 Cooking bananas, plantains 445 0.7 2.6 0.1 55.0 
19 Other starches 27 1.1 0.6 0.2 2.5 
20 Sugar  2371 1.3 0.4 0.0 14.0 
21 Sweets  195 11.5 12.6 0.7 75.0 
22 Honey, syrups, jams, marmalade, jellies, canned fruits 248 12.5 83.8 0.1 1000.0 
23 Peas, beans, lentils and other pulses 1628 2.4 49.5 0.1 2000.0 
24 Groundnuts in shell/shelled 446 1.3 1.0 0.2 14.3 
25 Coconuts (mature/immature) 1147 1.0 1.8 0.0 50.0 
26 Cashew, almonds and other nuts 9 2.2 2.8 0.3 7.0 
27 Seeds and products from nuts/seeds (excl. cooking oil) 24 1.5 1.9 0.3 10.0 
28 Onions, tomatoes, carrots and green pepper, other viungo 2569 1.1 0.9 0.0 20.0 
29 Spinach, cabbage and other green vegetables 1401 0.9 1.1 0.0 25.0 
30 Canned, dried and wild vegetables 30 1.0 0.8 0.2 2.7 
31 Ripe bananas 488 1.0 0.8 0.1 8.8 
32 Citrus fruits (oranges, lemon, tangerines, etc.) 624 0.7 0.6 0.0 10.0 
33 Mangoes, avocadoes and other fruits  406 0.8 0.6 0.1 8.6 
34 Sugarcane 244 0.5 0.6 0.0 5.0 
35 Goat meat 225 3.3 3.4 0.5 50.0 
36 Beef including minced sausage 1053 3.6 1.1 0.2 7.2 
37 Pork including sausages and bacon 165 2.9 1.2 0.3 10.0 
38 Chicken and other poultry 192 4.0 2.0 0.3 11.4 
39 Wild birds and insects 8 2.8 1.4 0.7 5.0 
40 Other domestic/wild meat products 14 1.4 1.0 0.3 4.0 
41 Eggs 351 4.2 2.0 0.1 30.0 
42 Fresh fish and seafood (including dagaa) 1114 2.6 18.0 0.0 600.0 
43 Dried/salted/canned fish and seafood (incl. dagaa) 1071 8.6 183.3 0.1 6000.0 
44 Package fish 4 3.2 1.7 1.0 5.0 
45 Fresh milk 619 9.3 164.9 0.1 4000.0 
46 Milk products (like cream, cheese, yoghurt etc) 121 1.0 1.6 0.0 15.0 
47 Canned milk/milk powder 39 8.1 6.8 0.4 20.0 
48 Cooking oil 511 37.4 713.0 0.0 16000.0 
49 Butter, margarine, ghee and other fat products 168 4.8 5.0 0.4 40.0 
50 Salt 3044 0.8 0.9 0.0 17.5 
51 Other spices 317 3.3 6.4 0.3 100.0 
52 Tea dry 2033 7.4 6.7 0.0 150.0 
53 Coffee and cocoa 52 14.0 16.3 0.5 70.0 
54 Other raw materials for drinks 24 0.6 1.4 0.0 6.7 
55 Bottled/canned soft drinks (soda, juice, water) 703 2.1 19.2 0.0 500.0 
56 Prepared tea, coffee 20 1.1 0.7 0.2 2.6 
57 Bottled beer 81 0.9 1.2 0.0 3.4 
58 Local brews 264 1.5 13.7 0.1 200.0 


















Table 3.F2: Regression used for NIPS Food Expenditure Imputation 
 (1) 
Dependent variables: Food expenditure OLS  
Number of Household members 0.125*** 
 (0.00435) 
Head of household has education1 0.196*** 
 (0.0304) 
Household has no electricity2 -0.0854 
 (0.0523) 
Household has no television3 -0.346*** 
 (0.0533) 










































Kaskazini Unguja -0.452*** 
 (0.105) 
Kusini Unguja -0.421*** 
 (0.137) 
Magharibu Unguja -0.478*** 
 (0.0842) 
Kaskazini Pemba -0.670*** 
 (0.101) 






Standard errors in parentheses 
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%            
● Dummy Reference: 1 head has no education • 2household has electricity • 3household has television, • 4house has metal roofing and • 
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Table 3.F3: Regression used for NIPS Rent Imputation 
 (1) 
Dependent variables: Rent expenditure OLS 
Number of rooms 0.572*** 
 (0.0934) 
Number of rooms2 -0.0489*** 
 (0.0158) 
House has no flush toilet1 -0.329*** 
 (0.0960) 
House has no electricity2 -0.529*** 
 (0.0676) 
House has a stand pipe3 -0.286*** 
 (0.108) 
House gets water outside compound4 -0.427*** 
 (0.102) 












































Magharibu Unguja 5.382*** 
 (0.466) 






Standard errors in parentheses 
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%            
Dummy Reference: 1household has flush toilet • 2household has electricity • 3household has piped water • 4head of household has an 
education and • 5Kaskazini Unguja 
Table 3.F4: Regression used for Per Capita Income (US$) Imputation 
 (1) 
Dependent variables: Per Capita Household Income (OLS) 

















Household size -0.135*** 
 (0.00265) 
Age of head -0.000797 
 (0.00249) 
Age of head2 3.88e-05 
 (2.40e-05) 
Head women -0.0861*** 
 (0.0144) 
Head has no education -0.616*** 
 (0.0360) 
Head has primary education -0.535*** 
 (0.0331) 
Head has tertiary education -0.325*** 
 (0.0310) 
Household possess a radio 0.123*** 
 (0.0147) 
Household possess a TV 0.0965*** 
 (0.0203) 
Household possess a fridge 0.171*** 
 (0.0199) 
Household possess a bicycle 0.147*** 
 (0.0200) 
Household possess a motorcycle 0.214*** 
 (0.0455) 
Household possess a car 0.379*** 
 (0.0234) 
Household has electricity -0.00494 
 (0.0211) 
Household has metal sheet (GCI) roofing  -0.0360** 
 (0.0146) 
Household has brick walls 0.0244 
 (0.0158) 






Predicted Income in DHS household (mean) 44.72 
Predicted Income in DHS household (standard deviation) 26.83 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Appendix 3.G: Imputing Household Income by Wealth Index 
The household wealth index is calculated using DHS household characteristics common to all six 
countries. These include: type of toilet, whether there is electricity in the household, presence of radio, 
television and bicycle, ownership of motorcycle or car, whether a telephone was available and type of 
floor material used to build the house.  
The wealth index is calculated using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) with Satorra-Bertler 
“robust” standard errors, since this is specifically designed for categorical data as in the case of DHS 
household data. All ten variables had positive factor loading. Additionally, although the RMSEA were 
slightly higher than expected (0.08), the Tucker-lewis non-normed fit index (TLI) and Bentler’s 
comparative fit index (CFI) were 0.9 and 0.9 respectively indicating a good fit. The output for the 





















Yuan-Bentler T2          = 6940.149    ; Prob[chi2(20)   > T2  ] = 0.0000
Satorra-Bentler Tadj     = 4551.246    ; Prob[chi2(14.7) > Tadj] = 0.0000
Satorra-Bentler Tsc      = 6207.297    ; Prob[chi2(20)   > Tsc ] = 0.0000
Test vs independence: LR =  7.8e+04    ; Prob[chi2(28) > LR] = 0.0000
Goodness of fit test: LR = 8353.384    ; Prob[chi2(20) > LR] = 0.0000
                                                                              
    mainroof       0.0045
         car       0.2209
  motorcycle       0.0124
      fridge       0.5640
  television       0.6340
       radio       0.1270
 electricity       0.6726
      toilet       0.4062
R2            
                                                                              
    mainroof     .2479845   .0006617   374.78   0.000     .2466877    .2492814
         car     .0414189   .0006579    62.96   0.000     .0401295    .0427083
  motorcycle     .0150276   .0005686    26.43   0.000     .0139132    .0161421
      fridge      .043594    .000611    71.35   0.000     .0423965    .0447914
  television     .0552502   .0009301    59.40   0.000     .0534273    .0570731
       radio      .206497    .000864   239.01   0.000     .2048036    .2081904
 electricity     .0547693   .0008717    62.83   0.000     .0530608    .0564778
      toilet     .2059985   .0014873   138.50   0.000     .2030834    .2089136
Var[error]                
wealthinde~x      .140934   .0020922    67.36   0.000     .1368333    .1450346
Factor cov.               
    mainroof     .0894097   .0073106    12.23   0.000     .0750813    .1037382
         car      .288657   .0060631    47.61   0.000     .2767735    .3005405
  motorcycle     .0365848   .0025666    14.25   0.000     .0315544    .0416153
      fridge     .6326114   .0069062    91.60   0.000     .6190755    .6461473
  television     .8240739   .0069621   118.36   0.000     .8104283    .8377195
       radio     .4617158   .0054255    85.10   0.000     .4510821    .4723495
 electricity     .8934538   .0065334   136.75   0.000     .8806486     .906259
      toilet            1          .        .       .            .           .
 wealthindex              
Loadings                  
    mainroof     1.529813   .0024643   620.80   0.000     1.524983    1.534643
         car     1.943664   .0011384  1707.38   0.000     1.941433    1.945896
  motorcycle     1.984545    .000609  3258.48   0.000     1.983351    1.985739
      fridge     1.887304   .0015613  1208.82   0.000     1.884244    1.890364
  television     1.814709   .0019183   945.99   0.000     1.810949    1.818469
       radio     1.383989   .0024013   576.35   0.000     1.379283    1.388696
 electricity     1.787626   .0020193   885.27   0.000     1.783668    1.791584
      toilet     2.056969   .0029081   707.32   0.000      2.05127    2.062669
Means                     
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Satorra-Bentler
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Appendix 3.H: Results of the First Stage CTSM  
Table 3.H1: First Stage - Heckman Model   
 (1) 
Dependent variable: Had Sex DHS 
Age  0.117*** 
 (0.0227) 








HIV prevention, one partner 0.0171 
 (0.126) 
Lesotho  0.0101 
 (0.132) 
Swaziland  -0.0350 
 (0.129) 
Tanzania  -0.0286 
 (0.122) 
Uganda  -0.0125 
 (0.127) 





HIV prevention, condom -0.0500 
 (0.118) 






Standard errors in parentheses 


















Appendix 3.I: Results using adjacent social group age bracket IV 
 
The key to our IV strategy is social grouping. Recall that our social groups consist of individuals of the 
same gender, age and income. Based on these social grouping characteristics the adjacent social group age 
bracket IV is adopted from the works of Grodner and Kniesner (2006); Etile (2007) and Grodner et al., 
(2011). As such the adjacent social group age bracket IV assumption is that the              (health uncertainty 
of a 21-25 age group) for example will be correlated with that of the adjacent age group to the left, 
             and to the right,              because of similar socioeconomic neighbourhoods, however 
the adjacent social              and              are uncorrelated with unobservables of individuals in 
social group              (for example unobservables of a 21 year old ) because the individuals in age 
group 21-25 are not members of the adjacent groups (Grodner and Kniesner 2006; Etile 2007; 
Grodner et al. 2011). Therefore, adjacent groups to the left and to the right of the social group can be 
used as IVs. The advantage of the IVs is that they allow for overidentification of the models, with the 
only limitation being that the IVs exclude the youngest social group and the oldest social group83 from 
analysis as these groups lack IVs84. 
 
                                                 
83  
84 We also employ the ‘extended’ adjacent social group IV. This is based on adjacent social group age bracket, with the only 
difference being that we include the youngest social group and oldest social group. We do this by using as instruments 
social groups with a different characteristics, for example replace the oldest social group if males with female oldest 
social group. This is so as to include the total sample since the adjacent social group IV omits the first age group and 










Chapter 3. Expected Health and Health Uncertainty 
 126 
Table 3.I1: Second Stage CTSM Risky Sex Results 
 Objective life expectancy 
 Panel A Panel B 
 HIV-life expectancy 2 (2000s mortality rates) Pre-HIV-life expectancy 1 (1980s mortality rates) 
 Panel A.1 Panel A.2 Panel B.1 Panel B.2 
Dependent variable IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT GMM 
Risky sex index Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model 








































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Expected health -0.0783*** -2.450*** -0.179*** -0.404*** -0.0945*** -3.657*** -0.240*** -0.522*** -0.00711*** -0.00678*** -0.0109*** -0.0132*** -0.00848*** -0.00894*** -0.0137*** -0.0166*** 
 (0.00305) (0.907) (0.00488) (0.0236) (0.00366) (1.351) (0.00658) (0.0306) (0.000313) (0.000418) (0.000341) (0.000303) (0.000371) (0.000516) (0.000420) (0.000375) 
Health uncertainty 0.0411*** 2.004*** 0.116*** 0.295*** 0.0501*** 2.999*** 0.157*** 0.383*** 0.0123*** 0.0181*** 0.0143*** 0.0128*** 0.0148*** 0.0224*** 0.0181*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00249) (0.750) (0.00414) (0.0187) (0.00298) (1.118) (0.00558) (0.0242) (0.000213) (0.000314) (0.000216) (0.000220) (0.000254) (0.000388) (0.000268) (0.000273) 
Social group characteristics -0.482*** -21.73*** -1.246*** -3.158*** -0.587*** -32.50*** -1.686*** -4.097*** 0.558*** 0.862*** 0.624*** 0.478*** 0.666*** 1.054*** 0.780*** 0.598*** 
 (0.0284) (8.137) (0.0462) (0.204) (0.0340) (12.12) (0.0622) (0.265) (0.0127) (0.0205) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0151) (0.0252) (0.0168) (0.0170) 
Expected income 0.0121*** 0.542*** 0.0324*** 0.0790*** 0.0148*** 0.811*** 0.0439*** 0.103*** -0.0113*** -0.0176*** -0.0126*** -0.00920*** -0.0134*** -0.0215*** -0.0157*** -0.0114*** 
 (0.000709) (0.203) (0.00118) (0.00508) (0.000849) (0.302) (0.00159) (0.00658) (0.000285) (0.000459) (0.000317) (0.000311) (0.000340) (0.000564) (0.000390) (0.000384) 
Education, years 0.618*** 0.207*** 0.0342*** 0.0470*** 0.0267*** 0.307*** 0.0460*** 0.0613*** 0.0127*** 0.0147*** 0.0169*** 0.0164*** 0.0152*** 0.0188*** 0.0214*** 0.0208*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0751) (0.00184) (0.00437) (0.00126) (0.112) (0.00247) (0.00566) (0.000980) (0.00109) (0.000998) (0.000881) (0.00117) (0.00135) (0.00123) (0.00109) 
Mills ratio 0.0222*** 205.9 -68.31*** -30.45 -85.38*** 317.9 -91.56*** -41.14 -72.24*** -85.83*** -90.88*** -86.69*** -85.73*** -109.9*** -116.9*** -110.8*** 
 (0.00105) (202.9) (11.43) (25.84) (7.791) (302.2) (15.39) (33.47) (6.329) (6.929) (6.395) (5.615) (7.545) (8.634) (7.928) (6.999) 
HIV prevention, one partner -71.97*** -0.125 0.0250** -0.00694 0.0260*** -0.188 0.0354** -0.00634 0.0301*** 0.0356*** 0.0384*** 0.0396*** 0.0364*** 0.0472*** 0.0511*** 0.0520*** 
 (6.487) (0.200) (0.0127) (0.0288) (0.00881) (0.298) (0.0171) (0.0373) (0.00714) (0.00776) (0.00711) (0.00629) (0.00853) (0.00970) (0.00884) (0.00787) 
Healthy looking person, HIV 0.0214*** 1.432*** 0.119*** 0.219*** 0.0627*** 2.146*** 0.160*** 0.286*** 0.00727 0.0191** 0.0433*** 0.0508*** 0.00845 0.0299*** 0.0583*** 0.0671*** 
 (0.00733) (0.547) (0.0127) (0.0301) (0.00906) (0.814) (0.0171) (0.0390) (0.00714) (0.00767) (0.00695) (0.00617) (0.00851) (0.00960) (0.00865) (0.00772) 
Rural 0.0523*** -2.265*** -0.123*** -0.348*** -0.0480*** -3.387*** -0.166*** -0.450*** 0.0665*** 0.0877*** 0.0649*** 0.0552*** 0.0802*** 0.108*** 0.0818*** 0.0697*** 
 (0.00754) (0.859) (0.00995) (0.0299) (0.00686) (1.279) (0.0134) (0.0387) (0.00497) (0.00575) (0.00515) (0.00460) (0.00591) (0.00712) (0.00633) (0.00568) 
Southern Africa -0.0402*** 20.79*** 1.514*** 3.359*** 0.746*** 31.04*** 2.033*** 4.343*** 0.0478*** 0.0601*** 0.0655*** 0.0722*** 0.0570*** 0.0763*** 0.0822*** 0.0906*** 
 (0.00573) (7.721) (0.0440) (0.201) (0.0317) (11.50) (0.0594) (0.261) (0.00452) (0.00501) (0.00468) (0.00405) (0.00537) (0.00620) (0.00575) (0.00501) 
Constant 9.785*** 11.73 10.86*** 10.26*** 11.44*** 15.76 14.17*** 13.12*** 8.357*** 9.668*** 10.29*** 9.872*** 9.725*** 12.10*** 12.94*** 12.33*** 
 (0.662) (17.28) (1.164) (2.609) (0.795) (25.73) (1.568) (3.379) (0.645) (0.706) (0.652) (0.573) (0.769) (0.880) (0.808) (0.714) 
Observations 46,774 52,155 48,430 52,155 42,369 52,155 48,430 52,155 42,369 52,155 48,430 52,155 42,369 52,155 48,430 52,155 
Anderson canon correlation 
statistics (p-value) 
    0.0000 0.0284 0.0000 0.0000     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan-Hansen (p-value)     0.0000 0.6381   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   
Amemiya-Lee Newey 
statistic (p-value) 
0.0000 0.6385               
● Robust Standard errors in parentheses        
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%              
● Definition of instruments follows from table 3.1.  
● Region reference is Eastern Africa 


















Appendix 3.J: Placebo social group using adjacent social group age bracket IV 
 
Table 3.J1: Second Stage CTSM Risky Sex Results based on placebo social groups 
 Objective life expectancy 
 Panel A Panel B 
 HIV-life expectancy 2 (2000s mortality rates) Pre-HIV-life expectancy 1 (1980s mortality rates) 
Dependent variable Panel A.1 Panel A.2 Panel B.1 Panel B.2 
 IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT GMM 
Risky sex index Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model 








































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Expected health -0.0330 0.0889 0.158 0.0880 -0.0442 0.119 0.213 0.117 -0.0123*** -0.0124*** -0.196 -0.00990 -0.0160*** -0.0160*** -0.255 -0.0131 
 (0.0676) (0.0943) (0.611) (0.0972) (0.0887) (0.124) (0.817) (0.128) (0.000269) (0.000156) (0.300) (0.0103) (0.000356) (0.000206) (0.391) (0.0134) 
Health uncertainty1 -0.000167 -0.00188 0.0124 -0.0145 -0.000254 -0.00272 0.0174 -0.0199 0.000879 0.000455 0.128 -0.00176 0.00124 0.000564 0.167 -0.00192 
 (0.00628) (0.00821) (0.0979) (0.0340) (0.00825) (0.0108) (0.131) (0.0448) (0.00142) (0.000578) (0.209) (0.00724) (0.00185) (0.000754) (0.273) (0.00941) 
Social group 
characteristics 
0.0317 -0.0987 -0.102 -0.179 0.0425 -0.132 -0.134 -0.242 0.00856 -0.000305 0.197 0.00323 0.0110 -0.000360 0.257 0.00470 
 (0.0265) (0.103) (0.165) (0.282) (0.0347) (0.136) (0.220) (0.371) (0.00785) (0.00631) (0.320) (0.0147) (0.0103) (0.00824) (0.417) (0.0191) 
Income 0.000431 0.00217* 0.00309 0.00216* 0.000521 0.00284* 0.00410 0.00282* 0.000894*** 0.00100*** 0.00549 0.000949*** 0.00114*** 0.00127*** 0.00715 0.00124*** 
 (0.00101) (0.00126) (0.00813) (0.00130) (0.00133) (0.00166) (0.0109) (0.00171) (0.000111) (6.43e-05) (0.00737) (0.000261) (0.000145) (8.39e-05) (0.00962) (0.000340) 
Education, years 0.0200*** 0.0194*** 0.0238 0.0188*** 0.0264*** 0.0255*** 0.0314 0.0246*** 0.0213*** 0.0198*** -0.00351 0.0202*** 0.0281*** 0.0260*** -0.00445 0.0264*** 
 (0.00388) (0.00198) (0.0157) (0.00260) (0.00510) (0.00261) (0.0211) (0.00343) (0.00145) (0.000837) (0.0398) (0.00180) (0.00190) (0.00110) (0.0520) (0.00234) 
Mills ratio -80.99 -182.3** -252.3 -181.1** -104.5 -240.0** -335.6 -238.4** -85.30*** -91.43*** 17.90 -92.46*** -111.8*** -119.7*** 22.52 -121.1*** 
 (60.72) (74.15) (531.4) (75.47) (79.74) (97.65) (711.0) (99.41) (9.258) (5.351) (187.3) (7.471) (12.21) (7.038) (244.5) (9.751) 
HIV prevention, one 
partner 
0.0238 0.171 0.256 0.170 0.0299 0.227 0.343 0.225 0.0344*** 0.0543*** -0.129 0.0570*** 0.0456*** 0.0726*** -0.167 0.0757*** 
 (0.0509) (0.106) (0.716) (0.109) (0.0669) (0.140) (0.959) (0.144) (0.0103) (0.00599) (0.299) (0.0130) (0.0137) (0.00791) (0.390) (0.0169) 
Healthy looking person, 
HIV 
0.0385 0.252 0.337 0.252 0.0473 0.333 0.451 0.333 0.0666*** 0.0781*** 0.319 0.0748*** 0.0873*** 0.103*** 0.417 0.0999*** 
 (0.111) (0.158) (0.935) (0.166) (0.145) (0.208) (1.251) (0.218) (0.0101) (0.00577) (0.409) (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.00763) (0.534) (0.0180) 
Southern Africa 0.209 -0.766 -1.323 -0.754 0.280 -1.022 -1.789 -1.005 0.00138 0.00481 1.737 -0.0187 0.00120 0.00564 2.264 -0.0215 
 (0.543) (0.758) (4.937) (0.772) (0.713) (0.999) (6.607) (1.016) (0.00636) (0.00367) (2.836) (0.0961) (0.00832) (0.00478) (3.703) (0.125) 
Constant 10.20*** 15.36*** 18.51 16.17*** 12.95*** 19.86*** 24.10 20.97*** 9.682*** 10.34*** 1.699 10.47*** 12.37*** 13.23*** 1.986 13.41*** 
 (2.935) (3.873) (20.98) (5.706) (3.855) (5.101) (28.08) (7.517) (0.966) (0.549) (15.23) (0.675) (1.274) (0.722) (19.89) (0.882) 
Observations 17,794 52,155 35,479 52,155 17,794 52,155 35,479 52,155 17,794 52,155 35,479 52,155 17,794 52,155 35,479 52,155 
● Robust Standard errors in parentheses        
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%              
● Definition of instruments follows from table 3.1.  
● Region reference is Eastern Africa 
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Appendix 3.K: Regression Output Using an Alternative Expected Income Proxy 
 
Table 3.K1: Wealth Index as the Expected Income Proxy   
 Panel A Panel B 
 2000s mortality rates 1980s mortality rates 
 IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT GMM 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage 
 Nonlinear in means mode Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model 

















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Expected health -0.0545*** -0.535*** -0.0645*** -0.835*** -0.00244*** -0.00472*** -0.00288*** -0.00583*** 
 (0.00184) (0.0722) (0.00218) (0.114) (0.000526) (0.000434) (0.000618) (0.000555) 
Health uncertainty 0.0186*** 0.350*** 0.0223*** 0.553*** 0.0156*** 0.0165*** 0.0185*** 0.0212*** 
 (0.00131) (0.0512) (0.00155) (0.0808) (0.000428) (0.000230) (0.000504) (0.000298) 
Social group characteristics -0.313*** -4.895*** -0.375*** -7.732*** 0.798*** 0.844*** 0.940*** 1.078*** 
 (0.0186) (0.707) (0.0220) (1.116) (0.0267) (0.0133) (0.0314) (0.0171) 
Expected income1 -0.0926*** -3.155*** -0.110*** -5.012*** 0.491*** 0.557*** 0.580*** 0.717*** 
 (0.0139) (0.479) (0.0164) (0.756) (0.0170) (0.0125) (0.0201) (0.0161) 
Education, years 0.0131*** 0.272*** 0.0159*** 0.431*** -0.0359*** -0.0342*** -0.0421*** -0.0431*** 
 (0.00121) (0.0396) (0.00144) (0.0624) (0.00141) (0.00110) (0.00166) (0.00141) 
Mills ratio -81.47*** -84.10 -95.46*** -112.0 -71.88*** -86.30*** -84.11*** -112.6*** 
 (6.099) (51.95) (7.223) (81.87) (8.876) (8.758) (10.45) (11.25) 
HIV prevention, one partner 0.0190*** -0.0756 0.0224*** -0.127 0.0450*** 0.0432*** 0.0532*** 0.0564*** 
 (0.00709) (0.0614) (0.00840) (0.0967) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0121) (0.0129) 
Healthy looking person, HIV 0.0273*** 0.0826 0.0316*** 0.125 -0.00612 0.0111 -0.00794 0.0139 
 (0.00703) (0.0587) (0.00831) (0.0925) (0.0103) (0.00981) (0.0121) (0.0126) 
Rural -0.137*** -1.421*** -0.162*** -2.226*** 0.187*** 0.185*** 0.221*** 0.235*** 
 (0.00750) (0.201) (0.00886) (0.317) (0.0111) (0.00898) (0.0131) (0.0115) 
Southern Africa 0.405*** 4.364*** 0.479*** 6.821*** 0.0962*** 0.100*** 0.113*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0153) (0.597) (0.0181) (0.943) (0.00712) (0.00707) (0.00838) (0.00906) 
Constant 10.93*** 22.75*** 12.65*** 32.85*** 7.669*** 9.145*** 8.795*** 11.63*** 
 (0.624) (5.548) (0.739) (8.745) (0.906) (0.893) (1.067) (1.147) 
Observations 41,769 47,202 41,769 47,202 41,769 47,202 41,769 47,202 
Standard errors in parentheses 
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%            
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Appendix 3.L: Regression Output for Eastern Africa and Southern Africa 
Table 3.L1: A Comparison between East and Southern Africa   
 Panel A Panel B 
 East Africa Southern Africa 
 Panel A1 Panel A2 Panel B1 Panel B2 
 2000s mortality rates 1980s mortality rates 2000s mortality rates 1980s mortality rates 
 GMM IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage 
 Nonlinear in means mode Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear in means mode Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model 

































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Expected health -0.0766*** -0.238*** -0.0893*** -0.304*** -0.0150*** -0.0311*** -0.0173*** -0.0382*** -0.0763*** -0.148*** -0.0957*** -0.206*** -0.0140*** -0.0695*** -0.0175*** -0.0937*** 
 (0.00595) (0.0125) (0.00687) (0.0160) (0.000566) (0.000697) (0.000650) (0.000835) (0.00291) (0.00370) (0.00363) (0.00522) (0.00110) (0.00147) (0.00135) (0.00203) 
Health uncertainty 0.0326*** 0.137*** 0.0383*** 0.176*** 0.00844*** 0.00677*** 0.00984*** 0.00831*** 0.0447*** 0.103*** 0.0569*** 0.147*** 0.0137*** 0.00417*** 0.0170*** 0.00566*** 
 (0.00407) (0.00884) (0.00470) (0.0113) (0.000260) (0.000283) (0.000300) (0.000338) (0.00268) (0.00358) (0.00332) (0.00502) (0.000332) (0.000424) (0.000413) (0.000582) 
Social group characteristics -0.461*** -1.708*** -0.543*** -2.185*** 0.306*** 0.0237 0.354*** 0.0207 -0.495*** -1.081*** -0.629*** -1.515*** 0.440*** -1.003*** 0.542*** -1.366*** 
 (0.0527) (0.110) (0.0609) (0.141) (0.0181) (0.0218) (0.0208) (0.0259) (0.0300) (0.0401) (0.0372) (0.0562) (0.0318) (0.0424) (0.0392) (0.0582) 
Expected income1 0.0110*** 0.0415*** 0.0130*** 0.0531*** -0.00607*** 0.000312 -0.00702*** 0.000611 0.0108*** 0.0248*** 0.0137*** 0.0349*** -0.00845*** 0.0194*** -0.0104*** 0.0264*** 
 (0.00123) (0.00265) (0.00142) (0.00338) (0.000397) (0.000493) (0.000456) (0.000586) (0.000683) (0.000939) (0.000847) (0.00132) (0.000606) (0.000835) (0.000746) (0.00114) 
Education, years 0.0137*** 0.00424 0.0160*** 0.00526 0.0161*** 0.0179*** 0.0187*** 0.0222*** 0.00295* -0.000825 0.00357* -0.000332 0.0116*** 0.00707*** 0.0144*** 0.0104*** 
 (0.00124) (0.00265) (0.00144) (0.00338) (0.00105) (0.00107) (0.00121) (0.00128) (0.00156) (0.00223) (0.00194) (0.00311) (0.00156) (0.00193) (0.00193) (0.00264) 
Mills ratio -113.9*** -177.7*** -131.2*** -228.0*** -86.47*** -125.7*** -99.49*** -155.6*** -70.51*** -92.15*** -87.64*** -128.9*** -42.53*** -64.23*** -52.36*** -89.22*** 
 (7.812) (16.31) (9.063) (20.86) (6.676) (6.714) (7.704) (8.085) (9.485) (13.71) (11.81) (19.19) (9.588) (11.88) (11.90) (16.39) 
HIV prevention, one partner 0.0735*** 0.0971*** 0.0865*** 0.130*** 0.0517*** 0.0722*** 0.0616*** 0.0948*** 0.00310 0.00863 0.00432 0.0129 -0.00483 -0.00115 -0.00564 -0.000240 
 (0.0105) (0.0214) (0.0122) (0.0274) (0.00931) (0.00905) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.00889) (0.0128) (0.0110) (0.0179) (0.00902) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0154) 
Healthy looking person, HIV 0.0123 0.0597*** 0.0142 0.0759*** -0.0152* 0.0331*** -0.0182** 0.0411*** 0.0508*** 0.0958*** 0.0633*** 0.137*** 0.0134 0.0946*** 0.0175 0.133*** 
 (0.00908) (0.0183) (0.0105) (0.0235) (0.00797) (0.00774) (0.00919) (0.00934) (0.0101) (0.0141) (0.0126) (0.0197) (0.0102) (0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0170) 
Rural 0.000383 -0.0299** 0.00115 -0.0379** 0.0156*** 0.00849 0.0188*** 0.0113* -0.0608*** -0.142*** -0.0763*** -0.199*** 0.106*** -0.169*** 0.131*** -0.229*** 
 (0.00624) (0.0133) (0.00722) (0.0169) (0.00541) (0.00556) (0.00622) (0.00661) (0.00809) (0.0115) (0.0100) (0.0161) (0.00928) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0162) 
Tanzania1 -0.228*** -0.729*** -0.266*** -0.931*** -0.212*** -0.455*** -0.245*** -0.558***         
 (0.0198) (0.0419) (0.0229) (0.0536) (0.0102) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0144)         
Uganda1 -0.520*** -1.810*** -0.607*** -2.310*** -0.148*** -0.390*** -0.171*** -0.477***         
 (0.0471) (0.101) (0.0545) (0.129) (0.00994) (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0139)         
Lesotho2         -0.210*** -0.459*** -0.266*** -0.639*** -0.0285* -0.695*** -0.0423** -0.950*** 
         (0.0147) (0.0201) (0.0182) (0.0281) (0.0161) (0.0204) (0.0199) (0.0281) 
Swaziland2         -0.196*** -0.412*** -0.248*** -0.581*** 0.108*** -0.509*** 0.128*** -0.696*** 
         (0.0118) (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0221) (0.0147) (0.0191) (0.0181) (0.0262) 
Constant 14.45*** 24.43*** 16.51*** 30.99*** 10.24*** 14.78*** 11.63*** 18.04*** 10.36*** 14.30*** 12.64*** 19.52*** 5.534*** 10.05*** 6.585*** 13.46*** 
 (0.838) (1.742) (0.972) (2.228) (0.683) (0.688) (0.788) (0.829) (0.975) (1.405) (1.213) (1.967) (0.979) (1.213) (1.215) (1.673) 
Observations 21,023 23,777 21,023 23,777 21,023 23,777 21,023 23,777 21,346 24,653 21,346 24,653 21,346 24,653 21,346 24,653 
Standard errors in parentheses 
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%            














Appendix 3.M: Results using an Alternative Outcome Variable 
Table 3.M1: Sex Partners Results   
 Objective life expectancy 
 2000s mortality rates 1980s mortality rates 
 IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT GMM 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage 
 Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model 









































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Expected health -0.0382*** -0.553*** -0.0841*** -0.274*** -0.0497*** -0.782*** -0.131*** -0.384*** -0.00280*** -0.00571*** -0.00558*** -0.00692*** -0.00381*** -0.00732*** -0.00844*** -0.00999*** 
 (0.00260) (0.0925) (0.00266) (0.0169) (0.00305) (0.124) (0.00376) (0.0236) (0.000270) (0.000336) (0.000318) (0.000280) (0.000316) (0.000406) (0.000393) (0.000342) 
Health uncertainty 0.0202*** 0.453*** 0.0484*** 0.201*** 0.0261*** 0.642*** 0.0797*** 0.283*** 0.00666*** 0.0111*** 0.0105*** 0.00986*** 0.00864*** 0.0145*** 0.0137*** 0.0126*** 
 (0.00214) (0.0768) (0.00229) (0.0134) (0.00251) (0.103) (0.00322) (0.0187) (0.000191) (0.000277) (0.000211) (0.000221) (0.000224) (0.000335) (0.000262) (0.000269) 
Social group 
characteristics 
-0.225*** -4.938*** -0.480*** -2.108*** -0.293*** -6.996*** -0.805*** -2.982*** 0.314*** 0.495*** 0.498*** 0.415*** 0.405*** 0.651*** 0.629*** 0.510*** 
 (0.0244) (0.843) (0.0255) (0.146) (0.0285) (1.130) (0.0358) (0.203) (0.0113) (0.0176) (0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0212) (0.0162) (0.0163) 
Income 0.00575*** 0.122*** 0.0125*** 0.0519*** 0.00748*** 0.173*** 0.0209*** 0.0734*** -0.00649*** -0.0104*** -0.0106*** -0.00861*** -0.00837*** -0.0137*** -0.0133*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.000602) (0.0207) (0.000647) (0.00357) (0.000704) (0.0278) (0.000909) (0.00497) (0.000261) (0.000404) (0.000312) (0.000311) (0.000306) (0.000487) (0.000384) (0.000378) 
Education, years -0.00717*** 0.0600*** 0.000424 0.0323*** -0.00756*** 0.0872*** 0.00413*** 0.0464*** -0.0111*** -0.00608*** -0.00761*** -0.00592*** -0.0126*** -0.00678*** -0.00856*** -0.00643*** 
 (0.000656) (0.0124) (0.000758) (0.00295) (0.000768) (0.0166) (0.00106) (0.00410) (0.000547) (0.000567) (0.000629) (0.000550) (0.000640) (0.000686) (0.000771) (0.000667) 
Mills ratio -80.90*** -72.36** -91.54*** -76.04*** -94.06*** -88.67** -116.1*** -92.91*** -75.49*** -82.80*** -92.42*** -83.27*** -86.69*** -99.06*** -114.3*** -101.6*** 
 (5.285) (32.99) (6.467) (15.34) (6.206) (44.22) (9.085) (21.34) (5.262) (5.298) (5.827) (5.143) (6.173) (6.467) (7.220) (6.288) 
HIV prevention, one 
partner 
0.0191*** -0.00918 0.0210*** -0.00954 0.0227*** -0.0146 0.0270*** -0.0143 0.0242*** 0.0282*** 0.0311*** 0.0288*** 0.0293*** 0.0355*** 0.0413*** 0.0374*** 
 (0.00595) (0.0377) (0.00718) (0.0173) (0.00699) (0.0505) (0.0101) (0.0241) (0.00591) (0.00593) (0.00646) (0.00575) (0.00693) (0.00725) (0.00803) (0.00705) 
Healthy looking 
person, HIV 
0.0144** 0.199*** 0.0286*** 0.0610*** 0.0188*** 0.284*** 0.0444*** 0.0883*** -0.00351 0.00554 0.00905 0.0113** -0.00450 0.00650 0.0153** 0.0181*** 
 (0.00578) (0.0442) (0.00688) (0.0166) (0.00678) (0.0593) (0.00967) (0.0231) (0.00573) (0.00571) (0.00619) (0.00549) (0.00671) (0.00698) (0.00767) (0.00672) 
Rural -0.00831* -0.405*** -0.0336*** -0.180*** -0.0121** -0.575*** -0.0587*** -0.255*** 0.0396*** 0.0536*** 0.0519*** 0.0473*** 0.0497*** 0.0691*** 0.0655*** 0.0583*** 
 (0.00471) (0.0759) (0.00567) (0.0179) (0.00552) (0.102) (0.00794) (0.0249) (0.00435) (0.00463) (0.00490) (0.00442) (0.00510) (0.00562) (0.00604) (0.00538) 
Southern Africa 0.278*** 4.432*** 0.650*** 2.133*** 0.364*** 6.274*** 1.031*** 2.994*** 0.00540 0.0157*** 0.0113** 0.0185*** 0.0106** 0.0229*** 0.0218*** 0.0302*** 
 (0.0219) (0.750) (0.0235) (0.137) (0.0257) (1.006) (0.0331) (0.190) (0.00388) (0.00397) (0.00438) (0.00383) (0.00454) (0.00482) (0.00539) (0.00466) 
Constant 10.03*** 15.29*** 11.97*** 12.98*** 11.61*** 19.79*** 15.25*** 16.32*** 8.763*** 9.524*** 10.54*** 9.592*** 9.925*** 11.20*** 12.82*** 11.50*** 
 (0.541) (3.434) (0.660) (1.569) (0.635) (4.604) (0.928) (2.184) (0.537) (0.541) (0.594) (0.525) (0.630) (0.660) (0.737) (0.642) 
Observations 54,467 67,735 61,160 67,735 54,467 67,735 61,160 67,735 54,467 67,735 61,160 67,735 54,467 67,735 61,160 67,735 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3.M2: DHS Condom Use Results   
 Objective life expectancy 
 2000s mortality rates 1980s mortality rates 
 IVTOBIT GMM IVTOBIT GMM 
 CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage CTSM 2nd stage 
 Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model Linear in means model Nonlinear in means model 









































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Expected health -0.186*** -1.428*** -0.302*** -0.879*** -0.252*** -2.310*** -0.477*** -1.325*** -0.0111*** -0.00593*** -0.0200*** -0.0193*** -0.0158*** -0.0105*** -0.0294*** -0.0288*** 
 (0.00706) (0.236) (0.00761) (0.0545) (0.00955) (0.359) (0.0119) (0.0819) (0.000608) (0.000781) (0.000597) (0.000554) (0.000820) (0.00111) (0.000839) (0.000793) 
Health uncertainty 0.113*** 1.153*** 0.198*** 0.662*** 0.154*** 1.878*** 0.319*** 1.001*** 0.0267*** 0.0370*** 0.0261*** 0.0243*** 0.0360*** 0.0519*** 0.0367*** 0.0347*** 
 (0.00581) (0.196) (0.00654) (0.0432) (0.00786) (0.299) (0.0102) (0.0649) (0.000430) (0.000644) (0.000396) (0.000436) (0.000588) (0.000919) (0.000564) (0.000625) 
Social group 
characteristics 
-1.415*** -12.70*** -2.271*** -7.217*** -1.908*** -20.64*** -3.579*** -10.87*** 1.044*** 1.663*** 0.936*** 0.796*** 1.405*** 2.308*** 1.291*** 1.121*** 
 (0.0662) (2.151) (0.0728) (0.469) (0.0895) (3.277) (0.113) (0.705) (0.0254) (0.0410) (0.0246) (0.0265) (0.0345) (0.0581) (0.0344) (0.0376) 
Income 0.0359*** 0.314*** 0.0585*** 0.178*** 0.0484*** 0.510*** 0.0923*** 0.268*** -0.0207*** -0.0350*** -0.0186*** -0.0155*** -0.0279*** -0.0485*** -0.0255*** -0.0218*** 
 (0.00163) (0.0529) (0.00185) (0.0115) (0.00221) (0.0806) (0.00288) (0.0173) (0.000588) (0.000940) (0.000585) (0.000614) (0.000795) (0.00133) (0.000817) (0.000870) 
Education, years 0.00470*** 0.173*** 0.0196*** 0.116*** 0.00833*** 0.282*** 0.0365*** 0.178*** -0.0150*** -0.00545*** -0.00919*** -0.00350*** -0.0175*** -0.00389** -0.00898*** -0.00119 
 (0.00178) (0.0317) (0.00217) (0.00949) (0.00240) (0.0482) (0.00335) (0.0143) (0.00123) (0.00132) (0.00118) (0.00109) (0.00166) (0.00188) (0.00164) (0.00154) 
Mills ratio -97.78*** -69.55 -98.37*** -79.21 -157.5*** -132.5 -176.1*** -145.3* -75.78*** -99.49*** -97.52*** -104.4*** -125.7*** -169.9*** -163.2*** -175.1*** 
 (14.36) (84.19) (18.48) (49.33) (19.42) (128.2) (28.68) (74.16) (11.84) (12.33) (10.94) (10.17) (16.08) (17.72) (15.49) (14.61) 
HIV prevention, one 
partner 
0.0254 -0.0649 0.0244 -0.0586 0.0416* -0.0905 0.0432 -0.0776 0.0489*** 0.0487*** 0.0555*** 0.0546*** 0.0722*** 0.0785*** 0.0868*** 0.0864*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0962) (0.0205) (0.0557) (0.0219) (0.147) (0.0319) (0.0838) (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0121) (0.0114) (0.0181) (0.0199) (0.0173) (0.0165) 
Healthy looking 
person, HIV 
0.111*** 0.508*** 0.140*** 0.252*** 0.160*** 0.852*** 0.223*** 0.393*** 0.0281** 0.0115 0.0650*** 0.0745*** 0.0479*** 0.0371* 0.108*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0157) (0.113) (0.0197) (0.0533) (0.0212) (0.172) (0.0306) (0.0801) (0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0116) (0.0109) (0.0175) (0.0192) (0.0165) (0.0157) 
Rural -0.000428 -0.959*** -0.0762*** -0.519*** -0.0176 -1.595*** -0.157*** -0.810*** 0.218*** 0.261*** 0.197*** 0.193*** 0.273*** 0.345*** 0.252*** 0.251*** 
 (0.0128) (0.194) (0.0162) (0.0577) (0.0173) (0.295) (0.0251) (0.0867) (0.00980) (0.0108) (0.00920) (0.00874) (0.0133) (0.0154) (0.0129) (0.0125) 
Southern Africa 1.262*** 11.27*** 2.294*** 6.757*** 1.726*** 18.30*** 3.663*** 10.21*** -0.105*** -0.123*** -0.0630*** -0.0888*** -0.119*** -0.152*** -0.0656*** -0.103*** 
 (0.0596) (1.915) (0.0671) (0.440) (0.0806) (2.917) (0.105) (0.661) (0.00873) (0.00923) (0.00822) (0.00757) (0.0118) (0.0132) (0.0115) (0.0108) 
Constant 14.76*** 26.92*** 16.52*** 22.41*** 21.88*** 44.13*** 27.06*** 35.43*** 9.327*** 11.56*** 11.72*** 12.28*** 14.35*** 18.60*** 18.42*** 19.42*** 
 (1.469) (8.765) (1.886) (5.048) (1.987) (13.35) (2.929) (7.589) (1.208) (1.258) (1.115) (1.038) (1.640) (1.809) (1.580) (1.492) 
Observations 54,467 67,735 61,160 67,735 54,467 67,735 61,160 67,735 54,467 67,735 61,160 67,735 54,467 67,735 61,160 67,735 
Standard errors in parentheses 
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%            


















The Role of Community Social Disorganisation in 
Contact and Contact Related Crime 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates how community social disorganisation, family disruption, residential instability, 
community disadvantage, lack of basic services and unemployment, can induce individuals to resort to crimes of 
social behaviour, namely contact crime and contact related crime in Cape Town, South Africa. The study uses a 
fixed effects model on a three year panel of seventy seven communities. To obtain the results the 
study needed to first circumvent four estimation challenges namely, excessive collinearity, 
measurement error as a result of reporting bias, omitted variable bias, and the influence of community 
unobservables. We find that the community social disorganisation attributes to be positive and 
significant in predicting contact crime and contact related crime. 
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4.1 Introduction 
We study the impact of social disorganisation on crime amongst communities in Cape Town which 
consist of a unique assortment of heterogeneous communities still largely segregated along racial lines. 
South Africa, and Cape Town in particular, has complex and unique socially disorganised 
communities, an aftermath of the apartheid past and the current high prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
(Emmett 2003; Demombynes and Ozler 2005; Breetzke 2010; Budlender and Lund 2011; Schatz et al. 
2011). A poignant quote by Silber and Geffen (2009) provides us with some insight into the intimate 
relationship between social disorganisation and crime in Khayelitsha, one of Cape Town’s largest 
informal settlements: 
...Khayelitsha, where 38% of inhabitants live in formal structures, 20% live with access to water, 65% with flush toilet, 
and a significant number without electricity, unemployment is over 50%…Women are frequently beaten and raped 
walking to the toilet or fetching water from taps not more than 50 metres from their homes, children are routinely injured 
or killed by cars that hurtle through their backyards, illness and death are common, houses are frequently lost to fire and 
flooding and contact crime is ever present. These burdens pervade every crevice of a township that is overwhelmingly black 
and poor…The inadequate provision of these and other basic amenities… serves to exacerbate the broader deficit and 
security and results in several constitutional rights being routinely violated... (Silber and Geffen 2009: p. 37). 
A mounting body of literature argues that the prevailing socially disorganised communities are pivotal 
ingredients in creating a conducive environment for crimes to flourish85 (Blackmore 2003; Emmett 
2003; Louw 2007; Landau and Misago 2009; Whyte 2010; Lau et al. 2010; Daniels and Adams 2010; 
Breetzke 2010). However, there exists a paucity of empirical literature to substantiate the effects of 
socially disorganised communities on crime in developing countries in general, and in sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular (Ward 200786; Breetzke 2010; SAIRR87 2010; Daniels and Adams 2010).  
Consequently, this study analyses the effects of community social disorganisation, specifically family 
disruption, residential instability, community disadvantage, lack of basic services and unemployment on contact crime 
and contact related crime in the Cape Town Metropolitan area of South Africa using a three year panel 
data. This is achieved by extending Becker’s theory to include social structures following the work of 
Fajnzylber et al. (2002) and Haddad and Moghadam (2011). This theme is closely related to the 
empirical work of Sampson et al. (1989); Hannon et al. (1998); Gorman et al. (2001); Fajnzylber et al. 
(2002)88; Breetzke (2010); Miyoshi (2011) and Haddad and Moghadam (2011). As such we 
                                                 
85 Gangsterism in Western Cape is linked to forced removals of Coloured families and their dispersal all over the Cape 
Flats. Standing and other researchers have argued that informal social control that communities had over youth was 
lost when established Cape Town communities were disbanded under the Group Areas Act. Crime and felony-related 
conflict became more prominent in Coloured communities after they were relocated to the Cape Flats (Daniels and 
Adams 2010: p. 47). 
86 While these factors have been identified in a number of US studies as being related to outcomes probably linked to 
social organisation of communities, their relevance in other contexts has yet to be established (Ward 2007: p. 79). 
87
 South African Institute of Race Relation (SAIRR). 















acknowledge these studies and the contribution they make to empirical literature on criminal 
behaviour. 
The study contributes to the current literature in that most of the existing empirical studies on social 
disorganisation concentrate on international experience and little research exists on sub-Saharan 
Africa (Ward 2007; SAIRR 2010; Daniels and Adams 2010). Our literature review identifies one study 
by Breetzke (2010) which was conducted in the Tswane region of South Africa. In addition, most of 
the aforementioned empirical studies are based on cross-sectional analysis. Yet it is well established 
that one of the major shortcomings of such cross sectional studies is the bias resulting from lack of 
controlling for community unobservables (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Blackmore 2003). Hence the study 
extends the current literature by using panel data analysis affording us the ability to control for 
community unobservables. In addition we also control for measurement error and omitted variable 
bias which is often a challenge that is ignored in empirical criminological literature (Fajnzylber et al. 
2002). 
In this study the community is the unit of analysis. In total there are 77 communities over a period of 
3 years covering the years 2001/2002, 2004/2005 and 2005/2006, implying that our total sample size 
is 231 communities. The panel is a combination of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) data and Cape 
Town crime data. CAPS is a panel study of young adults in Metropolitan Cape Town, while the Cape 
Town crime data is crime statistics from the South African police service. As previously stated to 
derive the results the study needed to first circumvent four estimation challenges namely, excessive 
collinearity among the regressors, measurement error as a result of reporting bias, omitted variable 
bias, and the influence of community unobservables. To control for unobservable community 
heterogeneity the study adopts a fixed effects model of the panel data. 
To curb the excessive collinearity we construct indices of the related variables, as proposed by among 
others Greene (2002). Our proxy measure for family disruption is the frequency of interaction between 
the youth and both parents, where the lower the frequency of interaction with both parents the higher 
the family disruption. Our proxy measure for unemployment is if the head of the household is unemployed. 
Lastly the proxy measure for residential instability is the percentage of individuals that have recently 
moved. The types of crime that constitute contact crimes include murder, attempted murder, rape, 
assault, and all forms of robbery. While the contact related crimes include malicious damage to property, 
arson, public violence and crimen injuria.  
Two approaches are used to control for measurement error. The first is the ‘naive approach’ where we 
constrain the analysis to include only those crime statistics that are not prone to measurement error. 
This approach involves eliminating rape and robbery from the contact crime outcome variable. The 
second approach follows Demombynes and Ozler (2005) and adjusts the rape and robbery statistics 
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The last estimation challenge is omitted variable bias as a result of the mobile nature of some crimes. 
This type of error is often ignored in the empirical literature of crime. The examples of such economic 
crimes include house robbery, bank robbery and cash in transit heists. The mobile nature of these 
crimes makes it difficult to establish the relationship with social or economic characteristics as these 
crimes are not area specific. To militate against this bias we follow the ‘naive approach’ and exclude 
crime statistics that are prone to omitted variable bias. In our case this involves eliminating robbery 
from our list of contact crimes. 
Additionally, all the regressors are interacted with majority racial population group in each community. 
This is a dummy variable consisting of Black, Coloured and White population groups residing in the 
greater Cape Town area. This is in order to capture the effects of the differences in communities 
based on racial composition, an effect of the apartheid past where communities differ by racially 
determined geographical areas (Emmett 2003; Demombynes and Ozler 2005; Hipp 2007; Breetzke 
2008; Breetzke 2010). In general the results reveal that the social factors are positive and significant in 
predicting both contact crimes and contact related crimes. In addition the results reveal that the majority 
Black communities are the most affected by social disorganisation which is consistent with the 
literature (Emmett 2003; Breetzke 2010; SAIRR 2010; Daniels and Adams 2010). 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: section 4.2 provides the details of existing 
empirical literature related to the current theme of this study including our contribution to the existing 
literature. Thereafter section 4.3 provides a background to and motivation for the study. In section 4.4 
we outline the theoretical framework of criminal behaviour that will guide our empirical model. 
Section 4.5 introduces the data and defines our outcome variable and the main regressors used as 
proxies for community social disorganisation. This is followed by the empirical framework which 
provides details of our estimation model, the likely estimation challenges of our model and our 
strategy to overcome these challenges. Section 4.6 describes the empirical results of our econometric 
modelling. We conclude in section 4.7 with a discussion of our findings. 
4.2 Review of Previous Empirical Research  
The overall theme of this paper relates to the previous empirical literature on socioeconomic 
structures that predict criminal behaviour. This include Sampson and Groves (1989); Hannon and 
Defronzo (1998); Gorman et al. (2001); Fajnzylber et al. (2002); Breetzke (2010); Miyoshi (2011) and 
Haddad and Moghadam (2011). Sampson and Groves (1989) which is perhaps one of the most cited 
empirical criminological studies utilises cross sectional data to investigate social disorganisation theory in 
238 localities in the United Kingdom. This theory is founded on the premise that factors such as 
ethnic diversity, poverty, population mobility, and family disruption increase the complexity of a 
community’s social organisation and ultimately lead to high levels of crime (Sampson and Groves 














Adams 2010). In line with this theory Sampson and Groves (1989) find evidence that communities 
with higher levels of family disruptions, ethnic heterogeneity and urbanisation do indeed have higher 
crime rates.  
Along similar lines Hannon and Defronzo (1998) adopts anomie/strain theory and uses cross sectional 
data from 406 counties in the United States of America (USA) to examine the effects of resource 
deprivation, unemployment, residential stability and public assistance on county crime rates. Strain 
theory argues that delinquency occurs when individuals turn to illegitimate channels after they are not 
able to achieve their goals through legitimate channels (Agnew 1985). Consistent with strain theory 
Hannon and Defronzo (1998) find that resource deprivation is less significant in determining crime in 
areas with higher levels of public assistance. Conversely Gorman et al. (2001) analysed the effects of 
neighbourhood structure, specifically poverty levels, racial concentration, residential stability, 
educational attainment and alcohol outlets (for example clubs and hotels) on violent crime in 98 
blocks in the USA and found that areas with a high concentration of alcohol outlets had a higher 
incident of violent crime. 
On the other hand, Fajnzylber et al. (2002) extended Becker’s theory to include social and demographic 
factors that determine crime in a multinational study. According to Becker’s theory the decision to 
commit crime is rational and based on the expected costs and benefits of committing a crime. The 
expected cost in this case is the charge/sentencing given to criminals that are apprehended, while the 
expected benefit is the difference between the wealth from the crime and the opportunity cost of the 
crime (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Miyoshi et al. 20110). Fajnzylber et al. (2002) use panel data of 45 Western 
industrialised countries, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the 
Middle East and North Africa and Asia (excluding sub-Saharan Africa) and find that previous crime 
rates, GDP growth rate, income distribution, presence of policing, drugs, urbanisation, religion, 
proportion of young males, and average years of education influence murder and robbery.  
Closely aligned with Sampson et al. (1989) and in a more recent application of social disorganisation theory 
is an empirical study by Breetzke (2010) who measured the effects of family disruption, 
unemployment and deprivation on crime in 354 communities in Tshwane, South Africa. Breetzke 
(2010) using data from the 2001 South African population census and South African Police Services 
(SAPS) crime data finds that whether the father is deceased or estranged  is positively significant in 
determining crime, whereas whether a household is female headed is insignificant in predicting crime. 
In addition, contrary to the authors’ expectation, unemployment was found to be negatively related to 
crime. In another recent empirical investigation Miyoshi (2011) provide evidence that is consistent 
with Becker’s theory using panel data from Japanese provinces. The finding from their study indicates 
that policing, employment and education are significant in predicting crime. Finally, Haddad and 
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The authors find that economic variables play a key role in predicting the outcome variables, burglary 
and threats. 
As previously mentioned this study contributes to the current literature in that most of the existing 
empirical research ignores the aforementioned estimation challenges. Additionally the current 
empirical studies on social disorganisation focus on international experience (Ward 2007; SAIRR 
2010; Daniels and Adams 2010). Among the aforementioned studies the empirical study by Breetzke 
(2010) is the only one conducted in South Africa in the Tswane area. We would like to acknowledge 
other empirical studies on crime in South Africa which have also been reviewed in detail by Breetzke 
(2010). Gilfillan (1999) assessed countrywide socio-economic determinants of crime, while Brown 
(2001) applied pairwise correlation to determine the nationwide socioeconomic variables that predict 
crime. Blackmore (2003) used a nationwide panel to determine the effects of socio-economic factors 
on crime in South Africa. We also acknowledge other empirical studies on crime that have used 
similar panel data methods based on international experience. The list is however unlikely to be 
exhaustive; Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) for example use panel data on the counties of North 
Carolina and find labour markets and the criminal justice system to be important deterring factors of 
crime. Along similar lines, Fajnzylber et al., (2002) used panel data of 45 Western industrialised 
countries, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and 
North Africa and Asia (excluding sub-Saharan Africa) and find that economic variables, crime 
deterrence, demographic, cultural as well as illegal drugs influence murder and robbery. In another 
recent empirical investigation Miyoshi (2011) provide evidence that is consistent with Becker’s theory 
using panel data of Japanese provinces and find that policing, employment and education are 
significant in predicting crime. Finally, Haddad and Moghadam (2011) also estimate an extension to 
Becker’s theory in Iran using panel data of provinces and find that economic variables play a key role 
in predicting burglary and threats. 
4.3 Motivation for Research Problem in the South African Context  
The current international literature shows that community social disorganisation leads to criminal 
behaviours (Sampson and Groves 1989; Kawachi et al. 1999), we study this assertion in the context of 
communities in Cape Town, South Africa. Figure 4.1 shows the number of crimes committed in the 
Metropolitan area of Cape Town (our study area) by type of crime from the period 2001/2002 to 
2005/2006. As is evident, the majority of the crimes are contact crimes, which usually occur as a result of 
social behaviour (SAPS 2010), hence mirroring the condition of existing social structures. The study 
therefore investigates whether community social disorganisation has any role to play in contact crimes 



















Figure 4.2: Total Number of Crime by the Five Major Categories in South Africa 
 
Source: SAPS (2010) 
Evidently and interestingly, this pattern is reflected throughout South Africa as depicted by figure 4.2 
which shows contact crimes to be the most prevalent89. 
This section gives a brief overview of the roots of social disorganisation in South African communities 
and highlights the current state of South African communities in relation to social disorganisation. 
The section mainly follows the works of Emmett (2003); Breetzke (2010); South African Institute of 
Race Relations (SAIRR) (2010); Budlender and Lund (2011) and Schatz et al. (2011). The literature 
points to two main intertwined sources of social disorganisation namely South Africa’s apartheid past 
and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. We highlight below the role of these issues in social disorganisation in 
South African communities. 
The consensual view asserts that the apartheid era scarred South Africa socially (Mare 2001; Emmett 
2003; Breetzke 2010; Lau et al. 2010; Daniels and Adams 2010; John 2010; Schatz et al. 2011) mainly 
because the political context was favourable in facilitating the breakdown of the formal and informal 
                                                 
89 Of the 2.1 million crimes reported in the 2009/2010 period 31.9% were contact crimes; 26.1% were property crimes, 
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social networks and associational ties inherent in  the social structure of South African communities90 
(Emmett 2003; Ward 2007; Breetzke 2010; Daniels and Adams 2010; Lau, 2010; Mathews et al. 2011).  
More broadly, the apartheid system was characterised by for example racial segregation policies, the 
migrant labour systems and hostels, pass laws and the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Education Act, 
school boycotts and popular uprisings. Consequently, this sparked a breakdown of traditional family 
structures in South Africa and increased separations within households, single parenthood, and 
isolation of nuclear families from extended families (Emmett 2003; Daniels and Adams 2010; 
Budlender and Lund 2011; Schatz et al. 2011). Further to this the segregation policies and a series of 
forced removals engendered the spatial separation of residents from their communities (Mare 2001; 
Emmett 2003; Breetzke 2010). The historical segregation policies also caused division between and 
within racial groups, cultivating mistrust, fear and breakdown in local ties and friendships91 (Emmett 
2003; Vincent 2008; John 2010; Ward and Bakhuis 2010). 
The migrant labour system in itself cultivated a non-traditional family in South Africa (Emmett 2003; 
Whyte 2010; Budlender and Lund 2011). By the late 1980s it was estimated that 40% (approximately 2 
million) of Black workers were migrant labourers, which is the highest ever recorded92 (Emmett 2003). 
This paved the way for a culture of absentee fathers and family desertion as migrant workers had 
multiple partners and secondary families93 (Emmett 2003; Whyte 2010; Budlender and Lund 2011; 
Mathews et al. 2011). The result is increased poverty among women (the majority of the migrant 
workers were male) inevitably forcing women to migrate as well in search of employment. The 
residual effects of the migrant labour system were a change in composition in the South African 
household and parents grappling for control over their children (Emmett 2003; Mathews et al. 2011).  
                                                 
90 Social and medical scientists have long documented the social disintegration of black communities in South Africa 
under the assault of colonialism, apartheid and racial oppression. Among the symptoms of disintegration, with 
increasing divorce rates, separations, single parenthood and teenage pregnancy: breakdown of authority of parents and 
teachers, high unemployment rates, low performance in all spheres of life, including school, high crime and violence 
rates at all levels of social interaction  (Emmet 2003: p. 5). Structures of apartheid which served to fragment, dislocate 
and alienate the individual from a sense of community, belonging, identity, and association with language and cultural 
groups in part resulted in ‘fractures in humanness’, as manifested in the high prevalence of violence in South Africa (Lau 
2010: p.7). South African townships are deprived and poor, plagued by social disorganisation caused by apartheid 
policies such as forced removals, which contributed to family breakdown and the rapid formation of street gangs 
(Mathews et al. 2011: p. 961). 
91 There is a sense that the physical violence of the past remains as long-term socio-psychic violence and manifests in 
social division, suspicion and lack of trust (John 2010: p. 59). 
92 There is no other country where such a system has existed for so long and has trapped so large a proportion of the 
labour force in a dehumanising structure (Wilson et al. 1989 cited in Emmett 2003: p. 5). 
93 For Blacks and Coloureds in South Africa, apartheid has had a devastating impact on family life. Studies on 
fatherhood have shown that the migrant labour system particularly impacted on black men’s availability for their 
families, resulting in fathers abandoning and neglecting their children. With child-rearing practices gendered and 
largely considered as womens’ domain... however, many children are raised not only without a father, but also without 
a biological mother, with grandmothers or aunts taking on the parenting role… Given this context children turn to 
others in their social environment for affirmation,…including peers which leads to exposure to gang culture with its 














Additionally, the migrant labour system created a favourable environment in the country for 
HIV/AIDS to flourish. Needless to say the situation further fuelled an increase in single headed and 
child headed households as many perished from the AIDS epidemic (Emmett 2003; Whyte 2010; 
Ragnarsson et al. 2010; Schatz et al. 2011; Kenyon and Zondo 2011). Consequently, South Africa 
currently has one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence in the world (UNAIDS 2009; Mah 2010a; 
Mah and Halperin 2010b; UNAIDS 2010).  
It has therefore become the ‘norm’ to have single female headed households and absentee fathers in 
South Africa94 (SAIRR 2011; Schatz et al. 2011; Mathews et al. 2011). Currently, the country faces 
disturbingly high rates of family disruption95 (Whyte 2010; Schatz et al. 2011; Budlender and Lund 2011; 
SAIRR 2011). Further to this, there is extensive practice of formal and informal polygamy and multiple 
concurrent partnerships in South Africa (Mah 2010a) which also affects household composition. In a 
recent study by SAIRR on ‘First Steps to Healing the South African Family’, the main findings were 
that increasingly South African children are growing up with only one parent. The same pattern is 
observed in the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) household data, where we find in wave 1 (2002) that 
71% of households were female headed, in wave 3 (2005) this increased to 77%, and in wave 4 (2006) 
to 81%. Additionally, more than 50% of these household heads are either divorced or widowed or 
never married (never married forms the highest frequency among the single heads of households). 
Table 4.B1 of Appendix 4.B summarises the current state of South African families. 
Amidst these there has been a consistent lack of basic services for most of the country but particularly in 
impoverished communities (Emmett 2003; Breetzke 2010; Alexander 2010; Lau et al. 2010). A number 
of studies have suggested that crime in South Africa cannot be eliminated without provision of basic 
services (Silber and Geffen 2009; Hough 2009; Vromans et al. 2011). The vestiges of apartheid have 
influenced this vast differences in community resources amongst which the most controversial is basic 
services96 (Goldin 2010). Th s is because South African communities were typified by racial division 
with Black and Coloured groups facing desolate conditions and having the least resources allocated 
towards their communities.  
These effects have spilled over so that even at present the Black communities are the most 
impoverished and lacking in basic services (Emmett 2003; Breetzke 2010; Goldin 2010). Recent riots 
                                                 
94 The latest available data about fathers in South Africa shows that the proportion of fathers who are living but absent 
increased between 1996 and 2009, from 42% to 48%. Boys growing up in households with absentee fathers are more 
likely to display ‘hyper-masculine’ behaviour, including aggression. These findings correspond with research from 
United States, where it was found that absence of fathers when children were growing up was associated with poor 
educational outcomes, anti-social behaviour, delinquency, and disrupted employment in later life (SAIRR 2010: p. 4). 
95 It is stated that the South African household composition is incongruent with the Western nuclear household 
(Emmett 2003; Schatz et al. 2011; Budlender and Lund 2011). 
96 The historical patterns of access to water and other areas of public service delivery in South Africa have been 
markedly skewed. Despite the reversal of the regime and the fact that South Africa is a middle-income country, there 
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during the 2011 South African local government elections re-emphasised this lack of basic services which 
thus far the South African government has failed to provide especially to informal settlements 
inhabited mainly by the Black population97. This is coupled by high mobility within the country. The 
impetus for residential instability is the search for employment opportunity as unemployment and poverty 
remain staggering high (Breetzke 2008). South Africa has one of the highest unemployment rates 
globally (Blackmore 2003; Klasen and Woolard 2008; SAIRR 2010; Davies and Thurlow 2010; 
Tregenna 2011), mainly concentrated among the Black population (Klasen and Woolard 2008). 
4.4 Theoretical Framework 
This section presents a simple theoretical framework for criminal behaviour that supports our 
hypothesis. The theoretical framework follows Fajnzylber et al. (2002) and Haddad and Moghadam 
(2011) who extended Becker’s theory (Becker 1968) which is grounded in the rational utility 
maximising framework. Becker’s (1968) influential paper ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach’ initiated several theoretical models of criminal behaviour in economic literature. According 
to Becker’s theory the decision to commit crime is rational and is based on the expected costs and 
benefits of committing a crime. The expected cost in this case is the charge/sentencing given to 
criminals that are apprehended, while the expected benefit is the difference between the wealth from 
the crime and the opportunity cost of the crime. To date Becker’s theory has had numerous 
extensions, for example Ehrlich (1973); Heineke (1978); Witte (1980); Fajnzylber et al. (2002); Becker 
et al. (2006); Mehlkop and Graeff (2010); Miyoshi (2011); and Haddad and Moghadam (2011). The 
extensions that are of relevance to the theme of this paper are the research works of Fajnzylber et al. 
(2002) and Haddad and Moghadam (2011).  Fajnzylber et al., (2002) extended Becker’s theory by making 
four main extensions in the core model. Firstly, the core model excludes deterrence factors because of 
limited cross-sectional data. Secondly, the model includes the effects of illegal drugs. Thirdly, 
demographic factors which include urbanisation and age composition are incorporated in the model. 
The fourth and final extension is to include two cultural factors which are geographic region and 
religion dummies. With these extensions, Fajnzylber et al., (2002) use a panel data of 45 Western 
industrialised countries, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the 
Middle East and North Africa and Asia (excluding sub-Saharan Africa) to test their hypothesis. 
Fajnzylber et al., (2002) re-estimate a second model in which they include deterrence factors. Their 
argument for this approach is based on the fact that significance of the income variable may be a 
result of unobservables such as unequal distribution of crime prevention efforts, and that this effect is 
likely to be eliminated by using deterrence proxies. The deterrence proxies that they use include the 
                                                 
97 Silber and Geffen (2009) state that crime cannot be eliminated without providing basic services such as sanitation 
and water. Hough (2009) notes that violence is likely to occur in deprived groups as a result of these groups 
comparing themselves with groups that are better off. Lau et al. (2010) states that protests occur in wards that have 
higher unemployment and lack access to services, while Vromans et al. (2011) asserts that violence is a result of post-














number of police personnel per 100,000 population and the second proxy is the existence of the death 
penalty. Similarly, Haddad and Moghadam (2011) also estimate an extension of Becker’s theory in Iran 
using panel data on provinces. Specifically, their model includes the following: deterrence (the 
probability of arrest which is defined as the number of arrested criminals over number of reported 
crime), economic factors (unemployment and income inequality), social factors (family instability and 
literacy rate) and demographic factors (population density). The extensions that are of relevance to the 
theme of this paper are the works of Fajnzylber et al. (2002) and Haddad and Moghadam (2011). 
Hence staying in the Beckerian setting and following Fajnzylber et al. (2002) and Haddad and 
Moghadam (2011) our theoretical framework is based on two core assumptions: firstly individuals act 
rationally in their decision to commit crime using cost benefit analysis and secondly individuals are 
assumed to be risk neutral. The expected net benefit (  ) of committing crime is equal to the probability 
of not being apprehended (    ) multiplied by the loot ( ), less the total cost of executing the crime ( ), less 
forgone wages from legitimate activities ( ). From this we then subtract the expected punishment from 
committing crime (     )  
    [(    )       ]  [     ]                            (4.1) 
In order for an individual to commit crime (   )  or not commit crime (   ) the expected net 
benefit needs to exceed the moral stance ( ). The moral stance incorporates moral values, and possesses 
the threshold of moral value beyond which a crime will be committed.   
               
                                        (4.2) 
The presence of family disruption (   ) implies that the formal and informal associational ties which 
assist in collective supervision, social support and social control at household and community level are 
broken. When this occurs there is likely to be a lower moral stance among individuals which in turn 
increases the likelihood of them committing a crime. Furthermore family disruption is also likely to 
decrease the cost of executing the crime, since young individuals who are not supervised are more likely to 
become involved in street gangs and hence have a higher chance of engaging in risky behaviours. 
Closely aligned to family disruption is residential instability (   ). Interestingly, residential instability disturbs 
the social networks of friendship and kinship in a community and consequently reduces the positive 
social relations among community members. This suggests that residential instability is likely to create a 
conducive environment for criminal behaviour as it reduces the cost of executing crime and moral stance.  
By the same token, an increase in the level of community disadvantage (   ) has the effect of lowering the 
community’s moral stance and decreasing legitimate activities since it captures and takes advantage of the 
characteristics of a community with social decay. This notion is based on the premise that 
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informal organisational activities that are designed to consolidate and reinforce community structures. 
High unemployment levels (   ) may be associated with lower levels of legitimate activities and thereby is 
likely to increase the probability of criminal behaviour. The lack of basic services (   ) implies the 
absence of resources required for basic survival as such this is likely to decrease moral stance and limit 
legitimate activities. 
Therefore the effects of the aforementioned social factors98 on the cost of executing crime can be formally 
written as 
  
    
    and 
  
    
    while the effects on the moral stance is 
  
    
   and 
  
    
  . On the 
other hand the effects on the loot (l) can therefore be formally represented by  
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  , while the effects on legitimate activities (w) is 
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   and finally the effects on 
the moral stance (m) is 
  
    
    
  
    
   and 
  
    
  . Recall that,     is family disruption,     is residential 
instability,     is the unemployment level,     is the community disadvantage, while     is the lack of basic 
services. Substituting these factors into equation (4.1) and (4.2) yields equation (4.3) which depicts the 
condition under which an individual is likely to commit a crime: 
         (           )    (        )   (       )   (                      )                         (4.3)  
Equation (4.3) can be rewritten as a function ( ) of the social factors in a reduced form as depicted in 
equation (4.4). 
         (                    )   ( )                              (4.4)  
Where   represents the factors that determine crime and 
  
    
    
  
    
    
  
    
    
  
    
   and 
  
    
  . We further assume that the decision to commit crime is based on a linear probability model 
and that   has a linear functional form. The individual equation then takes the form as portrayed in 
(4.5).  
  β                                               (4.5)                  
Equation (4.5) is an individual regression equation, however as previously mentioned, the current data 
at our disposal is aggregated crime data at community level and not individual level. Miyoshi (2011) 
lists a number of criminology studies that have experienced this obstacle and have instead relied on 
aggregated units of analysis such as country or province as opposed to analysis at individual level. The 
study therefore adopts a similar approach and follow Fajnzylber et al. (2002), and Haddad and 
                                                 
98 The social factors that we include are embedded in the international evidence of significant interaction between 















Moghadam (2011) and convert equation (4.5) to an aggregate community level regression by obtaining 
the average of all individuals in community ( ) in a given period ( ), giving rise to equation (4.6): 
   β                                                            (4.6)                 
Substituting   in equation (4.6), namely factors that determine crime, gives as the following equation:  
    α  β         β         β         β        β           
                                      (4.7) 
 
4.5 Empirical Framework 
The main purpose of this section is to describe the data and our estimation methods. Specifically, 
section 4.5.1 introduces the data used to test our model in equation (4.7). Section 4.5.2 defines the 
outcome variable and the regressors used in our estimation model. Thereafter we proceed to section 
4.5.3 which describes the likely estimation challenges in our model. We then end by outlining the 
strategy to overcome the estimation challenges. 
4.5.1 Area of Study and Sources of Data 
 
The study employs data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS)99 and Cape Town crime statistics 
from the South African Police Service (SAPS). CAPS is a longitudinal study of young adults in the 
Metropolitan Cape Town area of South Africa, the first wave was conducted in 2002 with the most 
recent wave, wave 4, carried out in 2006. The survey focuses on health, education, employment, family 
formation and intergenerational support systems of the young adults. The data which is the primary 
source of our regressors is the young adult data and household data.   
The crime statistics from the South African Police Service (SAPS) include statistics on 33 types of 
crime that occurred in the Metropolitan Cape Town area between 2001/2002 and 2005/2006. Table 
4.A1 in Appendix 4.A shows the distribution of the categories across the five years. We match the 
CAPS young adult dataset and household dataset of waves 1 (2002), 3 (2005) and 4 (2006), to the 
2001/2002, 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 crime data. As the crime statistics are grouped at the 
community (sub-place) level we also aggregate all the CAPS data at community level. Hence the unit 
of analysis in this study is the community (defined by sub-place). 
4.5.2 Variable Specification 
 
The section defines each of the variables used in our model which attempts to explain the impact of 
social disorganisation on contact and contact related crime. The model has two outcome variables: 
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contact crime and contact related crime, while the regressors include family disruption, community disadvantage, 
residential instability, lack of basic services and unemployment. 
4.5.2.1 Contact and Contact Related Crime 
As indicated earlier this study uses two types of outcome variable, namely contact crime and contact related 
crime. Our motivation for using contact crime and contact related crime is mainly because these crimes are a 
result of the underlying social structures, while other crimes (property related crimes, crimes detected by the 
police and other serious crimes) are mainly committed for economic reasons (SAPS 2010). Furthermore, 
because the determinants of crime are likely to vary by the type of crime (Breetzke 2010; Miyoshi 
2011), we test the two types of crimes separately. Below we describe each of the five main types of 
crime as defined by the South African police service (SAPS)100. 
Contact crime involves physical contact between the perpetrators and the victims of a crime. This 
category of crime is also known as social contact crime because it often occurs between individuals who 
are familiar with each other. Thus the types of crime that fall into this category mainly involve crimes 
of social or group behaviour. The category includes the following types of crime: murder, attempted 
murder, rape, all forms of assault, and all forms of robbery.  
Contact related crime usually occurs as a result of individual or collective behaviours, for example crimes 
that occur as a result of frustration. The types of crime that falls in this category include: malicious 
damage to property, arson, public violence101 and crimen injuria102. Property related crimes are usually 
classified as non-violent crimes as they occur in the absence of the victims. Burglary at residence and 
businesses, theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle, theft out of motor vehicle and stock theft are the 
types of crimes that fall into this category. Crimes detected by police are the fourth type of the broad 
category of crime. The crimes in this category are a result of police proactive action such as road 
blocks and random searches. The crimes in this category include illegal possession of firearms, drug 
related crimes and driving under the influence. The fifth and last category is the other serious crimes 
category which includes commercial crime, shoplifting and all theft not mentioned elsewhere. 
4.5.2.2 Family Disruption 
There are various proxies that have been used for family disruption. For example Sampson (1989) used 
an index consisting of the percentage of divorced/separated adults and percentage of single parents as 
                                                 
100 According to the SAPS 2009/2010 report, the various crimes in South Africa are grouped into five categories 
which include: contact crime, contact related crime, property related crime, crimes detected by police and other serious 
crimes. 
101 This includes all forms of contact crime that occur in public places. 















a proxy for family disruption. On the other hand, Breetzke (2010) used divorce/separation, father 
deceased/estranged and female headed household in the analysis. Lastly Haddad and Moghadam, 
(2010) included the number of divorces in the province as one of their regressors. In our view the 
above mentioned indicators are unlikely to be good proxies for family disruption in the case of South 
Africa. This is because and as previously mentioned absentee fathers and female headed households 
have become the ‘norm’ in South Africa SAIRR 2011; Schatz et al. 2011; Mathews et al. 2011), where 
the family unit differs from the conventional international ‘nuclear family’. Breetzke (2010) for 
instance found female headed household to be insignificant in predicting crime in Tshwane, South 
Africa. 
This study therefore uses the frequency of interaction between the youth and both parents as a proxy 
for family disruption, where the lower the frequency of interaction with both parents the higher the 
family disruption. Instead of capturing whether the household has a single female parent, which we 
have highlighted to be the ‘norm’ in South Africa, we rather focus on the amount of time parents 
spend with the youth. This proxy is obtained from the following two questions in the CAPS survey: 
‘how often has mother spend the night in the past 12 months’ and ‘how often has father spent the 
night in the past 12 months’. The response choices to these questions included: ‘never’, ‘rarely’, 
‘sometimes’ and ‘often’. Family disruption is represented by the percentage of youth who never and 
rarely see both parents. 
4.5.2.3 Community Disadvantage 
There are various factors that have been used as proxies for community disadvantage in empirical 
research, as recorded in the literature. For example Hannon and Defronzo (1998) include the 
percentage of female headed households, percentage of black population, and family poverty rate. 
Similarly Gorman et al. (2001) include the unemployment rate, the welfare rate and household income 
as measures of neighbourhood poverty. On the other hand Sampson et al. (1989) include education 
level, which was measured as the percentage of community members with college education, 
occupation measured as the percentage of respondents in professional and managerial positions and 
income represented by the percentage of those with high income. On the other hand Fajnzylber et al. 
(2002) includes GNP per capita and income inequality in their model, and control for reverse 
causality103 using lagged variables. Breetzke (2010) in turn uses socioeconomic deprivation captured by 
share of income. Reverse causality may arise in  models like these given that at community level, 
communities with low income levels are likely to be infested with crime and other socioeconomic 
problems. High crime levels in itself, are likely to repel high income earners from residing in such 
communities, while low income earners mostly do not have any alternative but to stay in such areas. 
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In it is worth noting that in recognising the reverse causality between income and crime we used a 
proxy which is mean years of education of a community104, where the lower the mean the more the 
disadvantaged the community, and the average ratio of number of rooms to number of household members105 
where lower ratios represent more disadvantaged households, and therefore a more disadvantaged 
community. However, education is also likely to be endogenous, see Machin et al (2004); Locher 
(2004); Buonanno and Leonida (2006) and Groot and Brink (2010) for this discussion. A possible 
channel of this endogeneity is reverse causality, for instance, low education is likely to increase 
criminal behaviour and by the same token high criminal behaviour is likely to influence investment in 
education. Further to this, communities with high crime rates are more likely to be less attractive to 
more educated individuals since they are likely to have more opportunities and thus have a wider 
choice of place of residence. We further acknowledge that the ratio of number of rooms to number of 
household members is also likely to be endogenous. One likely route of this endogeneity is a scenario 
where abundant houses in crime infested communities are more likely to be occupied by squatters, 
thus increasing the ratio of number of rooms to number of household members.  
With these caveats in mind we consider an alternative proxy measure which is the ratio of number of 
rooms to number of household members where we only include households who either own or rent the 
house, so as to purge out the squatter effects. Upon exploring our data we observe that the majority of 
the households either own or rent their households. Specifically, the data in the first wave show that 
71.8% of the households own the house, while 24.4% rent the house and the remaining 3.7% 
mentioned ‘other’. This ‘other’ category mainly consists of individuals who stay for free and as such 
this category is likely to contain the squatters described earlier on. Along similar lines, in the third 
wave, 74.1% of the households own the house, while 24.4% rent the house and those who stated 
‘other’ comprised of only 1.2% of the households. Finally, in the fourth wave and as in the previous 
waves the majority of the households own the houses (75.7%), while the minority rent the houses 
(23.4%), with the remaining 0.7% mentioning ‘other’. Overall, we found our results marginally 
different when using the two income proxies, namely the ratio of number of rooms to number of household 
members and the ratio of number of rooms to number of household members after including only households who 
either own or rent the house. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the ratio of number of rooms to number of 
household members is likely to be correlated with various other housing related factors such as the 
demand for housing, apart from income, which may in turn drive our results. Hence although the 
results are suggestive they are however not conclusive and this must be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the results. 
                                                 
104 This is derived from the variable: ‘number of years of education’ in the CAPS data, from this variable we calculate 
the average number of years of education of community members. 
105 This indicator is derived from two variables, one being ‘total number of household members that reside in the 
house’ and ‘total number of rooms contained in the house’. From this information we divide the number of rooms by 














4.5.2.4 Residential Instability 
Sampson and Groves (1989) uses the percentage of the population that grew up within 15 minutes of 
their current home (birth place) as a proxy for residential stability, while Gorman et al. (2001) uses the 
length of residential tenure and the proportion of the population that has moved in a five year interval 
and one year interval as a proxy for residential stability. Breetzke (2010) includes the percentage of 
Black immigrants, that is, African citizens who come from African countries outside of South Africa. 
Haddad and Moghadam (2010) use the number of immigrants as one of their regressors. Our proxy 
measure for residential instability is the proportion of individuals who have recently moved. Our 
motivation for using recently moved is the lack of availability of other variables that can be used as 
proxies for residential instability. 
4.5.2.5 Lack of Basic Services 
Breetzke (2010) includes a deprivation index which consists of five variables: the percentage of the 
population in informal settlements, the percentage of households that lack flush toilets, the percentage 
of households without water, the percentage of households without electricity and lastly the 
percentage of households without refuse removal. Following Breetzke (2010) our proxy measure 
includes three variables to capture lack of basic services including the percentage of households that do 
not have access to water106, the percentage of household with no sanitation107 and the percentage of 
households without access to electricity.   
4.5.2.6 Unemployment 
Previous empirical studies, for instance that of Breetzke (2010) include the proportion of the 
unemployed population who are 15 years of age and older. While Miyoshi (2011) and Haddad and 
Moghadam (2011) use the unemployment rate. Our proxy measure for unemployment is the 
percentage of households where the head of the household is unemployed.  
4.5.3 Empirical Model Specification 
Equation (4.7) is our econometric model that measures the relationship between community social 
disorganisation and contact and contact related crimes. The likely challenges facing our econometric 
model include: excessive collinearity among the regressors (Hannon and Defronzo 1998), 
measurement error which is highly prevalent in police crime data as a result of reporting bias 
(Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Demombynes and Ozler 2005; Louw 2007), omitted variable bias, and the 
                                                 
106 This proxy is created by calculating the percentage of households who do not have water in their houses or in their 
yard. These households mainly depend on carrier tanks or public tap/kiosk or boreholes as their source of water.   
107 We obtain this proxy by aggregating across number of household who use pit latrines, bucket toilets or any other 
means that does not involve the use of a toilet for their sanitation needs, we then calculate the percentage of these 
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influence of community unobservables (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Blackmore 2003). Another estimation 
challenge worth mentioning is reverse causality. Recall that section 4.5.2 controlled for the reverse 
causality between community disadvantage and contact crime and contact related crime by using a community 
disadvantage proxy that does not contain income but rather captures income effects.  
These challenges have been identified as some of the causes of the variation in results for this type of 
research, especially in cross-sectional analysis (Hannon and Defronzo 1998; Fajnzylber et al. 2002; 
Blackmore, 2003). Table 4.D1 in Appendix 4.D shows the estimation challenges that are likely to 
occur in the model. High multicollinearity is a result of theoretically related regressors in models of 
social determinants of crime, such that the regressors approach a near perfect linear relationship with 
each other. The presence of high multicollinearity among the regressors implies that the coefficients 
are likely to have large standard errors and hence low levels of significance, even in cases where the 
coefficients are significant. High collinearity may also affect the sign (wrong or unexpected sign) and 
size of the coefficient (Greene 2002; Wooldridge 2002). Table 4.C1 and 4.C2 in Appendix 4.C show 
the high collinearity between the variables used to construct a community disadvantage index and those 
that were employed in the lack of basic services index respectively108. To cushion against high collinearity 
we construct indices of the related variables, as proposed by among others Greene (2002)109 and 
following the work of Hannon and Defronzo (1998) and Breetzke (2010). Hence the community 
disadvantaged index consists of mean years of education of a community, percentage of the population that is non-
white, and the average ratio of number of rooms to number of household members. The lack of basic services index is 
composed of the percentage of households that do not have access to water, percentage of household with no sanitation 
and percentage who do not have access to electricity. To determine whether we have indeed controlled for high 
collinearity we perform a simple test that detects the presence of multicollinearity: by computing a 
correlation matrix (Cameron and T ivedi 2005). Table 4.C3 in Appendix 4.C shows the correlation 
matrix of our regressors. It is important to note that some of our regressors are related, for example 
people who have flush toilets are likely to have running water. This implies that these regressors are 
highly correlated, with the correlation coefficients ranging from 0.6 to 0.8. In an effort to curtail this 
we developed indices (see Greene, 2002; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) of related variables (for example 
flush toilet and running water). This had the effect of reducing the correlation coefficients to less than 
0.3 which is lower in comparison to the previous correlations among our regressors prior to 
constructing the indices. We do acknowledge the fact that using indices as regressors introduces a lack 
of clarity into what is being estimated by these regressors (see Greene, 2002), as such this caveat 
should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results.  
                                                 
108 For example table 4.C1 in appendix 4.C shows that the correlation between ratio of rooms to household members 
and education is 0.5544. Furthermore table 4.C1 also shows the pairwise correlation between the community 
disadvantage index and mean average income is positive and very high at 0.8302, therefore confirming our earlier 
statement: the community disadvantage proxy is likely to also capture the income effects. 
109 Hannon and Defronzo (1998), Fajnzylber et al. (2002) and Breetzke (2010) also construct indices to eliminate the 














The second likely estimation challenge is measurement error in the outcome variable. This type of 
error is not necessarily harmful to the estimators depending on whether the error is correlated or 
uncorrelated with the regressors. If the measurement error is uncorrelated with the regressors, this 
does not cause any bias in the coefficient. The only likely effect is to inflate the standard errors. 
However if the measurement error is correlated with the regressors then the coefficients become 
biased and inconsistent (Greene 2002; Bricker and Engelhardt 2008; Benoit et al. 2009).  
We follow Wooldridge (2002) and Bricker and Engelhardt (2008) to illustrate this. Recall from 
equation (4.7) that     is the reported/police crime statistics. Let  
 
   be the true crime statistics, such 
that         
 . The measurement error is therefore the difference between the true crime statistics and 
the reported/police statistics:             
   Where     is the measurement error, this equation can be 
re-written as         
      , substituting this into equation (4.7) we obtain:     α   β          
where   is a vector of regressors. In the case where    (    
     )   , the measurement error is 
uncorrelated with the true crime statistic. The coefficients are consistent although inefficient as long as 
measurement error is not correlated with the regressors (   (     )   ). Hence in this scenario one 
would proceed with the estimating equation (4.7), and ignore the fact that our dependent variable is 
imperfect (Wooldridge 2002; Bricker and Engelhardt 2008). However, when    (    
     )    that is, 
the measurement error is correlated with the true crime statistics and that relationship is of the form: 
         
    
  
 then equation (4.7) becomes:     α   (   )β         . Hence in this second 
scenario the coefficients will be biased (proportional bias of  ) and inconsistent. Using these two types 
of scenarios outlined above we determine the types of crimes that we can ignore in the presence of 
measurement error and the ones we cannot ignore. Specifically we are looking for those crime 
statistics where the measurement error is unsystematically related to the explanatory variables (this 
measurement error can be ignored), and the measurement error that is systematically related to the 
explanatory variables (cannot be ignored). 
The main channel of measurement error in crime literature is reporting bias which occurs as a result of 
underreporting of crime occurrence, and has been identified as a pervasive problem of police crime 
statistics (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Blackmore 2003; Demombynes and Ozler 2005). The types of crimes 
that are more likely to be afflicted with reporting bias are robbery and rape110 (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; 
Demombynes and Ozler 2005). For example in South Africa members from economically advantaged 
communities are more likely to report cases of robberies than those from disadvantaged communities, 
mainly because the latter communities mistrust the police force. In addition the disadvantaged 
communities are more likely to choose vigilante justice than to report any crime that has been 
committed (Blackmore, 2003).  
                                                 
110 It is worth noting that the crime that has the least reporting bias is murder, and this is because it is impossible to 
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In the case of rape there is more likely to be under reporting given the sensitive nature of sexual 
crimes and the stigmatisation that goes along with this type of crime (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Nleya and 
Thompson 2009; Clay-Warner and McMahon-Howard 2009; Wolitzky-tailor et al. 2011). A similar 
pattern is observed in South Africa where most rape cases go unreported (Nleya and Thompson 2009; 
Wolitzky-tailor et al. 2011)111. In addition it is stated that rape reporting differs by the demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics of victims (Clay-Warner and McMahon-Howard 2009). It is clear 
from this that these crimes exhibit a systematic relationship between the existing measurement error 
and the regressors. This is mainly because under reporting is likely to be higher among disadvantaged 
communities, as such we cannot ignore the measurement error in these crimes.  
Two approaches are used to address measurement error112. It is worth noting that this error only 
affects the contact crime outcome variable and not the contact related crime, and this is because contact crime 
includes rape and robbery. The first is the ‘naive approach’ where we constrain the analysis to include 
only those crime statistics that are not prone to measurement error. In this study this involves 
excluding rape and robbery from contact crime. The second approach follows the procedure of 
Demombynes and Ozler, (2005) who controlled for measurement error by adjusting the crime 
statistics with the probability of reporting crime which was derived from data from the 1998 Victims 
of Crime Survey (VCS)113. Using the VCS we regress the probability of reporting crime on a set of 
household characteristics common to VCS and CAPS, that is,     
     β          , where   is 
household characteristics common in both VCS and CAPS. Using the estimated coefficients we then 
impute the probability of reporting crime,   ̂   
      β̂
   
     , thereafter we predict the 
probabilities114.  
The third likely estimation challenge that is often ignored in crime literature relates to the mobile nature 
of crimes (Breetzke 2010). This mobility is often found in crimes that are committed for economic 
purposes as opposed to social crimes. Such economic crimes include house robbery, bank robbery, 
and cash in transit heists (shaded grey in Table 4.D1 in Appendix 4.D). The mobile nature of these 
                                                 
111 Existing studies have shown that some of the barriers to reporting rape include demographic factors, 
socioeconomic conditions and stigma (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Clay-Warner and McMahon-Howard 2009; Wolitzky-
tailor et al. 2011). 
112 All the previous studies that are closely related to the current study acknowledge the presence of measurement 
error; however different approaches were used to overcome this econometric challenge. Sampson et al. (1989), 
Hannon and Defronzo (1998) and Breetzke (2010) do not accommodate measurement error. Fajnzylber et al. (2002) 
only uses homicides and robbery, stating that these two crimes are least likely to have measurement error, although 
with regard to robbery this is questionable as we outlined in section 4.4. 
113 The 1998 VCS is the first nationwide survey in South Africa to collect information on crime incidence, crime 
reporting, the public’s perception of police, and the existing support structures for victims of crime. The data was 
collected from 3899 households and 12167 individuals throughout the nine province of South Africa (Stats SA, 2001).  
114 Table 5.A in Appendix 5 shows the Probit regressions that were used to impute and predict the probability of 
reporting crime. Using the merged VCS and CAPS household survey data we regress household reporting of crime on 
household characteristics common in both datasets and include: level of schooling, gender, age, household income and 
province. The regression output shows that reporting of crime differs by type of crime and in general by gender of 














crimes makes it difficult to establish their relationship to community social or economic characteristics 
as these crimes are not area specific. For example, crimes may be committed in area i by members 
from area j. Hence the characteristics of area i are unlikely to pick up the effects of the crime 
committed in area i, as the characteristics only include those of area i when they should also include 
those of area j115.  
We illustrate the likely result of omitting the variables following Cameron and Trivedi (2005). Recall 
our model:     α    β     . Where     is the crime statistic that is prevalent in community i in time 
t and    is a vector of regressors representing the structural characteristics in community i. Suppose 
that the crime that has occurred in community i is economically driven, representing for example 
house robberies. Then as argued above, the equation would be of the form     α    β            
where    represents characteristics from community j. However, if we do not include the 
characteristics from community j it implies that we are instead estimating the following equation 
    α    β  (        
) where           is the new error term. The regressors    will be correlated 
with the error term (          ) if    is correlated with   . Hence our estimated coefficients will be 
inconsistent due to the omitted variable bias. 
The omitted variable bias causes endogeneity in our model since the regressors (  ) are correlated with 
the error term (         ), hence requiring the use of instruments to counteract the effects of omitted 
variable bias116 (Wooldridge 2002; Cameron and Trivedi 2005). To militate against this bias we follow 
the ‘naive approach’ and do not include the crime statistics that are prone to omitted variable bias117. 
In our case this is robbery under contact crime. This error does not affect contact related crimes, as robbery 
only forms part of contact crimes. 
                                                 
115 To drive this point home we illustrate with an example, the usual model in most crime literature, which is: 
                           (                         ) where area represents country, state, province or community, 
depending on the unit of analysis. However, our example illustrates that the model is more likely to have the following 
form:                            (                                                   ) when mobile crimes are 
involved. A practical example would be the case of individuals from disadvantaged communities who are more likely 
to cross over to more advantaged communities to commit economic crimes such as house robbery. Omitting the 
characteristics of community j introduces omitted variable bias and will result in the coefficients being biased. 
However, the difficulty in estimating the model is further compounded by the fact that the model is likely to include 
more than one area, that is the individual who commits a crime in area i may be from area j, z or q and so on, and 
therefore establishing the community’s boundary becomes a challenge.   
116 If the omitted variables were time invariant then fixed effect model will suffice to cater for the omitted variable, 
however because     contains time varying omitted variables then IVs are also required (Wooldridge 2002). An 
alternative approach would be to use proxy variables for     (Wooldridge 2002). However because of the open-endness 
of    , that is    represents characteristics of adjacent communities (community j) from the community where crimes 
are committed (community i), determining the boundary of these adjacent communities becomes a challenge.  
117 From the list of studies that are closely related to this study, Gorman et al. (2001) and Breetzke (2010) acknowledge 
the likely presence of mobility in some of the crime data. However, these studies do not take any measures to 
counteract the effects. Fajnzylber et al. (2002) use instrumental variables (IVs) in their model, stating that it is likely 
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The fourth and final likely estimation challenge is unobserved community heterogeneity which refers 
to the intercommunity differences that cannot be measured, for example visible policing or police 
structures. The study applies the fixed effects model to counteract these effects118. Lastly, we include 
the effects of community racial composition in our analysis. This is done by interacting the majority 
population group119 dummy with our regressors. The motivation for this is to capture the effects of the 
differences in community based on the type of racial composition. This is because the apartheid 
system has led to differences in community resources along racial lines (Emmett 2003; Demombynes 
and Ozler 2005; Hipp 2007; Breetzke 2008; Breetzke 2010). Currently communities are still identified 
by their majority racial composition120. Equation (4.8) is our new equation with the interaction terms, 
where    represents the majority population group of community i, where    is the year dummy which 
controls for variations across time periods. 
    α  β           β           β           β          β                
                        (4.8) 
4.6 Estimation Results 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of our variables. The variables have been grouped by the 
majority population group in the community. As earlier indicated our data is a panel of three years. The 
sample consists of 77 communities which implies a total of 231 observations. Also as previously 
mentioned all variables are aggregated at the community level, they are then normalised by dividing 
them with the largest value in the sample. 
There are two key observations that the descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 show. Firstly, contact and 
contact related crime appear to be higher among communities where the Black population group are 
in the majority, lower among the majority Coloured communities and least among the majority White 
communities. The second key observation is that property crime appears to be the highest among 
majority White communities, hence supporting our earlier argument of the mobile nature of crime: 
individuals from disadvantaged communities are likely to cross over to advantaged communities to 
commit these economic crimes as opposed to social crimes (contact and contact related) which mainly 
occur as a result of social behaviour.   
                                                 
118 It is worth noting that a fixed effects model controls for unobservables that are time invariant. Hence any 
unobservables that are time variant are likely to be absorbed by the error term, and if these time variant unobersvables 
are correlated with the regressors it will result in omitted variable bias and cause endogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005). The time variant unobserved community heterogeneity that is likely to affect our model is that which will result 
from the mobile crimes such as robbery, and our strategy is to exclude these crimes.   
119 Majority racial population group categories define communities by population group that is most common in the 
area, this can be either be Black population group, a Coloured population group or a White population group.  
120 An alternative approach is to divide the sample by population and determine the effects of the individual variables 














The descriptive statistics also show that community disadvantage is highest amongst the Black 
communities (0.801), followed by the Coloured communities (0.792) while the mean community 
disadvantage for the White communities is very low (0.267). The other remaining regressors also 
appear to be highest among the Black communities illustrating the weak social structures in these 
communities which is consistent with findings in the existing literature. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of our Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Black Population Group 
 
          
Dependent Variable 
      Contact crime 57 0.453 0.297 0.014 0.918 Crime data 
Contact related crime 57 0.499 0.315 0.025 1.000 Crime data 
Property crime 57 0.162 0.094 0.042 0.316 Crime data 
Police detection crime 57 0.156 0.093 0.020 0.304 Crime data 
Other crime 57 0.240 0.111 0.020 0.398 Crime data 
Independent Variables 
      Community disadvantage index 57 0.801 0.117 0.323 0.912 CAPS household survey 
Residential instability 57 0.050 0.087 0.000 0.385 CAPS young adult survey 
Family disruption 57 0.591 0.128 0.393 0.846 CAPS young adult survey 
Service deliver index 57 0.466 0.220 0.022 0.967 CAPS household survey 
Unemployment (head of household) 57 0.862 0.120 0.553 0.993 CAPS household survey 
Coloured Population Group 
 
          
Dependent Variable 
      Contact crime 129 0.104 0.104 0.031 0.516 Crime data 
Contact related crime 129 0.225 0.145 0.082 0.755 Crime data  
Property crime 129 0.189 0.117 0.050 0.545 Crime data 
Police detection crime 129 0.131 0.097 0.038 0.465 Crime data 
Other crime 129 0.173 0.158 0.020 0.916 Crime data 
Independent Variables  
     Community disadvantage index 129 0.792 0.090 0.552 1.000 CAPS household survey 
Residential instability 129 0.080 0.137 0.000 0.671 CAPS young adult survey 
Family disruption 129 0.503 0.137 0.352 1.000 CAPS young adult survey 
Service deliver index 129 0.348 0.163 0.031 1.000 CAPS household survey 
Unemployment (head of household) 129 0.839 0.133 0.355 0.999 CAPS household survey 
White Population Group 
 
          
Dependent Variable 
      Contact crime 45 0.074 0.052 0.010 0.224 Crime data 
Contact related crime 45 0.251 0.165 0.082 0.890 Crime data 
Property crime 45 0.328 0.198 0.078 1.000 Crime data 
Police detection crime 45 0.255 0.220 0.046 1.000 Crime data  
Other crime 45 0.155 0.202 0.017 1.000 Crime data 
Independent Variables  
     Community disadvantage index 45 0.267 0.118 0.050 0.512 CAPS household survey 
Residential instability 45 0.207 0.261 0.000 1.000 CAPS young adult survey 
Family disruption 45 0.440 0.116 0.352 0.909 CAPS young adult survey 
Service deliver index 45 0.453 0.152 0.208 0.759 CAPS household survey 
Unemployment (head of household) 45 0.780 0.131 0.526 1.000 CAPS household survey 
 
We examine the amount of variation across communities and across time, see Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005). Several features are worth mentioning in this regard. Firstly, we observe that the within (across 
time) variations is less than half of the between (across communities) variation for contact crime, 
whereas in the contact related crime the within variation is half as large as the between variation. 
Turning to the regressors, we observe a similar pattern, in that the within variation is somewhat less 
than the between variation. As expected all the variability in the wave dummy is within variation. In 
general the between variation ranges between 0.11 and 1.64, while the within variation ranges from 
0.06 to 0.86. Thus the variation is larger between communities than it is within communities. By 
incorporating fixed effects a large portion of total variation is therefore absorbed. Since the Hausman 
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specification, the models presented in this paper are based on fixed effects models. Also worth 
reporting is the fact that an alternative analysis using the random effects models, although not 
reported in the paper, yielded reasonably similar results to our fixed effects models. Importantly, given 
that our panel consist of 77 communities covering a period of three years we do take note that the 
fixed effects estimates are likely to be imprecise, since most of the variation is across communities 
rather than across time. Notwithstanding, our results are reasonably consistent with the current 
literature on crime.  
4.6.2 Fixed Effects Model Results 
Our results are based on two types of regression models: the first model only controls for unobserved 
community heterogeneity by applying the fixed effects model. The results of these regressions are 
depicted in Table 4.2. The second model controls for unobserved community heterogeneity, 
measurement error and omitted variable bias. The unobserved heterogeneity is controlled by fixed 
effects and the measurement error bias as well as omitted variable bias is controlled for by using the 
‘naive approach and secondly by adjusting for the error approach, as depicted in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.2 shows both the main and interaction effects of community social disorganisation and racial 
composition on contact and contact related crime. Specifically, the main results are depicted in panel 
A, where column 1 of panel A depicts the results based on contact crime and column 2 shows the results 
when using contact related crime as the outcome variable. Panel B (column 3 and 4) shows the interaction 
effects where we interact our regressors with the majority population group dummy. Worth noting is 
the fact that the models presented in this paper are based on robust standard errors with clustering at 
the community level. Also worth noting is the fact that we found the results to be similar when we 
used robust standard errors. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Peterson (2009) for discussion on 
standard errors in panel data.  
We first observe that the interaction models in panel B are more significant than the models without 
interaction in panel A, showing that the racial composition of the community is significant. We also 
notice that in general when the community has either a Coloured or White racial composition the 
effect of any of the regressors on crime is less (as shown by the interaction effects). For example the 
effect of community disadvantage in column 3 for the Black population group is 3.663, while for the 
Coloured population group this is 3.663 + (-3.397), and the White population group is 3.663 + (-
3.552). Community disadvantage is statistically significant in most of the models but more so for contact 
crime (column 3). The same pattern is observed for residential instability in both the main effect model 
shown in panel A and the interaction model in panel B, where residential instability appears to be more 
significant among the Black communities than in the communities defined by a dominance of other 














Family disruption which captures the frequency of interaction between the youth and both parents is 
significant in the main effects (panel A) and even more significant when we introduce interactions, as 
shown in panel B. We also observe the effects to be more significant in the Black communities, and 
surprisingly in White communities as well although the effects are not significant in the Coloured 
communities. The results are consistent with findings in the current literature that show malicious 
damage to property (this crime falls under contact related crime) such as graffiti and broken windows to 
be predicted by evidence of unsupervised youth (Sampson and Groves 1989; Kawachi et al. 1999). It is 
worth noting that our family disruption proxy, frequency of interaction between the youth and both 
parents is not available in year 2006 of the CAPS data. To derive the variable we impute using the 
frequency of interaction between the youth and both parents of 2002 and 2005 and individual 
characteristics (age, gender, population group and education) common in all the three years. Table 
4.F1 of Appendix 4.F replicates the results of Table 4.2 with the only difference being that we exclude 
the year 2006. Hence the results consist of a two year panel of 77 communities, making the sample 
size 154. The results between the two tables are similar indicating that our imputation has not biased 
the results.  
In addition the main effects show that lack of basic services is significant in determining both contact and 
contact related crime. The interaction effects show that the results are significant in the Black and 
Coloured communities, while in the White communities these effects are insignificant. In Appendix 
4.G we substitute the lack of basic services variable with the access to water, electricity and sanitation 
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Table 4.2: Base Results From Fixed Effects Model 
 Panel A1 Panel B2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Community disadvantage 0.653*** 0.316* 3.663*** 2.526*** 
 (0.246) (0.188) (0.663) (0.506) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  Coloured   -3.397*** -2.394*** 
   (0.775) (0.592) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  White   -3.552*** -2.703*** 
   (0.737) (0.563) 
Residential instability 0.323* 0.280* 0.998** 0.802** 
 (0.191) (0.146) (0.487) (0.372) 
Residential instability*Majority  Coloured   -0.816 -0.818* 
   (0.545) (0.416) 
Residential instability*Majority  White   -0.903 -0.389 
   (0.577) (0.441) 
Family disruption  0.0497 0.0494** 0.155** 0.120** 
 (0.0306) (0.0234) (0.0628) (0.0480) 
Family disruption*Majority  Coloured   -0.103 -0.0661 
   (0.0756) (0.0578) 
Family disruption*Majority  White   -0.172* -0.129* 
   (0.0944) (0.0721) 
Lack of basic services 0.0307*** 0.0273*** 0.0697*** 0.0539*** 
 (0.0114) (0.00873) (0.0211) (0.0161) 
Lack of basic services *Majority  Coloured   -0.0559** -0.0371* 
   (0.0279) (0.0213) 
Lack of basic services *Majority  White   -0.0364 -0.0306 
   (0.0294) (0.0225) 
Head unemployed 0.0461 -0.0253 0.375 0.169 
 (0.169) (0.129) (0.278) (0.212) 
Head unemployed*Majority  Coloured   -0.587 -0.383 
   (0.362) (0.277) 
Head unemployed*Majority  White   -0.338 -0.266 
   (0.405) (0.309) 
Year 2005 -0.107*** -0.0781*** -0.0798*** -0.0614*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0189) (0.0251) (0.0192) 
Year 2006 -0.184*** -0.137*** -0.154*** -0.115*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0183) (0.0240) (0.0183) 
Constant -32.31* -27.77* -36.96* -26.97* 
 (19.12) (14.61) (19.64) (15.00) 
Observations 231 231 231 231 
R-squared 0.315 0.299 0.451 0.439 
Number of communities 77 77 77 77 
● Robust Standard errors in parentheses                             
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%            
1 Panel A is based on main effects only 
2 Panel B is based on main effects and interaction effects of all the regressors. As evident by R square, the 
interaction models in panel B offer a better fir than those in panel A. 
3 As previously described in section 4.5.2, contact crimes include murder, rape, assault, kidnapping, 
abduction and robbery 
4 Also as defined in section 4.5.2 contact related crimes consist of arson, malicious damage to property, public 















Table 4.3 presents the results after controlling for measurement error bias and omitted variable bias in 
our model. Since measurement error only affects contact crime and not contact related crime, the results are 
based on contact crime alone. Panel D is the contact crime base results from Table 4.2 in panel A. In Panel 
E we attempt to eliminate the bias using the ‘naive approach’ by excluding the crimes that are prone 
to measurement error. That is, we remove rape and robbery from contact crime, for the reason that the 
measurement error is likely to be systematically correlated with the regressors. This can occur if 
members from economically advantaged communities report these crimes while those from 
disadvantaged communities do not, as a result of mistrusting the police and therefore having a 
preference for vigilante justice. Also recall that we control for omitted variable bias using the ‘naive 
approach’ as the crime (robbery) prone to this bias is also eliminated. 
In Panel F we adjust for measurement error bias by calculating the probability of reporting crime from 
the Victims of Crime Survey data using these probabilities to correct the crime statistics. The results, 
shown in panel D, E and F are similar with the only difference being the size of the coefficients. This 
finding is similar to those of the study by Demombynes and Ozler (2005) who, using the Victims of 
Crime Survey data, after controlling for measurement error found the results to be similar to the 
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Table 4.3: Results Based on Fixed Effects Model Controlling for Measurement Error and 
Omitted Variable Bias 
 Panel D1 Panel E2 Panel F3 
 Base results:  Measurement error soln: Measurement error soln: 
 column (1) and (3) in Table 4.2 ‘Naïve approach’ Adjusting the crime data 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Community disadvantage 0.653*** 3.663*** 0.451*** 2.485*** 0.419*** 2.341*** 
 (0.246) (0.663) (0.165) (0.445) (0.160) (0.433) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  Coloured  -3.397***  -2.290***  -2.181*** 
  (0.775)  (0.520)  (0.507) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  White  -3.552***  -2.403***  -2.262*** 
  (0.737)  (0.495)  (0.482) 
Residential instability 0.323* 0.998** 0.225* 0.717** 0.206* 0.631** 
 (0.191) (0.487) (0.129) (0.327) (0.124) (0.318) 
Residential instability*Majority  Coloured  -0.816  -0.608*  -0.510 
  (0.545)  (0.365)  (0.356) 
Residential instability*Majority  White  -0.903  -0.624  -0.578 
  (0.577)  (0.387)  (0.377) 
Family disruption  0.0497 0.155** 0.0367* 0.108** 0.0308 0.0980** 
 (0.0306) (0.0628) (0.0206) (0.0421) (0.0199) (0.0410) 
Family disruption*Majority  Coloured  -0.103  -0.0698  -0.0645 
  (0.0756)  (0.0507)  (0.0494) 
Family disruption*Majority  White  -0.172*  -0.113*  -0.109* 
  (0.0944)  (0.0633)  (0.0617) 
Lack of basic services 0.0307*** 0.0697*** 0.0220*** 0.0480*** 0.0193** 0.0433*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0211) (0.00769) (0.0141) (0.00743) (0.0138) 
Lack of basic services *Majority  Coloured  -0.0559**  -0.0371**  -0.0345* 
  (0.0279)  (0.0187)  (0.0182) 
Lack of basic services *Majority  White  -0.0364  -0.0255  -0.0222 
  (0.0294)  (0.0197)  (0.0192) 
Head unemployed 0.0461 0.375 0.0178 0.249 0.0433 0.247 
 (0.169) (0.278) (0.114) (0.186) (0.110) (0.181) 
Head unemployed*Majority  Coloured  -0.587  -0.408*  -0.374 
  (0.362)  (0.243)  (0.237) 
Head unemployed*Majority  White  -0.338  -0.240  -0.196 
  (0.405)  (0.272)  (0.265) 
Year 2005 -0.107*** -0.0798*** -0.0660*** -0.0477*** -0.0693*** -0.0522*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0251) (0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0161) (0.0164) 
Year 2006 -0.184*** -0.154*** -0.119*** -0.0984*** -0.121*** -0.102*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0155) (0.0157) 
Constant -32.31* -36.96* -22.49* -25.80* -20.61* -23.54* 
 (19.12) (19.64) (12.86) (13.18) (12.43) (12.84) 
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231 
R-squared 0.315 0.451 0.302 0.444 0.317 0.447 
Number of communities 77 77 77 77 77 77 
● Robust Standard errors in parentheses                             
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%            
1 Panel D depicts our base results in table 4.2. The purpose for including these results in table 4.3 is to aid a comparison of 
results between our base results and the results after controlling for measurement error. 
2 In Panel E we control for measurement error using the ‘naïve approach’ in which we omit the crimes that are prone to 
measurement error. Hence we have omitted rape and robbery. The contact crime dependant variable therefore consists of 
murder, assault, kidnapping, and abduction. See section 4.6.3. 
It is also worth noting that the naïve approach also controls for omitted variable bias, as the crimes (robbery) prone to 
omitted variables are no longer included. 
In Panel F we control for measurement error by multiplying the crime statistics with 1/p, where p is the probability of 
















This study examined how community social disorganisation influence the perpetration of contact crime 
and contact related crime. Community social disorganisation was captured using family disruption, residential 
mobility, community disadvantage, lack of basic services and unemployment following conventional research 
detailed in the literature. The motivation behind this study is the high frequency of contact crime in 
South Africa (Emmett 2003; Blackmore 2003; Demombynes and Ozler 2005; Breetzke 2010; Whyte 
2010), and the research on current literature identifying South African communities as being socially 
disorganised (Emmett 2003; Demombynes and Ozler 2005; Breetzke 2010; Budlender and Lund 2011; 
Schatz et al. 2011).  
To determine the impact of these social factors on crime we follow Fajnzylber et al. (2002) and 
Haddad and Moghadam (2011) who extend Becker’s theory by including social and demographic 
structures in the theoretical framework. To arrive at the results we first need to control for excessive 
collinearity (Hannon and Defronzo 1998), measurement error as a result of reporting bias of police 
crime data (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Demombynes and Ozler 2005; Louw 2007), omitted variable bias 
and the influence of community unobservables (Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Blackmore 2003). 
Firstly, the study adopts a fixed effects model that controls for unobservable community heterogeneity 
using panel data covering the Cape Town Metropolitan region of South Africa. To eliminate the 
measurement error bias of police crime statistics, mainly as a result of misreporting, we use two 
approaches. The first is the ‘naive approach’ where we eliminate those crimes identified as being prone 
to reporting bias, rape and robbery, from our contact crime group. In the second approach we use the 
1998 Victims of Crime Survey data to obtain the probability of reporting crime and we use these 
probabilities to adjust our crime statistics for measurement error. In addition the ‘naive approach’ has 
the effect of curbing the omitted variable bias as we have eliminated robbery (mobile crime that is 
likely to have this bias) from our contact crime outcome. 
Additionally, all regressors are interacted with majority racial population group dummies to capture the 
effects of the differences in community based on the type of racial composition. This is an influence 
of the apartheid era on community structures, where individuals were housed by race with the Black 
and Coloured population groups having the least resources allocated to their communities. In general, 
our results show that the Black communities are systematically worse off than Coloured and White 
communities.  
Our findings reveal that lack of basic services breeds crime, as we find lack of basic services to be positive 
and significant in determining contact crime and contact related crime especially among the Black 
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types. Other social structures, such as community disadvantage and family disruption also appear to be 
strong determinants of crime in general, but once again more so among the Black communities.  
As previously mentioned the current literature states that there is a paucity of empirical literature to 
substantiate the effects of socially disorganised communities on crime in developing countries in 
general, and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular (Ward 2007; Breetzke 2010; SAIRR 2010; Daniels and 
Adams 2010). This study has demonstrated that community social disorganisation in the Cape Town 
Metropolitan area of South Africa creates a setting conducive to criminal behaviour and this research 
thereby supports the findings in the current literature that suggest that the aforementioned factors 
may have a role to play in the current high crime rates in South Africa (Emmett 2003; Louw 2007; 
Landau and Misago 2009; Whyte 2010; Lau et al. 2010; SAIRR 2010). 
In addition our study can be seen as complementary to the cross sectional study by Breetzke (2010) 
which was conducted in the Tswane area of South Africa. By using panel data, alternative proxies and 
the majority racial group interaction effects we are able to achieve positive and significant coefficients, 
which point to social disorganisation leasing to the perpetration of both contact crimes and contact related 
crimes. This is found across communities represented by all racial groups but especially among the 
majority Black communities.  
From a policy perspective, our results indicate that an investment in social capital is essential at the 
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Appendix 4.A: Distribution of Crime Rates 
 












       Contact Crimes 
     ·          Murder 69.8 88 61.4 46.2 47.8 
·          Rape  107 99.2 94.9 82.2 75.8 
·          Attempted murder  67.5 95.8 77.6 45 31.4 
·          Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm  478.8 479.9 518.3 359.4 278.4 
·          Common assault  428 502.1 561.8 504.1 419.3 
·          Indecent assault  19.9 21.5 24.8 28.5 28.3 
·          Neglect and ill-treatment of children  7.5 16.5 22.2 14.5 9.4 
·          Culpable homicide  16.7 20.6 16.7 15.3 13.6 
·          Robbery with aggravating circumstances  328.7 388.8 352.3 306.1 302.5 
·          Common robbery  292.1 345.2 287.6 248.7 163.7 
·          Bank robbery (subcategory of aggravated robbery)  1 0 0 0.1 0.1 
·          Robbery of cash in transit (subcategory of aggravated robbery) 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.9 
·          Robbery at residential premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery) 0 9.1 6.4 8.7 12.5 
·          Robbery at business premises (subcategory of aggravated robbery) 0 3.5 1.8 1.8 2.8 
           Contact Related Crimes 
     ·          Arson  11.9 13.9 17.1 10 7.1 
·          Malicious damage to property  341.3 408.8 441.2 380.1 365.5 
·          Crimen injuria  101.4 129 135 116.5 77.1 
·          Public violence  2.1 5.6 4 2.7 4.1 
           Property Related Crime 
     ·          Burglary at residential premises  685.2 731.5 676.8 554.7 492.9 
·          Burglary at business premises  179.8 153.6 138.4 99.6 99.3 
·          Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle  283.4 328.7 317 268.2 267.4 
·          Theft out of or from motor vehicle  905.8 869 726.7 637.8 654.4 
·          Stock-theft  1.5 0.9 1.3 0.6 0.4 
           Crime Detected as a Result of Police Action 
     ·          Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition  44.6 44.3 42.2 36.9 29.9 
·          Drug-related crime  152.6 140.1 185.6 239.2 275.3 
·          Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs  48.5 49.2 59.7 70 81 
           Other Serious Crime 
     ·          All theft not mentioned elsewhere  1459 1732 1897 1715 1415 
·          Commercial crime  168.3 154.1 160.4 149 158 
·          Shoplifting  172.3 185.3 201.3 186.1 188.3 
·          Carjacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)  22.7 29.7 32.6 22.5 23.6 
·          Truck hijacking (subcategory of aggravated robbery)  5.3 3.1 0.9 0.3 0.2 
·          Kidnapping  14.4 11 10.3 5 4.3 
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Appendix 4.B: Family Disruption Statistics in South Africa 
 
Table 4.B1: Evidence of Family Disruption in South Africa 
Proportion of children with absent fathers:     
 Black    Up from 46% (1996) to 52% (2009)   
 Coloured    Up from 34% (1996) to 41% (2009)   
 Indian   Down 17% (1996%) to 12% (2009) 
 White    Up from 13% (1996%) to 15% (2009)   
 Proportion of children with absent, living fathers    Up from 42% (1996) to 48% (2009)   
 Proportion of female urban single parents by race group:     
 Black   79% 
 Coloured   84% 
 Indian   64% 
 White   69% 
 Proportion of children (0-17) in HH with employed adult   34% 
 Urban single parents by age:     
 16-24 years   13% 
 25-34 years   33% 
 35-44 years   24% 
 45-64 years   23% 
 Number of registered civil marriages    Down176 521 (2004) to 171 989 (2009)   
 Number of registered customary marriages    Down 20 301 (2004) to 13 506 (2009)   















Appendix 4.C: Correlation Matrix of the Regressors 
 
Table 4.C1: Correlation Matrix of the Community Disadvantaged Proxies Vs. Average Income 
  
Ratio of no. of rooms to 
household members  






Ratio of no. of rooms to household 
members  1 
   
Mean years of education  0.5544* 1 
  
Community disadvantage index 0.9368* 0.7303* 1   
Average community income 0.8440* 0.4653* 0.8302* 1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.C2: Correlation Matrix of the Absolute Deprivation Proxies 
  
percentage of household with 
no access to sanitation 
percentage of household with 
no access to electricity 
percentage of household 
with no access to water 
percentage of household with no access to 
sanitation 1 
  
percentage of household with no access to 
electricity 0.6067* 1 
 
percentage of household with no access to 
water 0.9697* 0.6397* 1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 





instability Family disruption 




Community disadvantage 1 
    Residential instability 0.3170* 1 
   Family disruption 0.1016 -0.0139 1 
  Lack of basic services 0.2917* 0.0925 -0.0715 1 
 Head unemployed 0.2123* 0.0777 0.0290 0.1458* 1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
It is worth noting that the correlation between community disadvantage and lack of basic services is low and negative when type of 
toilet variable is included in the lack of basic services index. Once the type of toilet variable is removed from the lack of basic service 
index (leaving behind electricity and water) the correlation between this index and community disadvantage becomes positive and 
significant. A likely explanation for this is that the type of toilet variable does not capture the income effects across 
communities as this variable does not capture the complete and detailed variation in the type of toilet facilities present in 
communities. That is, in the CAPS dataset the following options exists in the variable: ‘flush toilet’, ‘improved pit latrine with 
ventilation’, ‘other pit latrine’, ‘bucket toilet’, ‘chemical toilet’ and ‘none’. While other datasets such as the National Income 
and Dynamic Survey (NIDS), for example, offers a wider range of type of toilet, specifically, ‘flush toilet with onsite disposal’, 
‘flush toilet with offsite disposal’, ‘chemical toilet’, ‘pit latrine with ventilation pipe’, ‘pit latrine without ventilation pipe’, 
‘bucket toilet’, ‘none’ and ‘other’. In our CAPS dataset all households with flush toilet, for instance, are therefore clustered as 
one category without distinguishing the type of ‘flush toilet’ in detail – whether it is ‘flush toilet’ with onsite or offsite 
disposal. The lack of this detailed explanation in the type of toilet is likely to make this variable bias in relation to income 
effects. Furthermore, a simple correlation between the household income and type of toilet variables reveals a negative correlation.  
In addition and most importantly the CAPS dataset does not capture information on whether the household shares the toilet 
facilities or not, (this information is captured in NIDS for instance) which is also likely to influence the toilet condition 
across communities. For example the ‘pit latrine with ventilation pipes’ toilet facilities in one community will not be 
distinguished from another community who may have the same (or similar – ‘pit latrine without ventilation pipe’) toilet 











Chapter 4. Community Social Disorganisation 
 171 
Appendix 4.D: Types of Crime and Likely Estimation Challenge 
 
Table 4.D1: Types of Crimes and Likely Estimation Challenge 









Errors emanating from type of outcome 
variables 
Errors emanating from 
regressors/model3 
Contact Crime       
Rape  √ 
 
√ √ 






Kidnapping or Abduction 
  
√ √ 
Neglect and ill-treatment of children  
  
√ √ 
Robbery  √ √ √ √ 






Malicious damage to property  
  
√ √ 
Crimen injuria  
  
√ √ 




Burglary  √ √ √ √ 
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle  
 
√ √ √ 
Theft out of or from motor vehicle  √ √ √ √ 
Stock-theft  
 




Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition  
 
√ √ √ 
Drug-related crime  
 
√ √ √ 




All theft not mentioned elsewhere  √ √ √ √ 
Commercial crime  
 
√ √ √ 
Shoplifting    √ √ √ 
 
1 These models show a systematic relationship between the measurement error (under reporting of crime) and the 
explanatory variable community disadvantage. This is because under reporting is likely to be higher among disadvantaged 
communities. Because of this systematic relationship we cannot ignore the measurement error in the models containing these 
crimes as the dependent variables. These crimes are usually executed for economic gain, (refer to section 4.5.3 for more 
detail). 
2 Omitted variables are as a result of the mobile nature of crimes that are committed for economic reasons. This mobility 
makes it difficult to establish a relationship between the crimes and  social, economic or structural characteristics of 
communities as these crimes are not area specific. This is further detailed in section 4.5.3. 
3 The errors in these columns are influenced by model specification and not specifically by the type of outcome variable. 
The grey area of the table shows the crimes that are not included in our current study. We are interested in contact and 















Appendix 4.E: Probit Results of Household Crime Reporting 
 
Table 4.E1: Household Reporting of Crime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Burglary Property Hijacking Vehicle 
Female -0.0372 -0.140** -0.0390 -0.213** 
 (0.0367) (0.0581) (0.130) (0.100) 
Coloured -0.0418 0.441*** -0.919*** -0.103 
 (0.0881) (0.117) (0.0370) (0.181) 
White -0.145* 0.280** -0.262 0.317*** 
 (0.0762) (0.112) (0.280) (0.120) 
Income bracket 3000-5999 -0.110* -0.0653 -0.995*** 0.327** 
 (0.0637) (0.0860) (0.00365) (0.144) 
Income bracket 6000-11999 -0.0355 0.144  0.150 
 (0.0635) (0.102)  (0.195) 
Income bracket 12000-23999 -0.128 0.00865 -0.991*** -0.00175 
 (0.0791) (0.103) (0.00705) (0.220) 
Income bracket 24000-47999 -0.0640 -0.136 -0.999*** 0.247 
 (0.0799) (0.0873) (0.00106) (0.174) 
Income bracket 48000-95999 -0.0996 0.0962 -0.998*** 0.281 
 (0.0935) (0.133) (0.00348) (0.174) 
Income bracket 96000 and above -0.125 -0.0109 -0.926*** 0.424*** 
 (0.118) (0.141) (0.0372) (0.125) 
Education, grade1-4 -0.179* -0.197**  -0.470** 
 (0.0979) (0.0880)  (0.202) 
Education, grade5-7 -0.0688 -0.233*** 0.337*** -0.169 
 (0.0819) (0.0834) (0.0904) (0.295) 
Education, grade8-11 -0.0685 -0.258** 0.968*** -0.185 
 (0.0713) (0.107) (0.0396) (0.267) 
Education, diploma/certificate without matric 0.164*** -0.0803  -0.169 
 (0.0551) (0.145)  (0.347) 
Education, matric (grade 12) -0.0228 -0.291*** 0.325*** -0.158 
 (0.0800) (0.0635) (0.117) (0.287) 
Education, higher than matric -0.0755 -0.222** 0.421*** -0.100 
 (0.102) (0.0872) (0.146) (0.297) 
Free State -0.0718 0.0697  -0.246 
 (0.0936) (0.120)  (0.189) 
Gauteng 0.0211 -0.0638  -0.0502 
 (0.118) (0.127)  (0.249) 
KwaZulu Natal -0.0280 0.155 -0.953*** 0.0987 
 (0.114) (0.152) (0.0274) (0.215) 
Limpopo -0.0244 0.124 -0.994*** 0.120 
 (0.0907) (0.145) (0.00594) (0.228) 
Mpumalanga -0.0556 0.0682 -0.953*** -0.576*** 
 (0.114) (0.186) (0.0267) (0.0833) 
North West 0.0672 0.0977 -0.971*** -0.372** 
 (0.0735) (0.133) (0.0426) (0.172) 
Northern Cape -0.0594 0.180 -0.934*** 0.197 
 (0.106) (0.166) (0.0512) (0.265) 
Western Caoe -0.126 0.366**  -0.200 
 (0.115) (0.167)  (0.219) 
Observations 548 308 48 147 
● Standard errors in parentheses        
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%   
● Reference for gender is male; reference for population group is Black; reference dummy for income bracket is 1-2999; reference 
dummy for education is none; reference for province is Eastern Cape 
● The empty coefficients in the hijacking model are as a result of the small sample size. As a result all those in income bracket6000-
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Appendix 4.F: Results Based on 2 Waves: 2002 and 2005  
 
Table 4.F1: Results Based on 2002 and 2005 Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Community disadvantage 0.902** 0.604** 3.057*** 2.183*** 
 (0.374) (0.301) (0.697) (0.591) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  Coloured   -2.873*** -2.344*** 
   (0.958) (0.812) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  White   -3.010*** -2.075*** 
   (0.843) (0.714) 
Residential instability 0.117 0.209 1.060 0.984* 
 (0.247) (0.200) (0.659) (0.558) 
Residential instability*Majority  Coloured   -1.196 -1.160* 
   (0.727) (0.616) 
Residential instability*Majority  White   -1.152 -0.766 
   (0.735) (0.622) 
Family disruption  0.0624 0.0420 0.252*** 0.184** 
 (0.0432) (0.0348) (0.0910) (0.0771) 
Family disruption*Majority  Coloured   -0.235** -0.151* 
   (0.105) (0.0891) 
Family disruption*Majority  White   -0.266** -0.221** 
   (0.115) (0.0977) 
Lack of basic services 0.0353** 0.0319*** 0.0667*** 0.0587*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0116) (0.0225) (0.0190) 
Lack of basic services *Majority  Coloured   -0.0581* -0.0491* 
   (0.0294) (0.0249) 
Lack of basic services *Majority  White   -0.0359 -0.0235 
   (0.0315) (0.0266) 
Head unemployed 0.0214 -0.108 0.843 0.222 
 (0.443) (0.357) (0.526) (0.446) 
Head unemployed*Majority  Coloured   -1.556** -0.956* 
   (0.625) (0.530) 
Head unemployed*Majority  White   -1.346 -0.421 
   (0.832) (0.705) 
Year 2005 -0.113*** -0.0829*** 0.0867*** 0.0705*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0247) (0.0285) (0.0241) 
Constant -11.81 -20.78 -16.85 -18.46 
 (24.77) (19.98) (24.38) (20.65) 
Observations 154 154 154 154 
R-squared 0.336 0.296 0.618 0.553 
Number of communities 77 77 77 77 
● Standard errors in parentheses        
● *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%   
● This table is of similar to table 4.2 in section 4.6.2. The only difference being that we use two years, 2002 and 2005 
and omit 2006. This is to check whether the imputation of the missing family disruption variable in 2006 is valid. 















Appendix 4.G: Results Based on Individual Basic Services 
 
Table 4.G1: Results Based on Water Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Community disadvantage 0.642*** 0.307 2.329*** 1.670*** 
 (0.245) (0.187) (0.697) (0.539) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  Coloured   -1.944** -1.467** 
   (0.796) (0.615) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  White   -2.245*** -1.868*** 
   (0.765) (0.591) 
Residential instability 0.350* 0.303** 0.933* 0.777** 
 (0.190) (0.145) (0.479) (0.370) 
Residential instability*Majority  Coloured   -0.619 -0.700* 
   (0.537) (0.414) 
Residential instability*Majority  White   -0.930 -0.438 
   (0.565) (0.437) 
Family disruption  0.0506 0.0502** 0.103 0.0871* 
 (0.0306) (0.0234) (0.0628) (0.0485) 
Family disruption*Majority  Coloured   -0.0538 -0.0355 
   (0.0746) (0.0576) 
Family disruption*Majority  White   -0.123 -0.0998 
   (0.0919) (0.0710) 
Water 0.234*** 0.209*** 0.00728 0.0626 
 (0.0857) (0.0654) (0.129) (0.0998) 
Water *Majority  Coloured   0.433*** 0.268** 
   (0.141) (0.109) 
Water *Majority  White   0.345** 0.201* 
   (0.143) (0.110) 
Head unemployed 0.0557 -0.0175 0.260 0.102 
 (0.168) (0.128) (0.276) (0.213) 
Head unemployed*Majority  Coloured   -0.407 -0.269 
   (0.361) (0.279) 
Head unemployed*Majority  White   -0.258 -0.235 
   (0.382) (0.295) 
Year 2005 -0.170*** -0.135*** 0.184*** 0.142*** 
 (0.0384) (0.0293) (0.0374) (0.0289) 
Year 2006 -0.244*** -0.191*** -0.0691*** -0.0495*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0275) (0.0236) (0.0182) 
Constant -35.02* -30.14** -40.97** -30.14** 
 (18.98) (14.49) (19.26) (14.87) 
Observations 231 231 231 231 
R-squared 0.316 0.301 0.475 0.451 
Number of communities 77 77 77 77 
● Standard errors in parentheses        
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Table 4.G2: Results Based on Electricity Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Community disadvantage 0.546** 0.219 2.514*** 1.612*** 
 (0.247) (0.190) (0.686) (0.526) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  Coloured   -2.242*** -1.497** 
   (0.802) (0.614) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  White   -2.491*** -1.836*** 
   (0.764) (0.585) 
Residential instability 0.358* 0.322** 1.214** 0.984** 
 (0.196) (0.151) (0.512) (0.392) 
Residential instability*Majority  Coloured   -1.004* -0.987** 
   (0.566) (0.433) 
Residential instability*Majority  White   -0.962 -0.450 
   (0.594) (0.455) 
Family disruption  0.0553* 0.0530** 0.0938 0.0692 
 (0.0315) (0.0243) (0.0709) (0.0543) 
Family disruption*Majority  Coloured   -0.0419 -0.0172 
   (0.0831) (0.0637) 
Family disruption*Majority  White   -0.0984 -0.0601 
   (0.102) (0.0781) 
Electricity 0.227 0.138 -0.616 -0.536 
 (0.190) (0.147) (0.445) (0.341) 
Electricity *Majority  Coloured   0.954* 0.802** 
   (0.497) (0.381) 
Electricity *Majority  White   1.093* 0.775* 
   (0.561) (0.430) 
Head unemployed 0.0940 0.0410 0.580** 0.337 
 (0.179) (0.138) (0.287) (0.220) 
Head unemployed*Majority  Coloured   -0.742** -0.503* 
   (0.372) (0.285) 
Head unemployed*Majority  White   -0.656 -0.439 
   (0.466) (0.357) 
Year 2005 -0.107*** -0.0728*** 0.0876*** 0.0660*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0227) (0.0294) (0.0225) 
Year 2006 -0.179*** -0.130*** -0.0786*** -0.0565*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0196) (0.0265) (0.0203) 
Constant -35.89* -32.00** -46.86** -34.55** 
 (19.55) (15.08) (20.39) (15.62) 
Observations 231 231 231 231 
R-squared 0.288 0.257 0.417 0.400 
Number of communities 77 77 77 77 
● Standard errors in parentheses        














Table 4.G3: Results Based on Sanitation Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Community disadvantage 0.568** 0.248 3.081*** 2.002*** 
 (0.247) (0.188) (0.635) (0.489) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  Coloured   -2.841*** -1.919*** 
   (0.749) (0.576) 
Community disadvantage*Majority  White   -2.954*** -2.145*** 
   (0.717) (0.551) 
Residential instability 0.359* 0.302** 1.145** 0.888** 
 (0.194) (0.148) (0.495) (0.380) 
Residential instability*Majority  Coloured   -1.111** -0.994** 
   (0.559) (0.430) 
Residential instability*Majority  White   -1.170* -0.558 
   (0.609) (0.468) 
Family disruption  0.0495 0.0491** 0.136** 0.108** 
 (0.0311) (0.0238) (0.0635) (0.0488) 
Family disruption*Majority  Coloured   -0.0824 -0.0508 
   (0.0763) (0.0587) 
Family disruption*Majority  White   -0.127 -0.103 
   (0.0918) (0.0706) 
Sanitation 0.0972 0.112** -0.0105 0.0569 
 (0.0651) (0.0496) (0.0770) (0.0593) 
Sanitation *Majority  Coloured   0.184** 0.0876 
   (0.0781) (0.0601) 
Sanitation *Majority  White   0.260* 0.141 
   (0.133) (0.102) 
Head unemployed 0.184 0.0987 0.619** 0.385* 
 (0.164) (0.125) (0.279) (0.214) 
Head unemployed*Majority  Coloured   -0.932** -0.668** 
   (0.373) (0.287) 
Head unemployed*Majority  White   -0.475 -0.389 
   (0.405) (0.311) 
Year 2005 -0.0705*** -0.0417** 0.0437 0.0307 
 (0.0264) (0.0202) (0.0272) (0.0209) 
Year 2006 -0.204*** -0.164*** -0.143*** -0.120*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0256) (0.0422) (0.0325) 
Constant -36.05* -30.12** -29.99 -22.48 
 (19.39) (14.79) (20.12) (15.48) 
Observations 231 231 231 231 
R-squared 0.292 0.277 0.435 0.414 
Number of communities 77 77 77 77 
● Standard errors in parentheses        


















Conclusion: Synopsis of Findings, Policy Implications, and 
Areas for Future Study  
 
To reiterate, this thesis presented an empirical investigation of the role of social interaction in risk 
taking, including. This is against the backdrop of an exponential growth of interest in including social 
interaction in the economic modelling of human behaviour and premised on the fact that the presence 
of the identification problem (the effects of unobservables, selection bias and simultaneity and the 
related reflection problem) has made the current literature skewed in favour of theory rather than 
empirical investigation.   
The thesis investigated three different research areas under the overall theme of social interaction 
while taking into consideration background information regarding identification into the economic 
modelling of our research problems involving risk taking behaviours. These three research areas 
include the role of social norms and social pressure in influencing multiple partnerships, the effects of 
expected income, expected health and contextual effects of health uncertainty on risky sex and how community 
social disorganisation namely family disruption, residential instability, community disadvantage, lack of basic 
services and unemployment can induce individuals’ to resort to crimes of social behaviour, specifically contact 
crime and contact related crime.  
Each of these three research areas provided a stand-alone paper that constitutes a chapter in the 
thesis. To enable the investigation three different data sources were utilised. This included data from 
the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) of young adults in Metropolitan Cape Town, South Africa. The 
second data source is the cross sectional Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of six sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries, namely Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda in East Africa; and Swaziland, Lesotho, 
and Zimbabwe from Southern Africa. The final data source consists of crime statistics for Cape Town 
from the South Africa police service (SAPS). The current concluding chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 5.1 provides a synthesis of our findings from the three stand-alone papers covered in chapter 
two, three and four. Thereafter section 5.2 gives the policy implication of our research findings and 
the final section 5.3 recommends areas for future research. 
5.1 Synopsis of the Findings 
As previously stated the aim of this thesis was to offer an economic perspective on the influence of 
social interaction on risk taking. In general, the thesis found social interaction to be significant in 
influencing risky behaviours and this appears to be the case for both men and women and in both the 














First this study moved outside the arena of current conventional individualistic empirical research that 
has explained multiple partnerships by individual level factors and has presented the influence of social 
norms and the related social pressure as equally important. We do indeed find that social norms and social 
pressure caused by social group interaction to be positive and significant in influencing risky sexual 
behaviour, in the choice of number of sex partners. The results also show that for both men and 
women choosing the number of sex partners to engage with is affected by the prevailing social norms 
and social pressure. 
Secondly, we discovered the pivotal role played by expected health and the underlying contextual health 
uncertainty in predicting the sexual risk associated with HIV infection. Surprisingly, this pattern is 
observed for both the East Africa and Southern Africa regions. This is despite of the fact that the two 
regions vary by the level of risk related to sexual behaviour where the Southern Africa region is 
deemed to be more risky than the Eastern Africa region in existing literature. The implication of this 
finding is that expected health and the associated contextual health uncertainty are instrumental in 
influencing sexual behaviour regardless of the magnitude of sexual risk taking.  
Thirdly, we find that community social disorganisation, specifically family disruption, residential instability, 
community disadvantage, lack of basic services and unemployment, creates conditions for contact crime and contact 
related crime to flourish. This is especially observed among the majority Black population group 
communities in comparison to the majority Coloured or majority White population group 
communities.  
5.2 Policy Implication 
Overall the thesis has established that social interaction matters in risk taking behaviours and thus 
should be incorporated into policies directed at changing human behaviour. 
For the reason that we fi d social interaction especially social norms have great implication for the 
‘zero new HIV infection’ vision promoted by UNAIDS, advocating for among others sexual behaviour 
change. This is because the prevailing social norms determine the number of sex partners an individual 
is likely to have. As such it becomes apparent that in order to change behaviour, especially multiple 
sexual partnerships and achieve a zero new infection rate we need to establish interventions that target 
the prevailing social norms.  
In addition our findings do offer support  for the validity of the UNAIDS ‘know your local epidemic’ 
which advocates for knowing  the contextual factors, as health and health uncertainty appear to be the 
background factors hindering change in sexual behaviours. Consequently, this study points to 
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Lastly, our results suggest that an investment  in social capital is essential at the community level, while 
improving family structures is of outmost important at the household level in curbing crimes of social 
behaviours, specifically contact crime and contact related crime. 
5.3 Areas for Future Research 
It is often argued that social norms are essential in understanding choices and variation in behaviour. 
This thesis has provided empirical evidence of how underlying social norms control the choice of 
multiple partnerships. It would be of interest to determine social norms that address other sexual risk 
taking behaviours such as social norms related to condom use or social norms related to sexual debut.  
Another contextual factor that is dominant in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region is food insecurity, 
especially given that most countries in this region are the most vulnerable to climate change. It is 
stated that climate change will lead to a decrease in food availability. It would be of interest to 
determine how this contextual factor would affect sexual risk taking. Particularly, given that research 
has highlighted that one of the reasons for transactional sex is dietary needs. The question then 
becomes how an increase in food insecurity as a contextual effect will influence sexual behaviours 
associated with HIV risk. 
The crimes of social behaviour that were included in this thesis are the contact crimes and contact related 
crimes. It would be of interest to establish how other crimes such as property crimes and policing crimes are 
influenced by prevailing social structures. However the difficulty arises as a result of the mobile nature 
of these crimes which makes it difficult to match the criminals’ place of residence to places where 
these crimes occur. Our current data sources do not permit such analysis, and these crimes where 
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